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WORK OF OTHER H~VES'l'IGATORS 
OHAPTEH I 
PREVIOUS INVESTIGATIO~S 
Th e Pecu l i ar Problem8 ~nd Di ff i cu l ti e s i n t he Cr i t ic ism 
and Int~rpretat i on of Ward ' s Continuum 
1. J ame0 Ward is a c entral fi gure o f mode rn 
Br it i s h psychology . At a time when Wi l liam J ames we .. a 
st i l l u nh ea,rd of, and wh en Bain and Sp en c er domi nated 
Br itish . t hought, Ward i n trodu ced a revoluti on i rAte 
Engl i sh p sychology . Both by t each i ng ex~. d by discussi on s 
at th ... Mora l Scienc Bs Cl u b Ws,rd r ~c onatruct ed British 
p sychology i n t e r ms o f Lot z e , He rbart, Kant, and 
Le i bn i z . A g r oup o f a rt ic l es i n Mi nd a r ou s ed 
i mm diate i nt e rest . But the spr'='ad o f W' .r cl ' s 
c onc e1·t i on was large l y du e t o hi s arti c le "Psycho ::Logy" 
f or t h e nir...th edit i on of the Encyolopaed i ~- Br i t::.-rm ic 8. . 
Willia m J ames says of t h i s arti c le , "··· i t seems t o 
me . on the whole , t h e d e::.pe s ·ti and. su bt l 13s t c ol leo·t. i v e 
vi ew of the su bject wh ich h a s appeared i n any 
The c ha:r1ge wrou gh t by this a r ticle was 
ve l'y f a r r ea ohil:,g and thor ou gh . Emp iri cal psychology 
wa s uni t ed t o a more c ot::p l ete and tho r ou gh goh:'.g met hod. i3 
l ,_,.. . nd 
l l l.L. . ' 0. s., 13 ( 1887), 183. 
2Th e Brit i sh Journal of Psycholo gy, 16 ( 1935), 3. 
Bain , a graat representat ive o f t h e o l der Br i tish 
Emp irica l School , we l c c•L1ed VJe, r r.l ' s art ic l e as a gr ·so,t 
c o:-:, t ri bution .1 He did. no t r ealiz e , howev e :;.:, how 
r evoluti onar y th~ new met hod wse . Wa r u ' s ~ sychology 
d;:;st r oy ed t h e do1n i nant psycholog1c a l atomism. 
11 
••• Br iti s h ps ycholo gy has f o r ove r a qua r tr=- r o f a 
c entu ry put off i ts mour~ ing garb f o r associ · t i on i sm . 
Pro f essor War d gave mental atomi sm i ts quietu s long 
We.1· d ' s met hod. t ended to ext end tha L1f l u enc6 
o f ernp i1· ica l psychol ogy. It s r e c ognit ion of the 
nec essit y o f a phi l osoph i cal stu dy of method and of 
ep i s t er!lolog ical r oblems br ou ght t o li gh t th e b ee..ri...:. g 
o f psychology upon philosoph y i tse l f. Without 
d oubt t h e Personal Ideal i s t s deri v ed t h e ir u lti3a t e 
i n sp i r a t:J.on fr om t he movement i nc:mgura.te CL by Wa:r'd . 
Bosanquet was f o1· san e t i1ne a disciple o f ~Yard ' s 
psycho logical method; and Br ad l ey shaped hi s own 
psycho l ogy by opposing Ward . 
Desp i te Ws.:::::·d. 1 8 g r s c-.. t L_flu ence , the r e i s v ~;ry 
little c r i t ical mat e rial writt en ab~ut hi s syst ~m . 
Ward hims t::l f thir1kS tlw;'- th i 8 i c p r;;rt l y du e to the 
f a c t t hat h i s e::-q)os i t i0!1 Wt:J.S not i r:. book f orm , but 
appaar<:::c.l as a lon g art icle i n an exp ens ive and vast 
l Mi nd , 0. S., 1.:.. (188 6 ), 47 7 . 
3The Briti sh Jour nal o f Psycho logy , 16 ( 1925), 56. 
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Th i s made it difficult f o r 
Eiany stude-nts t o obt ain . I t s i n flu enc e , how : ve r, wa.s 
f e lt by r:12.ny VlbC) did n ot knew the c·r iginal a :cticl s . 1 
0 9 o f Vard ' s students , Profe ssor G. F . St out, becams 
almos~ a s faffiouo as his t euchar, and b~tt ~ r k~awn . 
Thu s mcmy of W£i,r::i ' a the-o ri e s C C:.. i'J e t o be known i· ::. t he 
fo r~ p r e8 bnted by Prof ·ssor St out. This ml::i.y be the 
r eaaon that Ward ' a own peculiar doctrine of the contin-
uum i a not bPtt er k~own . Pro f 9sso r St out ~oe~ not 
e1:1pous e it and give it s. pormL.r expositi ·;)D. 
Mo r eover , t he exc essive condensat ion of th e 
Ency clopar.; clia c4rtic l ~~ mc::.de i t d ifficul t to unde r s tand 
and hinde red its popular i ty . The method suggest e ~ i s 
Su ggestions of t h is 
philosophical p ~riQdicals . 
thc.:tt th csr::.: p3 riodi ca l expos it i on.e we:1·e suffic i -::nt . 
He apra:c ent ly did not r ~li i"':.i h any overlB,pr i ng of his 
publi s hed mat eria l. But eve-.. thesa articlE>e a r e 
obs cu:r.· G, c~nd much mo1· e dif£j.cult t c· obtEd:r tha4 the 
The natur e of the c cE(._:·c s i t:. c,n of th·" Psychclogio<:, l 
Principl t:::.:; was no t such £1E t o r t:nlc.or th~ obs curity of 
tht: con tinu um doct rin;;; mor e c l ee,r . 3 Al l of th~ 
1Psycho l og ioal Prin cip l AB, p . vii . 
' ) 
'""'I b i d ., pp . v- vi i. 
i lnpor tc;,fL t r o.Bsags 8 VTh ich t r eat (l f th e CC•L t i •. u um, -l"r i th 
the rose i ble ~xc ept i cn o f ch<:l,pt "" r xvii, are ch i e f l y 
t r ant3cr i r t L::I! z fr om th :.1 En eye lore~ ~:;dia a r t ic 1es . 1 
Cha~t e r xvii t r eat s of the p r oblem of psychop l asm, a 
t he ccntit uum t heo ry . Althou gh t he P sycholo~ic al 
lJsycho l c·s Y, and u pon hi 8 brot:td e:r c on csrt i cr~ o f psycho logy 
c.'.s a s ci enos , it d.o e s not c cnt ri but c; much i n c:;.ddi tiN.t 
as f ar· as t he cont i.r.:.uu m p :ro b l :::m i s c on c ern <=~ cl. 
The p r oblem of th e c oLt j.r uum is l a r g e ly a p rob lem 
of Ward ' s method . It i s the J;.:robJ.em o f mo.l-:: ing 
expli.ci t hi e met he:doJ_cgi c e . l p r eeuppos i t i cr;s . ThesE~ a r e 
r ooted i1 h i s ep i 'i-lt ~n~o logy <=md genb r e.l rhiloecr:.h y . 
a..r.:.d hen c o, as a mer e p :r esur~.po s it i O ! , obscur - . Eve ry 
su ggest i c· _ \ ·h ich Wan.l hc.s r..ver mndc- a bout me t l1od mu s t 
rsychol0gi cal mmtho d . Even Ward ' s ~hi losophical 
Yi :r i t i _.gs ~;,r e obs cur e bec au s e t h -= post u lc:1, t es o f met hod 
a:c s iru l i cL r<:\ther t b: .n e.Xf' l '68Bed . Ward ras c o:r r ect 
whert h e laTI.er:. t ed t he ' holes ' r e.th e-r t hu.n t hE: f a c t t hat 
1The ar t j_c le ar.pea.1· e d v"li t h modifi.Cc\ t in: s i n t he t. ent h 
;;.,nd t he elev ent h ecl i t iu! s o f t hr.;. En eye lopakd.ie, . 
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th e.: work w~.:~s e. ' pat chwork ' •1 The Yielding o f old and 
n ew togeth e r was we ll done . He did n ot, h owever, fi ll 
i n all the on1 is s i ons i n method wh ich woulcl be n e c essary 
for an absolut e ly c or:1p lote treati s e u p on explane~to ry 
psycho l ogy. 
The f i.jw authors wh o h a v e wr itt en u pon Ward ' s 
psychology have u Gu ally not tr e~::;, t "3d. the c o ~1 c eption o f 
th e CNltinuum wi ·th e.ny full ness . Th ese writ ers h a v e 
not ma.de an at·t ,;;mr t t o det ermine th·9 met h od i r;.vo l ved ; 
but have critic iz ed Wa r d ' s vi ew upon t he bo.s i s of an 
assu med method . Most of the materia l is a critici sm 
r e.the1· than a n i Dterpr 5tation o f WE~rd 1 s c onc ept ion . 
The on l y thre<3 s i g11 ificant s.ttempta t o gr;;~.sp th ·~ 
msE<J.1ircg o f War d ' s c ontin.u um are portions of critici sms 
of hi s entir e psychologi c a l sys t em . . At t h e moat 
these cr it ic isms are v e ry short and i n c omplet . A 
stu dy of t hem , howeve r , wil l s how u s t h e nec ess ity of 
ex<.-~wi n. ing the p r 0blem more c omp l e"Gely. We sh2•l l 
c ons i der the a c cotuJ. t s o f Alexand er · B!;l.in 1 De.w·es Hicks , 
and Norman Kemp Smi th. 
Previ ou s Inve~~ igati one of Ward ' s Continuum 
2. Alexander Bain wr ot e a r evi ew of Ward ' s 
article wh en it a:J,Jr•ea.red LJ. the Encyclopc-:.ed i e. Britann ica . 
1r· . d Dl • , p . viii. 
Thi s r e vi ew a ppe<\r ed i n :M i n d as a running comment u pon 
UarQ ' s psycho l ogi c a l t heo ry. 1 Ba i n s eemed t o ha v 9 n o 
adequ a t e c onc ept i on o f t he r adical d ive r genc e o f Ward ' s 
views fr om his own . His gr eat eat error i n th e 
i nterpr etation o f War d is hi r3 f a i l ure t o app r eciate 
t hat Ward ' s subjec t i s a funct i or;al un i ty . Bain 
assmtl•2Z that WaJ.' :l ' s subj e ct mu s t b e some so r t of an 
2 obj ec t or pr esentation . Thi s assu mpt ion obs cur eG 
the whole i m:rort of t he c ~..ntinuum c o •• c erti on . Bairt 
fJ,ssumes that t he c ontinuum is Qn J.y a name f or t he u n i·cy 
vf t hought . " Now i t i s obviou s t hat ou r l ant:;-uage 
mu st provid~ f or both t he s eparat~.mess and u n ity or 
Yet my fear is 
t h'J.t 1 cent i nuum ' r .::1.ther i ncl i n .... s Ufl t oo much t o t h e 
other e xt re e . Mo r eov er , I am no t a\'ild.l'e o f any 
e rr on eou s tendenci es due t o the p r evi ou s phrasoology; 
at a ll ev& t s , I think it c ou ld be u s e d wi thout 
i mp lying any dange:rctcs amount o f i ndepend"'nc e ;;tmong 
t he t e 1·:r.l s o f ment a l succ ess i on ." 3 Ba i n i s o bvi ou s ly 
una;war~ of Ward ' s a ttempt t o dest r oy ment al a t om i sm 
by hi s do ctr i ne o f the c ontinuum. He i s l i kewi se 
unawa2:·e t hat Wa:r·d ' s c ont i nuum i s an explanation o f 
1Mi nd, 0. s., 11(1886), 457~477. 
?. 
..,I b id., 
3T'"d 
-01 • ' 461. 
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th9 origi~ o f gener ica l l y new sensati ons . That i s 
the reason th r;1. t the i mpo rt o f Ward 1 s p ecu l i B.r th eory of 
lo cal sign e escap es ·h i m. He t h i n ks that War d ' s 
theo ry i s the s~ne as Lotz e ' a . 1 He:nc e he miss:::s the 
d i a c r i mirla 0 i on . For Bain qua~Litat ively differ e tt 
sensat i ons are ult i mat e . Hi s at omi st ic lo ; ic bl i nds 
him t o all t hat cont i nuity means f or Wa r d . 
Dawes Hicks wrot s the r ev i ew o f Ward ' s 
Ps ychologi cal Princ ipl6s f or Mi nd . 2 
cri t i c &. l rttthe r than i nt e rp r et c:1,ti v e . Hicks u ses h i s 
own cri t ic:::.l :r;;c;tJ. i s m as t h e bci.s i s o f c :r i ti c L3m. He 
fran}:J.y attacks the c on t inuum c or.cep -t i cE u ::..on 
ep i 8t emolog i ca l grounds . . He con s i ders that i t i s a 
t ert ium q;u.id whi ch Wa:c d ' s r eali sm does no t wa r r.:mt . 3 
Th e cont :Lnuurn a s ph enomem.•.l s eems i n cons i s t ent li\f i t h 
Ward ' s func ti o~lal t hr~o ry of t h e S\J.b j e ct a:ad wh.::Lt Hic ks 
t akes t o be a r eal i st ic t heo r y o f t h e ob~ e c u . An 
Pr o f~aso r Hi cks does not r 2a l i ze that Ward ' s natu r al 
r ea l i sm do es not mean r ealism i n his ee~ae ~t all . I t 
i s tru e that Vl.:l.r d do e;;~ not u se t h e t erm 1 mental ' i n the 
1I bid . , 466 . 
2l;r" . ' "'J ~ Jh l LL Cl , J.', o U o) 30( 192 1 ) ' l-24 . 
3 I bid . , 7-9. 
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Ps ychol? p;j_ ca l Principles, but ·the t erm ' exper i ence ' 
i r:.s-tee..d . Prof essor Hicks clearly po i nt s ou t the 
che.nge of t e r mi nology i n one i mpo1· t ant p &ss&,ge . I n 
t h i a case the word ment a l is r emov ed amd. nothing but 
a. p r onoun and the neutra l t erm 'constituent ' are us ed 
L _ its pla ce . 1 
f rom ocoas i ons.lism; but he s ti l l adher es t o a 
ph enomenal ism. Ward ' s t heory may be untrue t o ft:wt, 
or i nc ons i s t ant with it self . Prof essor Hic ks' s 
cri t ici sm of it s de:fa ot s cloes not, howav s r, make c lear 
This r s viaw i s primar ily con cern ed with 
ep i at Jmolog ical p r oblems . Prof 9seo r Hic ks ' s 
preoccupa.t i on with the problem of cogn i ti on cau ses 
h i m t o f a i l t o r ealiz e the r eason f or a plastic 
c on.tj_nuum. Wa r d is int sr~st ed i n a self t hat moves 
as wel l a s one that kLows. Th e ego oper ates upor a 
co" ti r.~.uurn ~;•. s well ac be i r.:g awEt.r ·3 o :f it .2 Thi s mot or 
e l ement Prof essor Hic ks does not oan3 i der. 
howsver val id his critic ism, it does not make ax jlicit 
Ward ' s c omp l ete t heory o:f t he c onti -~um . 
of f a ct, it mis ses the centra l pos i tion of Ward 1 B 
theory; the anthrop omor phic ne.tur e of the 
1I' . r' 6 7 Ol U. ., , , 
2Psyoho lo ~ ical Princip l ea , pp . 20 , 21 . 
9 
int erp r ~ tati o, of the c ontinuum . i s omitted fr om 
c o::. siderat iur~ . For W&,rd knowledge is i nst rumental to 
pJ;oduct ivj_ ty . Even ep ist emology mu st rec ognize the 
r e la,t ion of k .. ~ ow ledge to experimenta,tion with reality . 
11 Exp•:< rience i s the proc ess of be c orn i ng exp er t by 
e xp e riment ... 11 , Wa.rd sa,ys . 1 This element whi ch i s 
so cen tral i n Ward ' s theory is ent ire ly omitted by 
Prof9esor Hicks . Th e r a ti onali st ic i nterpreta: i on of 
WS..l'd omits the 1nost i w:;:orta,nt c l u e to t he i r1t•;:;:rpret at ion 
o f the c on t i:nuurn . Th l;;,t is th? ree,son the,t Prof6 e.so r 
Hicks n eve r understands Ward 's theory of the growth of 
s e lf-ccmsciousni"B s . He ae~mmes that Ward mu st t hink 
t hat ther e i s a l ways awareness o f s e l f at eve ry lev e l 
of c onsciousnass . 2 
Professor Hicks's criticism is va luable as a 
posa ible r e i nterpretation o f Ward ' s psychology i n 
t a rms of critica l r ea li sm. It i s not , how'3ve r , an 
i r.d:; e rpr t=t a.ti on cmd expositi on. of Wa.rd ' s psychology in 
t e rms of Ward ' s own ep i st emo l ogy . The difficulti es 
with Warcl ' s t heory al·e to b e: f cund. fr6qu ent ly i n the 
fact that hi s method i s not mc•.de ex-p J. icit. A 
funda.nHmtal i nterpretation of Wo:>rd ' s, theory must 
make explici·t h i s anthropomorph ic method . 
1 I ' . d 2° 01· • ' p . .;J • 
2Mind, N. s ., 46(i921), 5,6. 
No r man K13tilp Si~1 i t h devotes the lar g-? r paTt of 
chapt er vi o f h i s Prolegomena to an I dE:)al i st Theor~ 
o f Knowlad;.-~e t o a statement and d i s cussion of Ward. ' s 
presentati i o-::\al c o.;. t i r:.uum. Prof essor Smi t h' s 
stc..te:ment o f th e doc t rine i s mo r e detailed them the 
s t at~ment s o f Ba i n and Hic ks . He· att em .i t s an 
expos it ion ,; t h ey did not. 
Pro f essor Smith corr ectly poi~t s out that Ward ' s 
theol'Y r e r,ts u p on t h e a ssu mpti on that s pac e i s no t a 
p ri r:n itive character i st ic of th e c onti.rmu m. 1 He i s 
also cor r ect when h e asserts t hat Ward c ons i de r s 
ext ens ity a p rope r t y o f t h e p r esent at i cmct l c cn1tinuum 
aS ~. \"h o"' e 2 J "" . , J. 1.. • But Prof essor Srn i t h does ne t understand 
t he· r ec~.t> on f or Wa:cd ' s p h enomenal ism. For Wa1·J. 
knowledge of re&.l it y is an i .t e r pret a·t i on of t he 
c ontL1uum i n t erms of t he s e lf. Prof esso r Smith 
rn i 3ses th s anthropomo r phic bas i s o f Ward ' s psychology 
and er i ate nology . We fi nd no r e f e r enc e t o th e self 
i n h is expos itio1 o f Ward ' s mean i Lg . That i s t h e 
r easo~ that h e do ~a no t see the reason f o r Wa rd ' s u se 
o f trv"' psychologica l i ndi vidua.l , 11 t:m i magins. ry 
i nd i vi c. ual •.. who has cant i nu ou sly o.dvan ced frorn th e 
begin1i~g of psych ical l ife ••. • 3 War d us es a type 
1s ru i·iih , Pro l egomena t o an I deal i s t Theo17 o f Know l edge, 
p . 105 . 
2 I b i d ., p. 10 4 . 
?: 0 Psycho l og ica l Pr incip l es , p. 7 5 . 
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o f exple.n<:~tion vvhich d ep ends u~~on t he crea-t iv•" a ctivity 
o f the self. Si~c e Professc r Smith doe s no t c onsider 
w~rd ' s t heory of the su bj ect i ~ rel ~ t i cn t o the 
c c-_.:r~tii:uun , h e does not unde r stan d the natur e of t he 
c o~~-t il:.uum it self in exp l anato ry psychology. Henc e 
War d ' s explanatory met hods ar e u nclear t o hi m. 1 
I n the d i s cuss i on of l o ce;.l signs Prof esso r Smi t h 
aesum.es t hat mathemati cal sp a c e mu s t be the gr ou nd f or 
any d i s cus s i on of lo c ati ons . 3 He do es no t appr t"1 ciate 
t he r r oblem o f g r owth wh ich is so c a r d ina l i n Ward ' s 
psycho :!_ogy . Pr o f es sor Smi th seems t o tr e a t the mind 
~\s i f it we1·e a mer e cogn it i v e i u. st rument. Th i s i s t o 
mise Ward's meani~g . Henc e Pr ofessor Smith's 
di s cuss i on is har d ly a n expos i tion of War:\. ' c: vi ew 
o f t h e conti:m um . It is r at.h e r an expos i ti.ov:, i n 
t e r ms o f Prof=s sor Smi th ' s own th ~ory, g iven t o p r ov e 
th ~ valid ity of a c ert a i.~ v iew o f s pac F> . The 
criticisn:. s o f VlarLl may h av e son:e va l idi t y; but an 
adequ a t e i te r p r etaticn of Wa:r·cl i s not g iven . 
Th s Inadequ a cy of t hese I n vsst i gat i OLS 
3. Th 6 i n v oS-.s t igs.ti on of the mf.3t=m i :-g o f Ward ' s 
c ont i r:;.uu.m wo.s n ot c <.-incluc ted i the e.bo vs c a s es i n 
op . cit., p . 9 7. 
' J ~~I bi d ., Pl=' · 103, 104 . 
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th ~ ir.t e;r· s~i t of a ful l expositi c;r, o f its mee.n i ng . 
They a r e criticim;:s , and critlclsme ·wh ich do n t:-t te!.]r.:e 
1 c c-r.-cir.unill ' i n r e latic·n t o th e h i stor ichl ue age8 of 
Th e r e<:-ison f o r WEt rcl 1 s u :;,e of the t brn 
throws light upc-n the c onc ept i uL it o .lf . It i EJ 
str L . i ng that so Btrong &. v j_tc:~J.ist e,e Wal'C shonlcl u s r~ 
s, mathem£l,ti c a1 t ~ rrr' t o d,ss:i.gnate an eesent i&.l e.spect of 
hie psychoJ.ogy . 
i 1vestigati oD of the t e rm cont i nuum , is t h inte rp r et a t i on 
of Vh:J.:cc"L 1 s psychology in the li e:_h t of his c;m throromo r phi em . 
All of thes ;:; i n vest ig8.t ic·I, a ha.ve fe,i J.ecl to int e r~· ret 
ac~ivity of the sub j e ct u pon the c1.c=<.t.um . 
- - -
This i s the 
clue , I thir.k, to be t h th e co:. til.~uum c on c c-pti cn and 
the er i etemo logy Which i s 0(llll6Ct ed With it . 
Thi s a.nth::copcn.c·r rhism is a lso t b e c l u •?. t o anoth e r 
w~rd 1 S critics h~ve 
f c r gc·tt (::n thc:•.t h e is c.t te.mr-ti..:.-. g t o c cnse.:rve t he best 
I t j_ s true 
that Prof oe ~o r Hicks h E;.S t ouched upcm thi s :po i n t; but 
h e. h e,s not cl eE:.rly disc .:: rn e::d whn.t Ward wi r;;hes t o 
c onecrv e i n He rbart 1 s theory . An i~veot igation of the 
t h eo ry of th e rresent&t i Gn i n r ~latio~ to Herbart 1 s 
t!H:;v17 o f t h •.:: Vo :rst el1u~:. ;.;~ t h r ow-· l i ght upon Vh.'i. 1:· d ' s ovvn 
o cn c ~yti on of t he psychic ob ~ ec t . 
I n o:r<le l' t o i n t e:rp r e":; WaTd ' s owr: t hE: or y of the 
c cnT. h m u.m i t wi ll be n ece·a set l'Y f or u s t o tra c e t h e 
h i sto ry of the t er m. We mu st a lso d.e t e rm ir~e t he 
out l i ~es of hi e t heo ry of knowl~dze a1d p eychologics l 
~ thod . Wi t h t h i s backgr ound we sha ll dete r~i~ ~ t he 
mee!l ll~.g of t he c cr:tt i nuum e.s e.. p r •"':f;;Gr;t a t i or .. t o ~ n 
exp&r i ~D c ing s elf o r sub j ect . Th i s wi l l ma ke c lesr 
t hE:l <1r_th:copomo r ph ic a s pec t of oogn i t i c·n . It wil l ed .so 
m~ke c l ea r t h6 r ea8cn a wh i ch u nde r l i e Ward ' s 
post u l a t es of met hod . We now t urn t o the hi sto ry of 
the oontir uum con c ep~l Gn . 
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AN I NTRODUCTORY ORIENTATION 
CHAPTER II 
HISTORY OF THE CONTINUUM THEORY 
Pythagorean and Eleatic Conceptions 
1. The history of the continuum theory is almost 
entirely the history of a mathematical conc eption. 
In all of the great philosophies the problem of the 
continuous seems to have centered itself about 
mathematical discussions. Even in the case of 
Aristotle, the continuum is expres sed in a mathematical 
manner; and we may ultimately find that Ward derived 
his first conception of it from some form of the 
mathematical theory. Hence a knowledge of the 
mathematical usages of the term may bring some clarity 
into our problem. 
The first significant theory of the continuous 
arose among the Pythagoreans. They conceived the 
universe itself as composed of numbers. 1 Geometry 
was made arithmetic by means of a simple theory of 
lines as composed of points. The point was a n:uni t 
having position".a such a theory of absolute units 
was dep endent upon a numerical theory of proportions. 
1Arist. Metaph. A. 5, 985 b 2·3. 
2 Taylor, E. R. E., vol. iv, p. 90. 
The discovery of irrational numbers would then have 
proven fatal to such a scheme. That may be the 
reason that this discovery was kept a secret by the 
Pythagoreana.l 
But, apart from the discovery of irrational 
numbers, Zeno'e arguments alone would have destroyed 
the Pythagorean theory of continuity. He showed that 
no infinitesimal reached by division of a line would 
ever reveal a unit without magnitude; and if it were 
reached as a point, or magnitude-lees position, it 
would be z:ero magnitude. But no number of ~ero 
magnitudes added together would produce a finite unit 
of magnitude. 3 This reductio ad absurdum of the 
numerical theory of continuity was the negative proof 
of the theory of the continuous as the basis of number. 
It would seem that some modern mathematical logicians3: 
go too far in making Zeno the precursor of 
Weierstrass's theory of the calculus without 
infinit~simals. 4 More probably, Zeno was only 
interested in the necessary primacy of the continuous, 
and in what he thought to be the imaginative charact er 
~eath, Greek Mathematics., vel. 1, pp. 154,155 • 
.3 Taylor, E. R. E. iv p. 91. 
3Bertrand Russell, The Principles of Mathematics, 
vol. i, pp. 347,348. 
~eath, op. cit~, vol. i, zq4. 
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of all divisions of the continuous. 
Platonic and Aristotelian Conceptions 
2. Plato was abreast of the mathematical knowledge 
of hie day. He inherited -the number theory of the 
Pythagoreans, and the paradoxes of Zeno as well. He 
appears to have attempted a construction of these 
theories of mathematics into one system. Prof. A. E. 
Taylor thinks that we can infer a numerical theory of 
the continuous from the dialogues. 1 Sir Thomas Heath, 
however, calla attention to the fact that the passages 
to which Prof. Taylor r efers deal with a mystic use of 
numbers.a Plato may have held that numbers were an 
explanation of the continuous; but this is not clear. 
He more probably never assimilated the diverse branches 
of mathematics into one science. 
Aristotle's theory of the continuum ·is more lucid, 
even if not so satisfactory as Plato's. He held that 
it could not be made up of indivisible parts. The 
continuous is that in which the limit or boundary of 
any two consecutive pS~.rts is not two, but one; and 
these adjacent parts always rema.in together. The 
infinite or unlimit ed only exists potentially, and not 
lTaylor, op. cit., vol. iv, 9a. 
z: Heath, op. cit., vol. i, 305. 
16 
in actuality. n·rn no other sense does the infinite 
exist but only in the sense just mentioned, that is 
potentially and by way of diminution. 111 Likewise, 
the continuous does not exist of ultimate, indivisible 
unite, but is divisible ad infinitum. 2 Infiniteeima le 
are arbitrary unite, chosen for approximat e demonstration, 
but they do not furnish us ultimates out of which the 
continuous is constructed. This gives the criterion 
of the continuous: "it seems that every continuum may 
be divided in parts which may also be divided ad 
infinitum. 113 By means of this conception of the 
continuous, Aristotle attempted to avoid the paradoxes 
which Zeno revealed within the Pythagorean syst em . 
"He solved the paradox of passing through an infinite 
number of space-pointe in a finite time by means of 
the new paradox, that within a finite number of time-
segments infinitely small lapse may be assumed. 
There is for him no real infinit e in the stringent 
sense of· a disconnected i nfinit e where greater or less 
is not poss ible. 114 
lHeath, op. cit., vel. 1, _ p. 343. 
2 II , Eisler, Worterbuch, VO.L. i, p. 432. 
3 . . 1 Phye. v. 3, 231 b 6 sq. 
4cantor, Geschichte der Mathematik, vol. i , p. 191. 
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Lei bniz.ian Concept i on 
3 . There was no essential variation from 
Aristotle's concept ion of cont.inui ty unt i 1 Lei bniz·. 
Even Descartes' Geometrie accepted the Aristotelian 
position. Leibniz 1 s attempts to solve the problem 
are int eresting because of his stress upon the 
fundamental principle of continuity as the cardinal 
pr esupposition of all order. 1 
An app licat i on of r eason t o the concept of motion 
brought the problem of the continuous into sharp 
f ocus. For Leibn iz, knowledge is a deductive s yst em 
der ived from fir s t principles. Sense-know l edge 
confu s edly symbolizes reason, but the meaning of sense 
can only be made man i fes t through the "'natura l l i ght 11 
of t he i nt e llect. Firs t principles can never be 
obtained by an analysis of sense percept ion , becaus e 
such an analysis would be infinite; but the logical 
pri ncip l es are given i n the i ntellect, and may then be 
found embodied in perception.a 
Leibniz's most comp l et e exposition of the 
applicat ion of r eason to the problem of t he cont i nu ous 
is to be found i n a dia logue , Pacidius Philalethi, 3 
l Math., vo l . vi, p . 129. 
2Fouche r de Careil, B., pp. 182,181; Phil., vii, p. 309; 
Monadology, s ections 31-37. 
3couturat, Opu scules et Fragments inedit s de Leibniz, 
PP. 594-627. 
l e 
which deals with the problem of motion. The question 
is raised whether the moment at which a man dies 
should be considered as simultaneously the last moment 
of life and the first moment of death. If the same 
moment be both life and death, this would be in 
accordanc e with Aristot le 's con c eption of the 
continuous, but it violates the law of contradiction . 
It would then seem that a change of state or of 
position in space in two adjacent pointe of time is a 
jump from position to position. In the case of a 
body moving i n space, the trans lation from one place 
to another would be a line of motion which is an 
aggregate of indivisibl e points. But thi s is absurd, 
for "the number of points in the side of a square is 
infin it ~, and , since we can draw one and only one 
parallel from any point in the diagonal to a given 
side, and since this parallel cuts two of the sides of 
the square in determinat e pointe, the diagonal will 
contain the same number of points as the side, and 
will therefore be equal to it.n 1 Henc e the line 
cannot be an infinite aggregate of points, sinc e the 
number of points would be the number of all numbers, 
which is absurd. Thus the unit taken, however small, 
must have length. The theory that motion is r est and 
1Taylor, op. cit., vol. iv, p. 96. 
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movement int erspersed is not a solution, since 
movement, even alt ernated by periods of r es t, is still 
movement. As the so l ution of the problem, Lei bniz 
proposes a theory of infin itesimals, but infini tesimala 
that have magnitude. Motion is composed of incr ementa, 
but each increment has magnitude , and may itself be 
divided ad infinitum. 1 A line is composed of many 
lines, each having its own continuity. 
phenomena l continuity. 
This is 
Leibniz. thinks that the law of the cont i nuous has 
universal app lication. He states it in very broad 
t erms as the principle of the order of the un iverse: 
ttNature makes no leaps." The r e lation of the monads 
i s supposed to be a fulfilment of this principle , 
since ther e is no gap. bet we en them when they a re 
ranged i n ascending order, or even when they are 
r elated i n nature .a The monads have no extens ity and 
are absolut e ly discrete. The continuity between them, 
t hen , is that of a we l l-ordered s eries . This is the 
metaphysical continuity. Thus we find two 
conceptions of the app lication of the principle of 
continuity: (1) the continuum as a series, and (2) the 
continuum as an extensity which implies any number of 
1Gerh., vol. ii, p. 77. 
2Haupteohrift en zur Grundlegung der Philosophie , 
ftbersetzt von A. Buchenau, vol. ii, pp. 556 ff. 
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increment s , ea.ch having magnitude. The principle of 
continuity seems to be Leibni~'s cardinal law of 
order. However, his two applications of the principle 
leave a breach in his system, a gap between phenomenal · 
and noumenal continuity. This breach itself is a 
violation of the principle of cont inuity. It is no 
wonder that Le ibn iz spoke of it as rtlabyrinthua de 
cornpoei tiona cont inui 11' • 1 
Kantian Conception 
4. There are peculiar ambiguities in Kant's 
treatment of the notion of continuity. He was not 
very familiar with the mathematical writings of 
Lei bniz·, and received from hie contempora.ri ea a 
confuaed conception of the relation of geometry and the 
numerical theory. The t endency of the eighteenth 
century was to treat the two sciences as disjunct. 
Hence, . when Kant attempted to give a philosophy of 
mathematics with some internal coherenc e of tha 
differ ent mathematical disciplines , the r esult was a 
vacil l ation from one point of vi ew to another. The 
traditional logic did not help Kant in thi s r espect, aa 
it gave him a fa l s e conc eption of concepts and formal 
relations. 
1 Gerh., vol. vi, p. 65. 
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In the Transcendental Aesthetic .Kant seems quite 
consistently to hold the position formulated in the 
Ina.ugu.ral . Disserta.tion, 1 that apace and time, a.s types 
of continua, are wholes whose parts are subsequent to 
the totality; and hence the continuity ia not an 
aggregate. This was clearly the traditional doctrine. 
But in the Schematism of the Pure Concepts of the 
Understanding, where Kant treats the problem of number 
in relation .to i ntuition, there is a. double position 
taken. The position taken i n the Transcendental 
Aesthetic is replaced by one more consistent with the 
doctrine of synthetic judgments. Intuition is made 
synthetic, i.e. a synthesis of sensations. "'AS the 
pure intuition in all phenomena is either time or 
space, so is every phenomenon in its character of 
intuition an extensive quantity, inasmuch as it can 
only be cognized i n our apprehension by successive 
synthesis (from part to part). All phenomena are, 
accordingly, intuited as an aggregate (col lection) of 
previously given parts; which is not the case with 
every sort of quantities, but only with those which are 
<::)) 
r epresented and app rehended by us as extensive. ".Q; 
lHartenstein, vel. ii, pp. 406 ff. 
2K. d .• r. V., A 163, B 2.03. 
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Only a few pages later, Kant assumes that the continuous 
is the ground of the manifold, rather than an aggregat e 
made by the synthesis of the manifold. 
property of quantities, according to which no part of 
them is the smallest possible (no part simple), is 
called their continuity. Space and time are quanta 
continua, because no part of them can be given without 
i nclos ing it within boundaries (points and moments); 
consequently, this given part is itself a apace or a 
time." 1 Kant seems to have be en puzzled, as were 
the ancients, by the problem of the appl ication of 
number to qua.."l.ti ty. Probably he held to the primacy 
of the cardinal numbers in conception. If so, the 
disjunction which he made between sense and 
understanding would constrain him to make the ordinal 
system of numbers an aggregate of discrete concepts. 
Hence the schematiciam vacillat es when number is 
applied to intuition. There is firs t an attempt to 
reconstruct the doctrine of intuition, then a return to 
the Aristotelian view. 
Modern Conception 
5. In the latter part of the nineteenth century, 
a new school of. mathema~ ics appeared, which now exists 
1Ibid., A 169, B 210:. (Meiklejohn' a translation) 
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as a dominant school along with the older theories. 
A careful study of the logical nature of number was 
made. New developments were made in formal logic 
showing ita relations to mathematics. A logical 
calculus helped in the elaboration of the technic of 
investigation. The "new mathematicians" devised a 
n ew theory of orde r which depended upon irrational 
numbers, the very numbers which had been a stumbling-
block to the Greeks. This furnished a new theory of 
aggregates as well. With the new conception of 
irrational fracti ons, it was discovered that there was 
no break between numbers in an ordered aeries, although 
the aeries itse lf was in a real sense an aggregate. 
With this basic conception, it was possible to deve lop 
geometry in t erms of number, rather than of an intuited 
apace. In other words, geometry was made conceptual, 
and intuition merely an ill ustration. In this sense 
the new mathematics fulfils Leibniz'a dream, but 
destroys the logical foundations of his theory of 
psychic monads with an inner life which is not a s eries. 1 
Mathematical continuity is made absolut e ly conceptual, 
just as Lei bniz: desired it to be. It is a matt er of 
abstract r eason apart from all spatial perception. 
But the continuity of spatial perception is left 
unexplained, and thus continuity itself is violated. 
1couturat, Lee Principes des Mathemat iques, ch. i v. 
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CHAPTER III 
WARD'S THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE 
The Theory of Knowledge and Psychology 
1. Ward borrowed the principle of continuity from 
Leibniz. Thia he explicitly affirms. 1 He does not 
us e it, however, in a Leibnizian fashion. He differs 
i n his conception of the knowing process, both in 
itself and as relat ed to concJ:ete human experience • . 
For Leibniz the mind is primarily an organ of 
knowledge. 2 Reason is an end i n itself, By abstract 
pr i nciples of pure knowledge the knowing mind appre-
hends the et ernally real. 
For Ward the mind is primarily volitional. 
Volition is central for both the theory of mind and 
the theory of knowledge. This appears even in Ward's 
earlier writings. At first he tried . to reconcile his 
volitional psychology with an epistemology that bore 
traces of Neo-Kantianiem. 3 He attempted to make 
epistemologica l problema comp letely independent of 
1Realm of Ends, p. 20. 
2
of course the monads are conative, but the conative 
element is never explicitly developed epistemolog-
ically. If developed, it would have destroyed 
Leibniz's rationalism. · 
3Mind 0. S. 8(1883), 167-68 . 
psychology. But by 18901. h e seems to have been 
comm itted thoroughly to the conception that theory is 
related to volition. Theory has its root in practi-
cal interest rather than mere curiosity, as Aristotle 
thought. "It is often alleged," he .says, "as a 
grievous short-coming of Locke, that he is content to 
say our knowledge is sufficient for our p ractica l 
needs. For my part, I venture to think that his fault 
lay not eo much in the principle he here assumed, viz., 
that knowledge is subordinate to p ractice: it lay 
rather in hie ignoring the fact that our knowledge is, 
after all, not sufficient for our practica l needs. n2 
However, this assumption that the original root of 
knowledge is practical does not mean that Ward repu-
diates theoretical knowledge or its validity. His 
r eaction is against the assumption that the logical 
int erest is purely autonomous. Hie contention is 
that it is derivative and, when considered in relation 
to concrete exp erience, subservient to practice. 
That does not mean that theory is true because it is 
3 useful; rather it is useful because it is true. 
The validity of theory is basic for science and 
scientific philosophy. Ward even contends that Fichte 
is wrong when he asserts: "Tell me of wha t sort a man 
1M1nd o. s. 15( 1890)' 232. 
2Mind o. s. 15(1890), 232. 
3Psychological Principles, p. 416. 
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is, and I will tell you what philosophy he will 
choose. 111 The practical interests do cause mankind 
to search for truth, and truth is useful; but useful 
because it is truth, and not truth because of ita 
usefulness. There is a sense in which Ward agrees 
with Fichte, as we shall see later, but not in relation 
to scientific theory or scientific philosophy. 
This conception of truth does not deny the 
anthropomorphic character of knowledge. To be sure, 
Ward does believe in existential or thetic propositions 
which assert mere matter of fact. But such absolute 
propositions only assert sense-data, appearances to 
the individual; and hence, although in one sense 
abaolute, 3 they are absolute only for subjective 
II 
knowledge and not for Bewtisstsein uberhaupt. But 
knowledge that deals with relations and not mere 
matters of fact involves fundaments. relationum. 2 
These fundaments. of the higher levels of knowledge 
are certain aspects of self-consciousness. The 
relations of cause and effect, substance and attribut e, 
means and end, all have their fundaments. in certain 
analogies drawn from the nature of self-consoiousness. 3 
Self-consciousness gives the key to the meaning of 
1Mind o. s. 15(1890), 2.29. 
2' Mind N. S. 38(1919), 258ff. 
3Psychological Principles, p. 334. 
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t he higher cat~gor i e a. Bene , al l ¥ .. n owledge i s 
anthromorphic i n che.re.ct ·:· r: s ense- knowledge, bece.use 
it is phen omena l or subj ective; sci entific1 an d 
metaphysica.l know l edges , 2 becau se t hey ar e grounded in 
a na l cgi ea based u pon s e lf-consciousness . 
I t s eems t o ha v e taken Wa r d. sonie t ime t o r ealize 
t hu.t thi s cor.:.c epti on of knowl ed.g e would ultima tely 
char ge hi s theory of the relati on of psycho l ogy a nd 
ep i s t emology . His ea1·li 8r theory that psycho : ogy can. 
n ot throw light u::,on th e ep i s temolog ical qu es tion s of 
t he ori g in and limit s of k:now ledge3 was c l ee.r l y 
inconsist ~nt with h ie theory of ~he na t ur e of thought. 
Thi s radica,l Kantie:mism seems t o have be~n changed by 
sturtlp f ' s article , "Psycholog i e und Erkenntnistheori e". 4 
Stump f care fully examine s Kant ' s theory of kn <)Yvle.ci.ge 
and shows that i t contains a gr es.t de c-, 1 of p sychology 
anu tha t not of the bes t sort . He th en critical~y 
t est s th e hypothe E;is that a thesis true i n peycholcgy 
r~ia.y b e fa.ls e i n ep i s t ernology, emd d emonstre.t e8 th e 
hope l ess i mp e,,ssA i nt o which i t l eads. Thu s i t s e ems 
r.:.ec es ea.ry to r e cogniz e "that noth i r .g can be tru e in 
l Naturalism a.nd Agno stici sm , pp. 527 ff. 
2p , ~ . 1 'D • • , '"' 7 4 s ycno J.Og lCc.-L .. .~.rlnCll · .LeB , p . 00 • 
3M· ·; 0 ~ l1CI. ; • s ., 8(188 3) , 167-68. 
4Abhand l . de r baye r. Akad ., 1881 . 
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epistemology that is false in psychology. "'l The 
facts about the origin and nature of knowledge, as 
psychology discovers them, are valid for epistemology. 
In thi~ sense epistemology is dependent upon 
psychology. This position of Stumpf, Ward adopted. 
Ward recogniz,es that n·there is a vast deal of 
truth in epistemology that is beyond the province of 
psychology to quest ion •.• "a ~This can only mean that 
as regards the main question, quid juris, there is --
or rather, should be -- no appeal to psychology; and 
that for the simple reason that the preliminary 
question, quid facti is or should be already settled."3 
Psychology as a science of fact is, of course, not a 
theory of validity; but validity ia dependent upon 
psychological fact. That means that, in the end, 
epistemology is anthropomorphic since it is root ed in 
the soil of anthropomorphic fact and estin~tes 
anthropomorphic validity. It is the science of the 
validity of a certain expression of human purpose, 
which proves 11 to be not logomorphic -- to coin a word 
but anthropomorphic , not a logical form but a 
subjective 1 analogy 111 • 4 For Ward that epistemology 
1 Psychologie und Erkenntniatheorie, Offprint, p. 18. 
2Psychological Principles, p. 433 (foot-note 1.) 
3A Study of Kant, p. 58. 
4Ibid. I p. 87. 
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which &aaumee the 11' logomorphic"' concept ion of knowledge, 
is unt1~e to the psychology of knowledge, and hence 
is false. 
But although anthropomorphic, all thought is not 
by necessity epistemologically subjective. It is 
anthropomorphic in the sense that it is either 
phenomenal or an elaboration by analogy from the 
meaning of the subject and the subject's reality; but 
it is over-individual in the sense that it acquaints 
him with meanings that transcend his life. 
The Theory of Knowledge and Logic 
2. Ward does not use the term logic, as do the 
absolute idealists, to denote the whole realm of 
knowledge. The term epistemology is used for that 
broad purpose.l Logic has for him a restricted 
meaning. It is used only in application to "thought-
knowledge". Epistemology treats of the nature of 
both "thought-knowledge" and "sense-knowledge". This 
distinction, viz· .• betwe en thought-knowledge and sense-
knowledge, is significant for Ward's entire theory of 
psychology, and of the continuum in particular. 
Quite obviously, this distinction is derived from 
1Mind 28(1919), 259; 450. (Logical contradiction is 
here contrasted with other more simple types of 
contradiction which epistemology recognizes.) 
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Kant. Ward considers that "the failure adequately to 
recognize this distinction was notoriously a defect of 
the English psychologists, especially of Hume and the 
eo-called Aeeociationists. 111 But there was truth in 
the English psychology: it did not make thought and 
sense completely disjunct. Kant maintained that 
sense was purely passive and understanding purely 
active. But there is at least the activity of 
attention in sense as well as understanding. "Nor 
can we well maintain that the presentations of sense 
and understanding differ altogether in kind; albeit 
such a view has been held from Plato downwards.n 2 
In other words, there is no sharp line between the 
two. There is a continuity between them. This 
continuity does not reduce thinking to a special kind 
of perception as the Associationalists thought. It 
only makes the differentia more problematic. ward 
gives a broad characterization of intelligence "as 
solving a problem -- finding an ~ that is b •••• 
Hence far the aptest and in fact the oldest descrip-
tion of such thought is that it is discursive." 3 
By sense-knowledge we are to understand trthe 
simplest stat ements that express only what is sensibly 
1A Study of Kant, p. 30 (foot-note a.) 
2Psychological Principles, p. 293. 
3Ibid., p. 295. 
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apprehended. 111 Of course, such knowledge may take 
the form of p-ropositions, and. propositions are a form 
of knowledge that belongs to a standpoint aibave that 
of mere sense-knowledge. But such propositions do 
express a knowledge that is mere "sensory awareness 
or 'simple apprehension', as euch.•2 The 'simple 
apprehension' of mere matter of sense fact is sense-
knowledge. Thought-knowledge is the explicit work 
of intellection. Although "'it involves a certain 
elaboration of sensory and motor presentations and has 
no content apart from these11 , 3 yet it is much more; it 
involves "free ideas" or concepts which are not 
present awareness but n·a. search for something more or 
less vaguely preconceived ••• , a clue which will be 
known when it ie found by helping to satisfy certain 
condi tiona. 114 This "clue" is "free" in eo far as it 
is not dependent upon present perception and may be 
manipulated in order to solve problems without 
changing the sense order. 
The relation of the concept to the real is a 
very vital question in Ward's epistemology where 
lMind 28(1919), 258. 
2 Ibid., 257. 
3 Psycho l ogical Principles, p. 293. 
4Ibid., p. 294. 
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sense-knowledge and thought-knowledge are thus 
differentiated. The language of much of The Realm 
of Ends and Naturalism and Agnosticism would lead the 
reader to suppose that Ward assumes that all concepts 
or n·free ideas" are but abstract schemata of the 
concret e real. "What then, 11 he asks, 117 ie left out 
of this abstract or empty time? Paradoxical though 
it appear, what is left out, we shall find, are the 
mutually implicated facts of duration and change.n1 
"The apace of the geometers ••• is indeed the work of 
the mind, has ideality and validity, but not reality; 
but also it is based upon concret e experiences ••• "2 
Ward's theory of the continuity of sense and under-
standing seems to justify the assumption that he 
regards all concepts as abstract. 
It is true, to be sure, that although abstract, 
the concepts of apace and time are not ttmerely 
perceptual time and space with only the filling l eft 
out. Perceptual time is not uniform and perceptual 
apace has not three homogeneous dimensions: nor is 
either indefinitely extended or indefinitely 
divisible. 1113 Conceptual space and time are not mere 
abstractions: they are tt r·creative', archetyp:al, 
1The Realm of Ends, p. 305. 
2Nat~ralism and Agnosticism, p. 438. 
3
-Psychological Princip les, p. 319. 
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constructive.tt n· ••• We apply them to the real world, 
but they do not belong there. The existence or non-
existence of that is no affair of theirs.tt 1 Despite 
the fact then that these concepts are not mere 
abstractions, they do not furnish us with the real. 
And this is true, not only of the concepts of space 
and time, but also of the notions of mathematics, and 
the laws of formal logic. Of course descriptive 
concepts are abstract because of their generic 
character. It seems, then, that the concept is for 
Ward an abstract schema. 
However, such a conclusion would be hasty. 
There are concepts which Ward does consider as 
furnishing us with a knowledge of the concrete . It 
is unfortunate that the two types of concepts a r e 
never contrasted as such. The assumption is latent 
in all the discussions of the schemata, and is made 
explicit in the radical diffe r ence between phenomenal 
and noumenal knowledge. 2 The real concepts are 
interpretations of perception in terms of self-
consciousness. In self-consciousness we have 
knowledge of ·ourselves as real; and by means of this 
concrete knowledge the ultimat e real is analogically 
known. 
1Proc. Ar. Soc. ( 1919-20), 4. 
2The Realm of Ends, pp. 300' ff. 
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Th er e i s no abso lut e discont inuity betwe·~ :!:'l these 
abstr&ct conc ept s and the c onc ept s of the r ea l . 
Self-consciou sn ess involves cert a in aspect s of aense-
:perc ~pti on . Sen:ae- per cerJt i on i s thus ~he basis of 
the ge~ et ic continuity between the s e t wo d ifferent 
typas of conc epts. The very continuity between t hem, 
however, brings u s ba ck t u the princi l e of cont i nui t y. 
The Principle of Continuity 
3 • .A lthough Wa1·d con stant ly appec-.. l s to thi s 
princip l e of continuity which h e bor rowed. fr om 
Lei bniz, 1 yet, strangely enou gh , h e n ever explicitly 
explain s it a plac ~ in hi s theory of know l edge . 
Clues , however, a r e not l acking, and fr o-a1 these i t may 
be poss ible to det e rmin~ i ts s i gnificanc e . 
\'ard does no t apply the princip l e i n t he 
thor oughgo ing fashion of Le ~ bni z . Th e limit s of 
ap ·lica ti on a r e dependent upon experi ence . " I n 
deali n g with r eal t hings ou r app r oach to the limit e 
can never be mor e than a symptot i c : we can atta in 
neith ·r to t he infinitas i mal nor t o thb infini te . 
Th e principle o f continui t y then gives u s no tit le to 
infer from the dist incti on reached by analysi s to the 
separ~1.te exi st enc e of the fact or s analyz ed. Only 
1 m_'n e R l f E d "'0 '  _ ~a m o !..n a , p • o • 
experience can justify such a separation. n:l Such 
limitation of application would not prevent it from 
being a formal law of thought since Ward so limite the 
laws of thought. However, he does not include it in 
hie list of formal categories or mention it as a law 
of synthesis. 2 
Even if we did not have Ward's list of categories 
at hand, we should be forced to consider the principle 
of continuity, in a different light from the categories. 
It is not a form of synthesis,~ but a presupposition 
of the categories which may be developed into a 
methodological principle. It is the factual 
prerequisite of all knowledg.e -- even sense-knowledge 
in eo far as it is noetic -- and hence is an empirical 
presupposition as well as a methodological principle. 
"That ••• absolute diversity-- or disparateness, as we 
may call it -- affords no ground for relations becomes 
evident when we consider (1) that, if we had only a 
plurality of presentations absolutely different, we 
should have in this sense no consciousness at all; 
and (2) that we never compar.e -- although we 
distinguish -- presentations which seem absolutely or 
totally disparate ••• n 3· The nature of knowledge 
1Peychol?gical Principles, p. 442 (foot-note 3). 
2Ibid., pp. 318-346 . 
3 r b · ' -z30 J. O. . ' p . u • 
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dems.r.d.o that th er--:. be. no lt::tar be:"twe ~n t he two re :.at a . 
This is t <.-tntt1.ncunt ass "rt i.n;; thr:vr. we nay o~. ly mc v e 
frcm the m~r e b1o n to the le s kn wn by int~rpr~~ing 
t::-1 . l~.::s knc\wn i n terms o f tha ore known , "in Be.con i a.n 
fashion ' pe r 6Calan aecensoriam, 1 through ax i ometa 
Oth 3r vv-ise a dvance o f empirice,l knowl~ .ge 
Thus t:lv~ fE<..ct of knowledg"'~ and 
th ·· CJ,rlvc-;..n c t< o f 1:now1edge as 4 un:e al ike th.::. pr i ncj.ple of 
re~ li~ y it is a postulate of the rati nality of 
ex;~rie~c~: an axiom of the poss i bi~ity ~f exp l anation . 
He··~cP. it i s rightly t erlied "he rrL.~.c iple c f con t2.Euity . 
lprr r> A.,. \,.! ........ .. • S ( 10 ~ 0 ':>Q ) ,., C· O, ._. J.. .... ' - '-' , 0 . 
CHAPTER IV 
WARD'S PSYCHOLOGICAL METHOD 
The Standpoint of Psychology as Individualistic 
1. To understand Ward's application of the 
pr inciple of continuity to the problems of psychology, 
it is necessary to appreciate hie psychological method. 
The principle ie applied to the . general method as well 
as to the specific problems of psychology. Ward 
thinks that psychology is not an abstract science in 
the sense that it deals only with a part of experience. 
Nor is it abst ract in the sense that it disregards 
significant aspects of concrete experience. Hence it 
is not schematic, archetypal, or reg~lative, in the 
sense that geometry and l ogic are . It is an empirical 
science wh ich deale with experience as fact. 1 
Since peycholOgy1 in some sense, deals with 
experience as a whole, it can hardly "be defined by 
reference to a special subject-matt er as such concret e 
sciences, for example, as mineralogy and botany can 
be ••. " 1 If it is to be charact er ized at all, it must 
be de fined by its standpoint. Ward suggests that it s 
1Psychological Principles, p. 26. 
standpo int is 'individua l i s tic', but car efully guards 
hi e stat ement to prevent mi sunderstanding. 
Psychology is not mere biography, particularly 
biography that is purely subj ect ive and in essence 
incommun icable . It is purely universa listic in the 
sense that it s judgment s belong to Bewussts e in_ 
uberhaupt and are not epistemologica lly subjective. 
Th ey are judgments true for all. But p sychology i s 
individualistic i n the sense that i t deals with 
experi ence as rtsomeone ' a experience"·, be that someone 
man or mere amoeba. Psychology never abstract s from 
the fact 
--
a.e Ward deems it 
--
that experience is 
possessed by someone experiencing. 1 The so-called 
objective or natural sciences , according to him, 
abstract from this element of experience. Since 
these sciences are i nterest ed in certain aspect s of 
experience alone, they treat the se aspects as if they 
exist ed by themse lves , and do not conside r the f act 
that they are a lways objects of someone'e experience. 2 
Ward's i s the same standpoint as tha t from which 
Locke and Berkeley app roached psychology. "Of all 
the facts with which he deals, the psychologist may 
truly say that the ir ~ is percipi, in so far as 
lrbid., p . 35. 
zrbid., p. a-6. 
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su.ch facts are facts of presentation, are ideas in 
Locke's sense, or objects which imply a subject."·1 
However, Ward does not acc ept Locke and Berkeley's 
theory of the nature of the perceived objects, either 
in r elation to each other or i n relation to the world 
of reality. In f act he repudiat es the association-
alist 1 theory of the relation of psychic objects, and 
the Cartesian theory of subjective modifications. 2 
In his article, Psychology, contained in the ninth 
edition of the Encyclopaedia Britannica, Ward did 
espouse the theory of subj ective modifications. 3 It 
was a heritage from the Cart es ian dualism which shaped 
Locke and Berkeley. However, Reid's careful criticism 
of Descartes• theory of ideas seems to have changed 
Ward's conception. 11 What Reid. meant to say was: --
In perception we are not conscious of ideas in us, but 
we affirm objects present to us. 114 Ward thinks that 
the theory of subjective modifications arose fro m the 
crude psychophysical standpoin t that charact eriz es the 
thinking of common..:sense, and of the older psychology. 
•tin to the man's head the whole world goes, inc l uding 
1Ibid., p. 27. 
aNaturalism and Agnostic ism, pp . 405,406; 
Psychological Principles , p. 27. 
3Encyclopa dia Britannica, 9th ed., vol. xx, p. 38 b. 
4psychological Princip les , p. 18. 
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the head itself. Such thoroughgo ing 'introject i on ' 
affords no ground for subsequent 'projection. 1 nl 
Subjective modificGtion is only meaningful as a 
metaphor drawn from the psychophysical standpoint. 
But if the psychological~ rather than the psycho-
physical , standpoint is most bas ic~ then ther e i s no 
warrant for the theory of subjective modifications. 
Clearly, l:aubj ective modification' should mean that the 
exper i ent who has the experi enc e i s modifi ed. But 
perceptions are not modificat ions of the experient~ 
but of the experient'e perc eptions. Th ese 
perceptions are for individual exper ienc e some aspect 
of the r eal world. This is demanded by the primacy 
of the psychological standpoint over th& psycho-
physical, and also by the necessity of avoiding the 
epistemological dil emmas produced by subjective 
i deal i sm. If the psychophysical position were the 
funda-~.menta l one ~ then the theory of subj e1ct i ve 
modi ficatiOnS WOUld be the Only pOSSible One . II:But 
what i n t hat event would become of ep istemology is 
not eas y to say. 11 2 Exper i ence , then , is not caused. 
It i s that with which psychology must deal as ultimate. 
But although it cannot be consider ed as caused 
lrbid. ~ p. 103. 




by something t~1de of it, yet experience ne eds 
exp lanat ion if we are to understand its meaning. 
Psychological _Explanation 
a. Ward lays great s~ress upon the met hod of 
psychological explanation . It s central i mportance 
he r epeatedly affirms. 1 As we have just s een , he 
r e jects a causal explanat ion of experi ence from outside 
itself. Cause lies within experi ence . That means 
that exper i ence must be apprehended from wi th i n if ita 
compl ete meaning is to be apprehended . Experi ence is 
concrete only for t he experiencing individual himself. 
We know only our own exper ienc e , and must i n f er that 
of sub-human beings. We have already seen that Ward 
holds that the princip le of continuity, the basic 
pr inc i p l e of methodology, demands that we pr ocet:d from 
the more known t o the l ess known, explaining the 
latter by means of ita r e lations to the former. Thus 
human exper i ence becomes the bas is for comparative 
and genet ic psychol ogy. By means of human psychology 
animal psychology may be underst ood. "Lower f orms 
of exp erience, notwiths tanding their great er 
simplicity, we know lat er and know les s ." 2 
l Ibid., pp. 24-26. 
2 Ibid. , p. 25. 
It would 
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be a violation of the principle of continui ty to begin 
with a mere biology of the protozoa and advance to the 
level of man, passing gradually from biology proper 
to psychology proper. This is indeed an attempt to 
apply t he principle of continuity, but one which does 
not realiz:e the direction in which explanation must 
move. "If it be a sound maxim to proceed from the 
known to the unlmown, then Analytic Psychology, 
s t arting from human experience should p r ecede any 
att ·3mpt to treat the genesis of exp erience a s a whole, 
or to corre lat e psychology with physiology.rrl 
Ward emphasizes an Analytic Psychology of human 
experi ence as the first desideratum of psychic 
exp lanation. In this he follows Herba.rt. 3 We have 
seen why Ward contends that psychology should begin 
with human experience; but we have not s e en why it 
should be analytic. The problem will be made clear er 
if we notic e one fact, which Ward mentions but never 
sufficiently stres ses: the difference between 
psychological and psychical analysis. "By psycho-
logical analysis we mean such analysis as the psycho-
logical observer can reflectively make, by psychical 
analysis only such analysis as is possible in the 
libid., p. as. 
2Ibid., p. 309. 
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immediate experi ence of the subject observed."l The 
analysis of Analytic Psychology i s psychological 
analysis. It is an attempt to find all the 
significant aspects of the mental life. These facts 
may not be clear t o the experiencing individual, but 
careful s crutiny brings them to light as aspects of his 
experience. There are rnfacts i n plenty within the 
whole range of human experi ence" whose importance is 
never r evealed in any other way . 2 But Ward considers 
that analys is should do even more than furni sh 
s i gni ficant aspects of the mental life which may be 
used analogically to understand the problems of 
cornpar ati,re psychology. . He considers that analysis 
can r eveal the hypothetical fact ors involved in any 
possible experi ence . This is accomplished by the 
examinat ion of hwnan consciousness, and the determi-
nation of its most essential character istics. Thi s 
fu rnishes us with the most simple type of organization, 
the limit wh ich genetic explanation assumes as the 
most primi t ive form of experi ence . It i s the ideal 
limit, the most simp le consc i ousness.3 
But such psychological analysi s does not r eveal 
1Ibid., p. 105 ( f oo·t-not e 3) • 
2 Ibid., p . 2_6. 
3Ibid. , p. 40. 
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absolutely separate factors of organization. "The 
principle of continuity .•• gives us no title to infer 
from the distinction reached by analysis to the 
separate existence of the factors analyzed. n·1 It 
only reveals characteristics of experience, which may 
be isolated for examination, but are never separated 
in actual experience. Analysis is the preliminary of 
explanation. 
For Ward, explanation in psychology seems usually 
to mean genetic er~lanation. Genetic explanation 
appar ently is an applicat-ion of the principle of 
continuity. This is the type of explanation that is 
exemplified in the organization of the Psychological 
Principles. There is first a ve ry short analytic 
psychology which furnishes the necessary charact er-
istics of experience. 2 Then there is a. study of the 
genesis of experience, using the limit furnished by 
the prior analysis. Explanation reveals the 
unknown in terms of the known; aspects of human 
experi enc e furnish the key for the discovery of the 
necessary characteristics of any experi ence whatsoever. 
The assumption that the unknown must be analogous to 
the knovm means that there must be no absolut e break 
1 Ibid., p. 442. 
2Ibid., ch. ii, pp. 29-59. 
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between our present experienc e and our past experience, 
and between our experience and the experience' of sub-
human beings. 
But Ward does not consider genetic explanation 
merely as a deacripti ve-; enterprise. For example, 
the application of the category of cause in psychology 
is not merely formal. The application of this 
cat ego ry is formal in the so-called natural sciences 
because they abstract f r om the concrete significance 
of such a category • . They abstract from the 
anthropomorphic character of cause. Causation ir~ 
psychology i s quite different. In psychology, the 
anthropomorphic charact er of the category is 
r ecognized, and the active exper i ent becomes the basis 
for the genesis of experience.l It is the nature of 
the exper ient as well as the nature of experience 
it se lf that furnishe s the ·basie for genetic explanatiun 
in Ward's psychology. 
laid upon this point. 
Too much stress can hardly be 
Of course the experi ence itself 
has charact eristics, but the genesis is due to the 
exper i ent's activity. "So -- as ' it goee cycling. 
on' --the range of experience continuously extends, its 
'contehte' becoming at once mor e divers ified; more 
harmonized , more unified •.. The explanation lies (1) 
lrbid., pp. 340-345. 
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in the steady subject j.ve orientation towards the good, 
t ent ative, and erring indeed but none the l ese 
p ersistent; and (a) in the plasticity of the objective 
cont inuum. There is, then, a single a gent on the one 
s i de and a cont inuous 'fi e ld ' bef ore it on the other: 
the one we may cal l t he primum movene, the other the 
mater ia l condition, of psychogeny. 111 The ground of 
the meaning of the forma of explanation ie the concrete 
ground of genes is. The mat erial conditions li e i n 
the exp eri ence, but the development is due t o the 
subj ec t of expe ri ence. · Now it becomes apparent why 
Ward is confident that analysis can r eveal the ultimate 
fact ors of exper ienc e . He thinks that the ground of 
exp lanation i s the experient, wh ich i s the basis f or 
the meaniEg of all the forms of explanation,. that is, 
gives meaning to the categori es . Hence the princip le 
of continuity demands that al1 experi ence whatsoeve r 
i nvo1ve an experient. Otherwise it wou ld not be 
other than an abstracti on.2 And that is just what 
Warcl cons iders presentationalism to be: an attempt to 
expla in the whole in terms of one part . 3 Thus it 
proves that genetic explanati on has a special meaning 
1Ibid.' p. 411. 
2rb · . ld.' p. 309. 
3Ibid., pp. 23, 24. 
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for Ward: explanation of the deve lopment of exper i ence 
in t erms of an active subject or experient elaborating 
acme order of furnished condi t h ms . 
The Psychological Individual 
3. Such thoroughgoing psychological exp lanation 
involves, as we have ~een , the assumption that al l 
the complexity of the ment al life has been acquired 
by the activity of an experi er..t. Thi s follows from 
Ward 's application of the principle of continuity. 
"OBut we seem bound as a matter of method to suppose 
all discernible comp l exity and different iation a mong 
pr esentations to have been originated, i. e. 
experimentally acquired at some time or cther." 1 
But this assumption i nvolves genetic psychology in 
peculiar difficulti es which make the immediate 
app lication of the assumption somewhat complex . In 
the life of the actual i ndividual "all disc ernible 
comp lexi.ty and differentiati on" canrJot be considered as 
originated by the exper ient himse lf. The f acta of 
heredity must be fac ed. Of course it may be assumed 
"that ther e has been a succes s ion of sentient individuals 
beginn i ng at the lowes t level of life and advancing 
1Ibid., p. 75. 
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cant i ;·:u ouely to the levr:::;_ 0 f man ." l 1iard a.o e s th i s ; 
h ~ as -m!1e.8 tha -t wha.t the anor~ s tor aoquir -- d by ~ ffort h1 
iLe ti~ct i n t he p r ogeny . 
suc1.1 a r sycho logical Larnu.rckiaHi sm i s very oomr, lex . 
Th8 prcc,sGs o f r epr c duc i! g t?.:r2.cee tr,t(al expe rit<IJ. Ot:: i n 
t hc. · l if E> of the p r cger_y i s uru sual l y oo n:pl i ce,t-:-c~ and 
r::ro b:!.. ema-r:. ic. War d c o~sid!rs that the developme~t o f 
Xl::·cr i e ~ ce: from it e dawn to its highest f c r rne can best 
deve loped cc ~ ti~uou a ly from t he b e g i nn i rg of psychical 
1 ifs; t c th .:~: l eve l. o f hurnc:m exreri.ence . Such an 
It allows a 
s i mi l e pr~~~ntati cL of hi s p ostula t e of psychic 
c c. ti. .uit.y. Of c our s e auch a fict ion l~ave s to the 
r:e:rcholcgy o f thr.' cc·r·c r -:> te L~c..'-ividiJ.al a vr; r y de::.. i c o ~e 
rro olern : vv-hat i s tlv; val:Ldity o f tlE · rsyohologica. l 
L cH vi du;:;., }_, i. e . , this f ictj_cn which 1fT r ei u s_.e·., fer 
c o1c r c ~ e psychology? We ~hall disccv e r later t hat 
!a r d eepar~~ee the obj ~c t s of axpcri~nce fr om th e 
sub j ec t c f exp eri eLoe . The con t i.r:ui ty which tb. e 
dc.ctr· ine o f th e peycho lcgic <.".. l ir<d i vidua l is i n t er:.d.ed 
to mc:'vl:e expl icit is tr~ a.t o f t he objects of ex:rer i e ce , 
lrb·i r: p 7 .:.1 
. ..... \..(,. . ) • .!: • 
2Realm o f Endz, pp . 208,209 . 
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~Ld i r no way r~ fers to a ccutinuity of sub~ecto i~ 
the gen~alogical s ~rif8 . Th "' f iat i c. ,e:.•,l i ndi vi. uJ.:.&,l 
t akss the ? l ao0 o f the eeri~s of dist~.P ct aub ~ ec t e . 
I n th i s way the 6ters of hsr~di ty and th e trand f e r of 
The: cr ux of \7B,::c;::l ' s t hi:'ory o f oc._ti :uity i s 
SiLo ~ th~r ~ i s LO continuity 
oicle . This ulti~a~ ely l 8Lds Werd t o th ~ theory of 
a p lasm wh ich the il: di vi dudl i r.h -::' ri t s as hi e set of 
' . ' C· OJE!C "tS . This ~lasrr was e l abora t ed by th e subject's 
,r:.c e&tcrt:: 1 and i s c a l led i::syc hcr lasm. Tl:. e ficti ur: o f 
th~ reycholog ic ~l i~divi dual he l ra to make xpl icit 
oc:nt j_: ·ui ty \'.rh ich ps~rchopla,G r:o ulti ma'" e1y "'x:;:laL s . 
How··.ver , it incider-.tb. l l y 1-r .ScEt s a _:ind c f c,:-: .t i r.uity 
subj ~ct s of ex~ eri e~ c~ . 
T hi~; 1:-tcds tlS d ir -::.ctly t o th 8 rrc-b J.:. m of th"" 
sub~.::ct - obj .:.,ct T(jJ.B,tic-r, r.,nc . a study 0 f th '?. c o~ . tiru ity 
--- - ------
1cf. below , ch . ix, sec. a. 
III 
THE SUBJECT-OBJECT PROBLEM 
CHAPTER V 
THE SUBJECT-OBJECT RELATION 
Fundamental Analysis: The Subject-Object Relation 
1. It is now clear that Ward's psychological 
method i s an embodiment of the principle of continuity. 
The meaning of cent ir,ui ty, in specific app licat io1 to 
the problems of general psychology, only becomea clear 
by followil g out Ward ' s ~wn method of rrocedure. As 
has already been shown, this method is (1) the most 
general analysis of human experience, (2) genetic 
explanat ior1 in terms of this fundamental analysis. 
For Ward, the most fundamental analysis of 
experience yields the duality of subject and object . 1 
Of course this is not what has been defined above as 
psychic analysis. Frequently the dietinctlor of 
subject and objec t is not ev (;~n recogniz ed in 
consciousnass.2 There is oft en no awareness of it s 
existence . It is only psyoholoe;ical analysis which 
r€;veale the fundamental charactel'istics of experience. 
Hence it is not an i mmediat e datum of awareness; it is 
1Psychological Princii)les, p. 309; Naturalism and 
Agnosticism, p . 417. 
2psychological Principles, p. 361. 
rather what Kant calls a judgment of exre1·i ence, n·a 
judgment made at the conceptual level. nl It i s an 
i n f er ence because it i s an int erprete.tion of the given 
i~ t erms of the not-given. This ana lys i s , which 
yielde the duality of subject and object of experienc e, 
i s the most fundamental analysi s because it r eveals 
the t wo factors without which exp er i ence at any level 
c anno t b e understood. Ward does contelid, as we have 
seen, that experience must not be transcended i n 
emp irical psychology. But he likewi se cont ends that 
,,_ 
exper i ence is more than the object of awar eness . Q· 
Exper i ence i nvolves the object of awareness and t he 
awarenes s itself. · We are not aware of the activity 
as datun1; but there is, in the f i rst i nstance , 
awareness of the obj ect to which awareness i s direc ted. 
For Ward, the natur e of self-consciousness verif i es 
this conception. Self-consci ousness does not seem 
necesrJary to experi ence . Also the growth of self-
consciousness is a s low elaboratioL . It is only 
a ft e r long exper imen-tati oL with va1·ioue ideas t he.,t 
there is elaborat ed a clear conc eption of the self in 
relation to the object.3 Th e presentat ion of the 
lA Study of Kant, p . 73. 
2 Psycho l ogical Princip l es, pp . 378,379 . 
3 I bid., pp. 371-38~. 
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duality of experience is always conceptual, i. e. an 
int erpretation of perception and ideation. 
In one of his earlier articles upon psychology, 
Vlard asserts, "We c<:m often form a distinct concepti on 
of the l'elation between two t erms when we have no 
such distinct conception of the terms themselves . 
So here: without waiting to examine onto logicetl 
theories we can ask how subject and object are related~"l 
Thia assertion would seem t o i ndicate that the 
relation was the conc ern of empirical psychology and 
that the f actors were not it s conc e rn~ Yet i n the 
very series of articles in wh ich this assertion occurs, 
Ward. use e the method whi ch he le,ter employs in the 
Psychological Principles . He diecueeee factors of 
the mental l ife : (1) the objects of experience, and 
(2) the subject of exper i ence . To unde1· sta.nd this 
seeming paradox we must realize that Ward considers the 
subject-object relation as asynrrnetrical . The relation 
of subject to objec t i s not the same as t he relation 
of object to subject . 2 That means that both subject 
and object are relational meaning~ . Since this is 
so, we can study object through ita relatiO.t..c to subject. 
This is the psychological relati on of presentation. 
This may be done without making a study of the nature 
1~ .·. . 0 ,.., 
lV11DQ. • I:) • 
2Mind N. S. 
12( 1887) J 54 . 
2 ( 189 3) ; 8 i3. 
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of the ob j ect as i ndependent fr om the sub ject. We 
study the object i n rel~ticn t o a subj ect as o~e 
factor of experience . In psychology we do not s tudy 
objects l)er se, but obj ects a e p res '.ntat i ons. Th e 
subj ect or self i s studi ed i n psychology, not as a 
w=taphysical ent ity, but as r e le.t ed to th~ pres ented 
by a tt ending t o i t . Thus p r E)BEn t$.th: n i s the r e l a tion 
of object t o su bj t:: ct; and a ttE"nt ic·~ · i s the r e lation of 
subject to obj ect.l 
As shown. by a t able given ir: the Psycho iogi cal 
Principles , th ~;; fact ors of experi er ce ar· e considered 
only i n so f a r as r e lat ed. 2 Although th e t er rus subject 
and object ar e us ed, they do net i ndica t e f z,ctors as 
they ar-3 i n th ems elves ; but f e,ctors qua r ela,t ed . Thi s 
i s wl:ly the t e r ms subj ect and obj ect are used: they are 
correla,t ive and make exrl ici t t he r elc>,t i o .a l mee.n i ng 
wh ich they ar e intended to c o~vey . "Now wherever th e 
·or d Subject and it s der ivative-s occur in psychology 
we might subst itut e the word Ego and analogous 
der ivati ves , did such exist. But Sub~ect is almoet 
always the pr eferable t e rm; it s personal form i s an 
advantags , aLd it r eadily r ec ~lls it e modern 
correlat ive Ohjeot." 3 The m~an ing of the f act .rs of 
lpsychological Pri:cip l lB, p. 39 . 
z_, . , 1 o1a ., p . 56. 
3 - - . ' l Dl Q. ., p . 35 . 
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experi ence i s aOW clearer . They ar relational, and 
becauscj r elational they always imply the whole of 
experi -A1ce t o which they belong. Th ey ar'9 never 
ent i t i es, but parts of the organism of exper i ence. 
Aspects of the Subject-Object Relation 
2 . Ward is convinced that t he relation of pr esen-
tatiou i s r~ latively i ndependent of its correlative 
relation . For thi s reason the theory is plaus i ble 
that experi ~nce is only c omposed of ideas or pr eaen-
tati cns associated t ogether. "Whatever our 
sentimental preferences may be, it is hard to see any 
sc i e::.~ltific obj ection to such an att empt if only it 
could succeed. The one q~esticn t o be asked then i s : 
It was Herbart who convi nced Ward of the 
l arge i ndependence of present atiol s . Herbart showed 
the lavvs of associatio.l, ass i milat i on, and r eproduction 
as laws that apply t o idea.s. The exp l anatory succes s 
of thia attempt convinced Ward tha t the resent at ional 
relation accounted fol.' nine-tenths of e.ach fact of the 
ment al l ife . 2 Herbart's explanation was solely i n 
terms of the r elation e of i deas to each other . The 
va lidity of Her·ba.rt i an i sm lies ir1 the fact that the 
1 Ibid.' p .. 71. 
2 . Ib1d., p. 411 . 
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rele.t ion of pre sen tat ions to each other explains so 
much of experience . The r elation of "obj ects" to 
each other is then one of pri me importance for 
psychological explanat i on . 1 Because of it s relative 
autonomy i t may be made a separate inquiry in 
psychology . Ward does not agree with the extremes to 
wh ich Herbart would have carri ed his "stat i cs and 
dynamic s of presentatiOI s " , "but his attempt may at 
least s e rve to e;xh i bit mor e: i mp r ess ive ly the large 
amount of i ndependenc e there i s between the subject o f 
consciousn e~-:Js and its objects. 11 2 Ward ' a own 
treatme~t of psychology deve lops large ly along th ~ 
lines of exp lanati on 1n tsrms of t;he relatio:1s of 
psychic "objects" t o each other, because h ... be lieve s 
these r elatic;L s explai n the large r part of each fact 
of expel·i ence . 
But Herbart's servic es we r e more than t he 
contribution of a theory of Vorste l lungen or i deas . 
Along wi th the associationalist s , h e did mor:: t han he 
real i zed. "The mar~ he has succeeded i n making the 
structure of t he n ine-t enths clear the mor .;; he has 
unint ent i onally brought t o li ght the fac t thc>,t thi.s 
p r esentational structure i mpl i es a subjective function." 3 
1
- b'd 1 1 • ' p. 4C. o. 
2 Ibid., p . r-"' oo. 
3
-b' d 
. 1 l • ' p. 411. 
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Ward considers that the ideas of Hume and the Briti sh 
Assoc i at i onal i sts , and the Vorstellunge~ of Herbart 
imply the presentational referenc e . The validity of 
their exp lanation i s only possible because they 
implicitly assume that the idea i s a presented object . 
"But, hOYI'ever much assai l ed or disowned, the concept 
of a ' self ' or conscious subject i s to be f ound 
imp li citly or expli citly in all psychological writ ers 
wha tever -- not mor e in Berke ley, who accepts it ae a 
fact, than in Hume , who treats it as a fic tiou . 
This being so , we ar ~ f ar more l ikely to r ea ch the 
truth event ually if we openly a cknowl edge thi s 
i nexpugne.ble aesumpt iqn, if such it prov E:: ' instead of 
r esorting o all sorts of devious peri phrases to hide 
Viard 1 s entire p sychology is shaped by the 
conviction that psychic object s are always considered , 
i mpl icitly at least, ~s pre sentations, that is, as 
r e lated to an exper i Elnt. It is only because of t h i s 
relational asp~ct that they are cons i der ed p sychic 
objects at all. So when Herbart make s c lear the 
poss ibility of a sci ence of psych ic objects wi th grea t 
explanatory power, h i s very thoroughness makes explicit 
the f act that the Vorstellung_en are present at ion s. 
The object is always assumed t o be given. But if 
1Ibid.' p. 35. 
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given, given to whom?1 Berbart ' a psychology of the 
r elation of ideas makes explic it for Ward the relation 
of preseL.tai;ion as primal in experie:nce . In f act 
Herbart •s t heo ry, correct ed by the int erpretation of 
ideas as present ations to an attendi ng subj ect who 
se lectively modifies ideas, i 8 the basis of Ward ' s 
gene ral psychology . This relational theory of the 
subject and object, although so fundarnen·tal to Ward ' s 
whole psychology , i s ne-vel' made sufficiently explicit 
or elaborat ed in any of Ward ' s treatises. It i s 
alluded to and impli ed, but not made clear. This 
nakes an understandi ng of his psychologi cal writings 
difficult . In the Psychological Princin les the 
rt:lational conc ept ion is assume d as an obvious 
p sychological necessi t y . To be sure the necessity of 
the psycholog i ca l subject i a stres s ed . Also the 
psychologict:o. l subj ect i s stressed as i rnpl. i ed by 
Herbartianism and Associe.tiona.lism , and demanded a,s 
their corrective . But Ward does not make explic it 
the notion of pres entation as r e lational. 
Accordir.~g to V a.rd, Her bart ' a Vorst llunv.er:t ar e i mp l ie itly 
relational , that is, the y are always coneid6red ae 
p r· esenta.t 1 one . Yet HArbart den i es the r elation of 
present~t ion t o a subject . For that reason WarQ 
1oongress of Arts and Sciences, vol . v, pp . 639,640 . 
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•. 
co e i ders Herbart i Lcons icten t. 1 
Be,c a.us e Her bar t i mp lie it ly assumed t he 
Voret e1lun geiJ as r e l s.tiN;.al , yet failed t o rE<-cognize 
the psychological subject, he endowed th em with 
aspects p rop6r ly belonging to a tt ention . ard 
cons i ders that He rbart denies th e nec~seity o f the 
c or.,c ep t i on o f the peychologice,l subject f or emp ir·ical 
psychology because He rbart coneide·rs that if there 
were a subject f or ps ycholo gy, · it must be d i scov-=rable 
by L .. trospecti on or percer-t ion . In i tself it mu st 
b~ a psych ic object. 2 But as has been s hown , Ward 
c onsiders that the subject by it s very nature canr.ot 
be a p r esentc:.tic•n be cause it i~,:; the r elati c'n of 
attention t o the object, and i pso f ac t o canno t be it a 
correlat~e , a p r esent ation. In ee lf-consci ouanese 
attenti<..tr.~. i s known, but i s not i t~elf p resent ed . Th e 
criticism of Herbartiani em i s tha t it fail ed to r ealize 
the i mr-~ lic.:;,tion.s of its own posi t j_on . 
what the Vo r stel~ungen or i de-as imp ly that mak"'s them 
poss ible . Of course thhJ i s psychological and not 
psychic analysi s, but Warc.l is convinc ed, as has been 
shown , tha t psychology dee.le with mo r e tharh p sychic 
analys i e . His positi0n at th i s poi~t is quite 
diffe r ent fr om Prof esso r Ca J.ki n e's. She makee; exp licit 
1Peychologica l Principles , p. 35. 
2congress of Arts and Scier:.ces , vol. v, pp . 638,639. 
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refe r ence t o the self an aspect of all c onac i uueness 
wha.t E:loev~; r. The self i s an ob j ect of awa r eness a~ 
certa i nly as pwrc e~tual objects are . Professor 
Calki ne '·s answer t o the Herbartians would be tha t 
in~rospe ction reveals the self, to whi ch all exper i ence 
is refe1·red. «In other wo r ds, psychology as s ci ence 
of selves can be studied only by one who bel i eves , or 
a ssumes , that he is directly conscious of hime~lf." 1 
I n other words, she affirms the "coextens ion of self-
c or· sc i ousness with c.cnscicJUEme s s "; Ward clen i es it. 
He agrees with Herbart2 : self-conecicuanesa i s a 
growth, ·and the "pure " self i s never an object of 
awareness . But he disagree s ·1vi th Herbart i n the 
aff irmation that th ~ sc;l f i s not neE.ded i n emp i r ic ,t l 
psychology . For Wa~d , Vorstellungen or psychic 
objects are only psychic because they are presentations 
to a subject. 
Because He::rbart did not r eal ize the r elat ional 
meanil1g of the Vorste l l ung , h e attempted t o explain 
a) erception and the growth of self-c onsciousness by 
means of the i nherent forc e of the ideas . By means of 
mutua l attraction and repulsion they arrange themselves 
in more and r..11ore complex forms . Ward thinks the.t 
lcalkine ~ A First Book in Psychology, p. 278. 
2Paychological Principles, pp . 372,373. 
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this attempt r evee.ls most clearly the f ailurt;; of 
H~rbart ' s theory of exper i ence . The mutual attraction 
cannot explai n th e creat ive s ynthesis wh ich growing 
consc i ousness invo l ves . Mere surmnat ion cannot 
a ccount f or thq selective unions t o be f Gund in mental 
development . "All r eal synthes i s entails new 
propert i es ~hich its component fact vrs in their 
previous isolation did no t posseos ."l Her bart ' s 
theor · is b.~.sed. upon a me chanica1 met hodology . I ._ 
a.seui:16S t hr;;.t t he growth of mi nd is quantite .. tiv...: e,nd 
me chanical. I t h~s no way of accounting f or th5 
quB.litatively new thali r e zul-cs from selective 
synthes i s . Wurd agre As t hat Herbart i s right in 
contending that ths ground of such creative synthesis 
is ~ot p r esented . But beccn1se He rbart ' s method is 
mecha.ni ce.l, he f ai l s to r ;~al i ze that change i n structure 
is det ~ rmin ed by fur1cti o~·. . Pressnt .. t.tions are modif i ed 
by function . It is functi on that is creative . 2 
With Hel'ba rt ' e conc""pticln of the pree·3Tlt&.tion , functi on 
cannot be a p r esent.s.t ion . Ward fo l lows H~rbart ' s 
lead a."ld. agrees that function i e not p r esertatj.on . 
Function is however the correlative of pres6D1~~.tion ; i t 
i s t he r elat i on of attention e.nd i s the ground of the 
1 The Realm of E~ds, p . 102 . 
2 I bi .~ n 107 
-'"" ·' .. -. - . 
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g~nerically new in experie" cc . Function makes 
poss ible creative synthesis. 
Ward ' s general theory of functi on seems then to 
be (l) that exper i ence i nvolves more: than the given, 
(2) tha;; knowledge i s not coextens ive with experience 
but is the r~ lation of presente,t i on within experience , 
to which attention is a correlat ive re:lation , and ( 3) 
the correlat ive r e lation to presentD,tion is functi on . 
Presentation determines and sets the bounds to function ; 
but function organizes and changes the given presenta-
tion . "Presentations do not associate thems~lvea in 
virtue of some inher"'nt adhesiveness or attraction •.. 
They mus;; be attended ·t; oge~her: i -G is only what 
subj ec~ ive i nterest has integrated that is afterwards 
aut ma"Gically redintc6Tat eci .. W~re associetiol a 
purely pass i ve process so far as the e:xparient is 
concerned, it would be difficult to a ccount for the 
diversities which exis t i!'. th7: organized exp osr iences 
of crt:--atures with the samE-: general et vironment ; but 
subjectiv~ selectie:n explains this at once ." 1 
The Pt:iychological Subj ~ ct or Exp r: rient 
3. The self in Ward ' s psycholo zy is the subject 
of exper i e .~.ce . It i~ the func~i cnal activity of 
1
ccmg1' '36S of Art s and Sci t=:nces , vol. v, p . 649. 
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the rind . Obj ecta are pr esented to it and it attonds 
to ob j ect s . The relation of an objec t t o the subject 
i s presehtation; the r elation of th~ subject t o the 
obj~ct is attent i on . That does not mean t hat tne 
subject is p&ss ive in pres~nt ation . Qui te on the 
c or;.trary, it nay be qu ' te active , cmd i s never 
altogether passive . The r e lation of the subject to 
~he object when the object i s presented to the subject 
i s a tt ention. That is tantamount to asserting what 
v'as explai ned abc.ve: the r""lation of subj ect and 
object is asy:mniet rical. That is just the r eason the 
subject i s nev-s r its own object . 
The r ~ lati() c f subject and obj ect is ot 
primarily causaL The subject is i mi11an en:t cau se, but 
does not p r oduc e the object ; and the object does 4ot 
p r oduce th .;:; eubj t:ct. To ur!derslie.nd the psychological 
subject another catego ry than caus':l mu st be u sed . 
Early i n hi s writing Ward compared the r e l at i on o f 
subject t o objeo·t ,as the r el at i on. of en l'gy t o mat"ter .l 
It i s 11o t an altor;ethe:r ha.ppy f or m of explanation, but 
was used to make some i mpress i on upoE the p r ·-=-don inantly 
mechanical thought o f the latt er p&.rt of t h e ninet e1"'nth 
c entury. It is an i l lust rati on which only partially 
i llustrat -:;s . Ward hims elf s~ys,"I do not mean by 
1Mind, N. S., 2(1893 ) , 80 . 
6 3 
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t h i s t o i mp ly any useful analogy b etvre en p s ychic a. l 
life an d a mor r;; or l ees Emt ome.tic ma,chine a t wo rk: but 
s i mr: ly to ill ustra t e by another L tst anc e the diffe r e ~t ee 
o f ce.tPfe;C ry betw~;;;;~r: p r eser tat :.or.s 0 1 t he one hand, en d 
C On ec 4 0 '1 " l i .::- €..a 0 IJ d ..t:'J. t;! I=; _l 1~ 1 1, b('f Ol".l· +. h ·.'· o + } __ l c ... _. r' • ,,. 1 ••• '- ... - .!. Q' ""' . ...  '"" • v ' v -" M- xwe l l 
sa.ys t hn.t ensr gy a nd mE~tt ~'.:n· are no t the s ame . Energy 
i s the agent ; matt e r i s t hat -v hi ch i s a c te' u:por~ by 
ene r gy . The energy is i nnTianent i n t he e ff ec t p r odu ced 
u:t:on rnatt sr . I t does no t procluc e ma tt e r, but mere 
modificat i cLs i n mat t f r. It i s n eve r r ev ~aled i n 
itself , bu t oL ly i :- • it s eff e c tc; . So f ar th e analogy 
is good, aJd so f a r War d des ire d it t o be c arri ed . 
But uhe ps yc ho l oz iccl,} subj ~ c t i s s elec t ive in it s 
cwt i v ity. He r e; the ana'.ogy bn:a k s dovvn . Al s o t he 
subj ~c t is not r elat ed t o a pass ive ob j ec t. Th 
object i s givc.n t o t he sub j ect and . h er.~. c e has i n t ens i t y. 
Th -:: re: l e,ti oE o f pree~'>ntat ior i n volve-s an objec t wi t h 
it i s given t o the subj ect -- a~d an 
~tt· d i rg su b j ect. Both p r eset-te. t ie>r, and a t ttmt it· 1 
have in~~ enai ty . Ne i t h .r t he su b j ec t nor t he ob j ect is 
pass i ve i n p r esent at i on . 
vVar·d ' a CLesc r l.pt i N1 of the sub ~ t-ct a:::. fun ct i.cr::a l 
activ ity i s much sur.:er i c r t o th e ene r e;et ic de scrip t ic·n. 
For pa ycho lo2,-y t he sub j ec t i s exc l u s i v e ly func t i c>r::.a l. 
VJa.ru avows t h i s c oncept i on wh en h e dE:no t ::.s the se lf as 
l "!_r • ., ' J S 2 ( -""9r' ) 8C' 1·;1 1 na. , N . • , l. u o ; • . 
" the exclusivt:J.y func tion&.J.. being of the E;xrerient 
subj~ct , on which we have been led t o i ns i st ." 1 Th e 
func ... ~ , .. ,-, 1 co··· c ""·.,.·+ ' ··r: of ·tl·l"" eu1)·ie0 "" ·ic.1 1' 
_ lrJ. \ ,..' .J. (,N.l.. . l.J. r.:t ,t ' v .LL' J - "-" u v \.1 .~.~ full accord 
i,'f i t h the r ela t io:::·.al conc c:-rt ion of sub j ec t and obj ec t. 
Psycho logy deale with the se~ f i n eo fa r as it attends . 
The sr:;lf i s only va l i d for en:IJ iri cal psychology i n so 
far as it i e actively r e l ating it self to t he objbc t . 
Funct icr· i s mc11'e than r~"~ al ene·rgy ; i t i s selective and 
C"J:" ea.tive . I t i s t he ground of th e modif ication of 
st:::·uctu re . I f the Hr::rb·· rt ian Vor stellung g i v t-e u s a 
rOL~gh ske t ch of the :fresentation , -- <:md Ward th i nks 
ths;tJ :i. t do es , then t he notion of func~ i o ~ in 
b i ology gives us the corr ectiv6 of a purely structural 
concertion of any l iving p r ecess . Fur. c t i or: i e o. 1 y 
ross i ble i D so fo.r as j_t modifi As e:, s tructure . Thi s 
l S vit al in \'lard ' s thou gh ', e.lthc~ugh he merr:<:.y allud:;;:s 
t o the concept i on . 2 The notio .1. of func ti::.r.l is a 
rclat.:.c.cal one . Func t i c•n i t! th e rt::ls,ti on c>f an agent 
t o a ~ iven s tructure . Ths structure i s i n some s:~se 
furnieh~d t u the agent ; it i s the datum f or it. 
Th i s i s th e dative relation . 3 But even L:. the 
r eception of the datum the agent i s active . The 
d::;,tive r e lat i on i s no t a c ommu tablt; one . 
1Psychological Princ i ples , p . 456 . 
2Mi nd, N. S., 2 ( 1293 ) , 80 . 
" ••• A s t ate 
3 C ong;r~ss o f Art s a.nd Scienc~;s , vol. v, pp . 639,G 40 . 
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or ar.~. i mpr r. s ::: 1 en is not a funct io:t;. , t hough t o rec e ive 
a_.;. inr. r cssion or to chang~ a ste,tt.: may be .. • " 1 And 
t he noti c:r of f u ...... c ticm i nvclves both the r e.lat i c'n o f 
recept ic·n and the chane;e: of structure. Function is a 
relath,ral notioL of active r e cept i v ity and cree.tivity. 
Now it is c le~u that the 6Ubj~~ ct is functi ona l and 
v h~" ob j &c t not. So it i s the sub j e c t t ha. t j_ e 
c onsci ou8 , and net t he obj ec t . 2 War~ do es ~ct car~ 
f or the t e r m c o~sc i ousnes8 bPcau ae of its rrimarily 
Cv,. Cf"Y 1' t l V f:· '!l'l· !"<<>Y', ; • O· 3 o"'· - ..... .... ~.,.."., ... - ·o • It im:t=lies that kLowiedge and t he 
n;er ... t~,l l if t:. are coext eus ive ; whr~r ~:aa h :~ cons iders , as 
alre<:'.d.y shoW1! , tha ·. k~~ owlt16.g.::.· li ee within ccmsci ou snc se 
but is not co exten sive with i t . So h e p r e~ers t he 
t e :cm a tt ention to cove.r th r:: mear.t i r .. g of th e fur ... cti c·ra l 
asrec t of th1" min d . I t ha s two advc~nte,s; ::) : ( l ) it 
stresses a ctiv ity and it s object, i. e . th f3 dual i ty of 
e):pe riel.lCE;, and, ( 2 ) it gi v e~ s no suggeet i cn of the 
bB BOCiati oLali sts 1 th ~o ry Of a Clust r of f aculti ea . 4 
n e ce s s ary to r(-"al ize i ts r e latior .. tc' th e con.cer·t .of 
fe e l i ng . By f eeling· i s meant p leasure- ra in, not a 
1Mind , o. ·s . , 12 ( 1887 ), 49 . 
2p b - . - p . . J syc.o1og1ca ~ r1~c1v .•s, p . 104 . 
3
- · ' d ;::? - 22 1 01 • , ·!p . ...; 1, • 
4 I bid . , pp . 60,61 . 
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t ouch, an orgar~ ic sensation, an emotion, or a 
. . . l 
c onvJ.Ct;l cn . Thi s theory o f p leasure-pa i n is 
ob scure and helrs c om:rl ica t 8 thE theo ry of attent i ('~ll . 
The Ps~rchologi ca1 Prir-cir,le:s i n seve ral ple.c e8 co lta i ns 
exrr-Gsic·LB o f thi s ty e : "· .. Feel i!'g and atteuti.on 
e~clusiv~ ly belo1g t o, and al ~geth6r make up ~he 
Sl:b~ ~ a t - s i de . n Z This set:·ms t o irnr.ly that there are at 
leas t two f a culti es : -f ee ling and a ttent ion . He t ells 
u s , t o be sure , that "··· p r esentati0n affects the 
s1~~e ct : h er~ iu l ies it s one rr i ffi itive caracit y - -
that of f eelL:g . FecJ. i r:g aga i . i mplieti but o 1.e 
r rir::i'tive faculty-- that of b e ir g cor:scicus or atten-
Th i s exp lancvtj.on i s no't very i llurrd.r_~~t i r. g . 
I t see'-llis t o i mlJ ly that fe E-1 in i:J i s not fur, cti 11al , and 
h en c e makPs an exc -::-p t i en t o hi s pu r e ly funct i cna.l 
't heory of th "" sub j oct . But i t doe~:, ma .. e rose i b1e a 
diat i n c t i un which i s v ital t o the n otion o f at t~~t i cn 
and th e e tt ir e rsycho:ogy : the differe~ce between 
"( a ) the seneo.!_Y or recert ivE:: attitude , Wh'3n El.tt e1~ tio 
i s non-vo 1untE~r i1y cle t ermir_,", d , i. e . \vh ere· f eel i ng 
~ollows the ac t o f atte~tion; and (b) the motor or 
a c-c i v e a"Gt i t u de, where f eeling p r e c t:deB the o.ct o f 
1 Ib i d 
' 
p . 41. 
2 I bid . , p . 26-:l -
"'.> also p . 57, an ll. p . 66. 
3 r b i d . , p . 66 . 
67 
att~nticn, wh ich i s thu s det. ::.r·ir,i::::.ed vo:Luntarily . 111 
Fee::;_ i r.,g is abso lutely essent ial to the unde r s t e.r d i ng 
of the act ivi ty of atteution . I t wm..1.ld then se ~ m that 
"Act i C;n- und ;;.::c-Fee l i 11.g 11 , a descr i pt ive t erm which War 1 
himse l f u ses i n one pas sage , 2 would be a better usage 
than "a.tter.:.t i on". Howev~r , such a usage would obscure 
the i nvolunt ary awareness wh ich itsel f det~rmines 
f ee l i Lg . This bririge aga i ; t o the for e the p rob~em 
involved i n Ward ' s us e of t he t erm attenti on . 
"Apart from fe e ling as the direct spr i rg of action , the 
q_uest ioE , th en , is s i ni-· J. y ·vvh ether act i on i n proc ess i e 
-nyth i ng mo r e than attenticn to a specia l clasz of 
ob -1ects . 11 3 u LeaviEg t o one s i de t he problem of the 
"on6 :rr i ntitivc capacj_ty - that of f eL·- li . g 11 and i ts 
r eJ.ation t u the functi~nal concept j on of the subject, 
we have to the fore the problem imr l i ed ir Ward ' s use 
cf the t erm att ention. The differe 1c e betw e~n th: 
rece:~pt ive; and r eac tj_v e, fEi.ct ors in c onsc:i ousnc: s s, apart 
fr om ( 1) fee l ing ~s the mctive t o acti cn , and ( 2 ) 
f ee l i r.:.g as det<:·rmi vil d by ee E: ory avr r enees , i s a 
diff erenc e of pres6~tati one . The act i vj_ty i s the same ; 
out rec e: :f.•t ive activity dec.:...:::. s with s~nscry obj8ct::J, 
vo l itiona l activ i ty wi th motor ob ject s . One of the 
1 I bid.' p . 57. 
3 I b " -lei . ' p. 70 . 
,., 
.:._) 67 . I b i d ., p . 
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f inal proofs wh: ch Ward cit es i n d6f~ns6 of h i e po~ it i on 
is 'Tundt ' e 1 aintple. r eact i on-t i we ' exper i ments • 1 I n 
th St: exrerin:ent s t h E: r eacti.on-time wo.B n il , which 
se~ms to i )d i cat~ that t he perce iving ar d &ct i ng w~re 
onE: . Warcl ac .nowled2;tj~' that i n human ac tivity the 
re c e:t:·t i v 6 and r eactive a:re u su a- l l y di s t i r!ct. They are 
not how~ver h · the s i mple reactic·L experimc·ntt~ . Th i s 
me:d(t:8 o l ec:.r the resu l t of our i :r:.it.ial ana:Lya i s : the 
subject of t he sub ~ ect -object relat i on i s sele ct i ve 
a ct iv ity dir6cted t o objects presen t ed t o the sub ~ ect . 
Atter ... ti.r·n i s t he correlat i ve of rrebent c:,t tcn . I t i s 
not a. psychoe i s f ollovvil g aftel' p r et:-;-:; . tat ion , but i s 
~he subject ' s relat i o1 t o the ob~ect . Pr ee.E.nt ati on 
i s t h e ob~ ect cons i dered eubject-w~rd ; atte t i on i s the 
subject cons i dered object-wa~a . 
But ths probL .. m of th e:. nature of f eel1I,g as t he 
o . e "p rimiti ve cs.paci t y" s ti ll reu:a i ns . 
we have seen , i s t he only ac t ivi t y of the sub j 5ct 
upon th6 ob~ec • . The t e r m " f acult y" here obviously 
i s used i~ a very srecial se .ee . I t mec:1.ns th~ 
a c t i vity -o f t he au bjP.ct upon t he: o b~ ~::: c t . Ev~n 
rec e~tive a t teLt i or , e i r c E:: it i e selecti ve , i s the 
act ivity of the su bject uron the object . But we 
canEot undE :cstancl the meani :,g of t h~ a cti vi ty of t he 
subject unless we u •. d f· :rGtanc.l the v-·ay i n wh ich obj ect e 
1
- b · d" lJJ . > p . 68 . 
69 
i rd :Lu enc e at -c er.-c j OI.t . Ob ~ ec t 8 not only narrow th · 
rang e o f a tt ention ; but they coJ.'j_trol s. t tenti or: by 
me.::;.ns of the af f e- ct which th€. s.ctivity of att. ....... tio ·1 
it sel f entails. 1 Fe<.: ling i s n e i tht:r r e c er;t i ve no r 
react ive: atteecicJn ; but it r e sults fr om r ec er·tive 
&:t·C.erttion and. caus es r eact ive attt;r:t j on . It is a 
ca~aci t y of th e subj e ct i n r e lati c~ to th e control o f 
a tt enti on . Thus 
it may we,ll be called a "capacity" . In the larger 
seL86 , howev :;.~ r, it may be consid.e r ed as an e.s:pect of 
c. tt ent :i.or: . If it be r ememb"' red that attent ic;n is 
functi cnal, thi s concepticn becomes clear. 1ard 
fu:.:.·r .  ibh"'"s a clue . "P syc ho-phys ics seems to warrant us 
in say i ng that diffe rentiation of pres-Ltati ons i s th e 
rsychiual parall el of d iff0rent iation of ner vous 
structur e , whereas paych ichl act ivi t y or l ife sesms t o 
b e the conoomi tant of thv mcr8 of. lee::: i n t ense wor k i:r.,; 
o r funct i cn i Dr; of thi:;; e:tructure , and. pur e: feel ir~g a 
f unction , so to se,y , of this funot i cn . n 2 Fee ling is 
ne i t1H:;l' pu:r e pass ivi ty :nor pUl'r: activ~lty . Like the 
activity of att~tiou to objects, it is bot h, active 
a~~ pase i ve . I t i s pass ive in so far as i~ d.ep6nds 
upon at t ention t o arouse it. I t is active in so f ar 
lib ' < . , ·. 4"1 Ll..1. lCl., I.Jl' · .:.>, •.• • 
a~, , - , u s .., ( l so .-, ) ·~i:LitCl, ·~ . • ' {.;) .;;.;) J 80 . 
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ae it h.:J,s an i nter...s :i. ty of i te own . But it is not 
act i ve i ::. the senf:.f: of di:r:·e,ct ly cha.ngir.g p r E.sentat icns. 
Rather , i t mocli fi e: s the fun ction o f att ent i on to 
Henc e i t i s the r egulat h :g fun c t i or~ of the 
funct icr; of at tent i o •. . I n this s ense i t i s a caracity; 
it i & t he capacity o f ir.ter~,s1j ancl mot:i.vat i on . I t i s 
the central fu.nc.:·r.ion of the mi nd . It d ep en <is upon 
a.ttent i or: , and attent i on de:t;,ends u pon i t . I ts relation 
to presentational ob jec ttl i s never dir ec t , but a l ways 
by ·1 eana of the functi on of attent;ion . Thi s ma k es 
clear why exp erL. c e i s fundamentally conative . 
Attentton i s motivated by the seconda ry functi or! of 
feeltng . "The fundamental f a ct o f exper i ence , i n a 
wo r d , i s the int er est taken in , and not mer e ly the bare 
· r~ sence of , t his Non- Ego ... But the Non- Ego has no 
i nterest i n us •.. Th e r e lation of the two is then not 
s ymmet rical i n a,ny r espect." 1 
The re. sult ~ of Ward's general analysis of 
experience , an ana lysis which h e conside r s the fir e t 
s tep in ps ycho logy, p roved t o b e the corr~lative 
factor s of subject and obj ct . Th"' object i s a 
Thi e i s mo r e 
than a cor:r:·ect ed. Her bart i a.n i srn . I n the end we fi nd 
that fe~ling , a sec ondary func ti~n of attention, 
mut ivates and controls attenti on more than the pres·~n-
--- --·------
1 I mmanu el Kant , pp . 12,13. 
7 1 
tat ion . "Action-under-Feeling" i s the c entral fact of 
E- Xp51' i enc e . 
This brings analysis to the second inqui ry whi ch 
i t must UtHls:-rtake . It must det e rmin e the r -lati o::.1 o f 
pr es~nt ati ons t o each other. Obviously the se 
preB'"'.ltc.:t i m1 s ar e i n fluenced i n part by att ention . 
Mort:ove r, on~ typ · . of continui t y i s already f ound to 
be i mp li ed i n the mind: the cont i nui t y of oonsciousnf.::ss 
or att ent i on . This subj ective cont i nuity , as ha s 
be~n shown in the d i s cussion of Ward ' s theory of 
method , i s the ground of the lavv of cc t inui t y . It s 
na ~ur e i s now exp licit . Th :-- cont imli ty of th~ ob j Act 
Nhich corresponds t o t hat of "'Gh t; subj c.ct must now be 
m· d . . e.:ylici t . 
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IV 
THE CONTINUUJl.I PROBLEM 
CHAPTER VI 
PRES~~TATIONAL OBJECTS AS A COITTINUUM 
Charact ~r i sti c e of S e~ sat i ons 
1. Th e n~tur e of th e r 91 ti on s of p r esent at i ons 
~rin;s our i nqu iry fac e to f ace wi th it s c Gntr~l 
· roblem : the natur a of tha p r esent at i on~l c ont i n.uum. 
Lat .3 r a farthe r probl em must be f aced: the mea.ni J: g o f 
tne Ctmt 1;~.uum f o r psycho- hy::.;ic s . But s ycno-phys ic s 
i s seco.dar y r&ther tha primary f ~ r Ward . The 
c t::l r!t ral questj_ot.. i s : wha t do · s th ~ p r eEJEmtat i c·na l 
c ant i nuum meE~.n f or i ndividual expe i·i enc e , i. e . what i s 
the ountinuum as a const i tuent o f someone ' s ex;.' ~r i enc e . 
Th i s , as has b~en shown , i s the only psych lo~ical 
v i ew oi rt , a cc ordi 1g t o Wara . Psychic ob j ~cta are 
a~way s p resentat i o~s , dat a g i v9n t o a sub j ~ ct . Th is 
brings the p r oblem f a c,. t o f a c e wj.th c.u1 ambigui t y that 
mus-r; bt:: r ad explioi t b._. f o r ,. w~ can und&r st nl the 
conc~pt i o& o f th& datum in Warl . 
Psychic ob j e ct s ar-; prese.r.ctat j.c.ns b~? c au ee:. they 
ar~ g iven to a sub j ec t . That meana t " ey a r e a tt ended 
-r; o by a subj ect. They c u ld not be prebent ed un l eas 
attend&u to . Henc e· a t tentic.'n c ent r als th:.. ob j ec li , 
s inc e: i t ·vould l L) t be r e:.:>'='nta,t i c·n apart fr om a tt ention . 
~ard asserts i his d i scussion of senactions that the 
magr..itu de of the object is re lc:.tive to the attending 
sub j ect. Attention controls the standu.rd o f magnituc.le 
~y means of restriction . 1 Th e limitation o f at t ~nt i on, 
1e ;rcn;.: ;e des Bewuestseins as Herba,rt terrned i t , l:£__Q_ 
facto controls the range of int ens ity and magnitud':- of 
the - reseLtations, and thus sets the limits of the unit 
attended . This furnish es an abeolut ·;: start· 1.~.rd of 
lJ!a ,. litude, a mo.gnitude which is re l~.tiv·e t o the 
exper i ent . II . .. The quanti at ive chs,rac ter istics of 
r'='senta.tic•ns are all as Aristotle said, ' r elat iv~ to 
3 
US . I :1 Desp ite the clarity of the theory thus far, i t 
is not yet cl0ar how the p r~s~nt ation h as charact ~r ietic s , 
wh ich though ro:~lative in magnitude to attention.> yet 
as tyr::es of me,gnitudc. and quality, belong to the 
object qua prE.!sen-Gat i oiJ. , and not to attention . The 
The p r obable answer to this question lies i n t~e 
relat i oL of function ·to y_uantity . Function has only 
o e quantitat ive aspect acco:c<.ling t v Ward : it has 
i nte ... s j.ty. H;:;.nce the other · u ant itative aep ct~ of 
yre~entat i ~l 1 although relative t o thq limit s of 
attention , belong to Glle pr~ser..tat i on and n t to the 
sub ject. Thi s i s War~ ' .;; general analys is. 
1Psychological Principles 1 p . 89 . 
2 Ibid. 1 p . 11?. 
That 
? 4 
this point gave him some difficulty will appe~r lat ~ r. 
Att'3ntior, and p resentc:,t i ons are th(~ resul-:;s of 
the r...~ rimary analysis . The p roblem of :r~ resernat i on s 
lius t be solvsd i n the l i ght of attent i on . Th e p roblem 
o f psychic ob j ~c t~ is to discov6r those charact ~ ristic s 
of p r esentations whi ch mak~ it possible f or subjective 
activity, i . e . attent i on , to deyelop such exper i ence 
<;1..8 it! f ound i n human consciousness. The p roblem is 
one of exp lanation . Ward i s not content merr?.ly to 
d e scr i be ; he makes psychology an explanatory s ci ,enc e . 
The subject i s the clue to explcmat i on ; but complet-s 
e. plan.a::;ion is n .::> t poseible without a kno rledge of 
thoee charo.ct er ist ic e of obj ect a vvhioh make development 
p ossible . Thi s i s the central p roblem o f this essay . 
All ob ject s o f awareness arA pres!jntati ons , 
wh ethe r they- arP: percept 6 , i ma,g·::-a , Ol' oonc$p t s . But 
th0 presentati onal co tinuum is a conception of the 
r e l~t ion of sensati ons . I n Ward ' s expla,natory or 
genetic p sychology we shall discover why h e makes the 
1-.: r . ee~1t~n ional cont i nuu 60 i mfortant. He c ons id~rs 
that by cr(:.<.J.tive synthesis i n:ag inat i on and i ntellec"t i on 
were develo ed out o f sensat i on . So much f or his 
ge!'Ltic the.ory. Sense:l.tio s a:c~ nev-::r found i n human 
c or.~ui0usneE:s as aton1s or u n i liS of a mani fo ld . They 
ar9 relat ed , a d r e lat ed according to th~ law of 
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·Att enti on i s one tyr e of c o:;t i:;.ui ty for 
r·sychology. It i s k l.cOW.l to be cout i .,uous for t vo 
r6a~o~s : (1) attenti on is a funct i ~al unity, and i s 
not . a\..i.e up of ~4 manifold. of f aculti es , ( 2) psychology 
vi th i ts i ndividual i sti c standpo i nt n e vt.r transcerJ.ds 
t h.::: esse that i s p6 rcipe r c , as far al:l funct i cn i s 
This ve~y co.tiL uity of attention, the 
functj_onal un ity of the mental life , makes necaesary a 
corr esponding obj ective un i t y. "The screech of the 
owl , for examplt:;, has phye ics.lly noth i nt; to do wi th 
the brightn0as of the moon -- e ithe r one m~y c om~ or 
go without changing the order of things t :) wh ich the 
othe:t· be. longs . But for me , the i nd i vic'i.uaJ. exper i ant, 
t hese ar~ the parts of one whole , r..ot merely becaus rs 
sp cial a tt entior:. t o one d i mi nishes the i n t ensity of 
th :. 01;hers, but also be cause as a t tent i cn passps f rom 
one t o the othe r it passes over no vc id. And not 
only ar<;.~ t h ey parts of one whole, but such 
d istinctness as t hey p r ese1:.t i s t he result of gradual 
diff~rentiation ." 1 Desp i te some vacillati n on 
~lar?- ' e part, he s eerns to cc J.silLE<r the fur.cticr.al un ity 
of ELt' er.ticn as the clue t~.. tho:: u n i ty of th e etructu1·al 
s ide of expcrienct,. 
proc e Bs pre. cedes analy s is, wh ich is Etn i d ir e:ot one ; 
1 I b i d . , p • 49 • 
7 6 
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thou gh ai.i£-1.1ys i s b e ths fh•r:::t. in the o:r:·der· of know·l edge , 
s y thes i s is the fir st i n the o rder ~f exist er c e . 
The ~ r oxiruate fact fer th e psychological obs~rver is, 
h oweve r - - this much, a.t l east , w::: 1nay scfely say -- a 
unity that i s different iat ed.~ 1 Th ~,., prin:al synth 1~ sis, 
howev(~ r, i ~ be yon d. us, sin cE- Yi e stand in medi is r e bus, 
a d. h enc e the unity of objective fi e ld Wh ic h W'." fir ... d 
at any stage of develo:r;::ment . 
The que.;;t i c·.·. no\v is: i n what r esr e ct e i:U' e 
rr su. tc.•,t i or. s c or t ir .u o'\J.s ? 
charaot · l' istj_c of scncF:.· t i crle, a cc ordi r.g to Wi;;l.rcl , is 
~ha~ They f orm man y ccntir~a . It s e r:-:n1s s trange t o hil11 
tha.,.. the i mpo r-te.nce of th is fact has net b t:e n more 
w id~ ly c o~side red by psychologists. 
fact ~ bout th0 r ~ la~io 1 of thbs e ordinary G e~sa ' i t~s 
tc each other wh ich, though wel l kn own to physici sts , 
is scc:~rc e; ly rec ogn iz e d by .ssycho ::i.og i st s; and tho. t i s 
thut in s~veral case e, perha~s i n ~11, they constitute 
z:rou.l._: s of c c·r.tinu~ . A music&.l nett: or the; c olc:r o f 
th .:: s ky doe s not adn:it of clas ~ :i. f:ica,t}. on any morE 
than the posit i cr1 of London do es ; but a:::: th i s be longs 
t o tha. t cc.sEt irmu 1 we c a ll thtl surfa,ce of the glo l:Je, so 
do they tc.1 a cont :.r.uum o:f t cv es and c o lors resp ect i Vt- ly . 
But by a co.~t ir.cuur:i he :r:e: I me.c:m ;s, s .;::ri 6E: of obj ects such 
1- b·. 1 1 • l 409 , 4 10 . 
that b0 ~ ~6~D any tWO a s ari~ 8 of others may be , o r mry 
be c onc ~ ivad t 0 b~ , i ntbrposed so a· t c diff ~r th 6 
l Ec:;:; s th e; me r~ t hey ar~r: ro.x:ims:t-:- th-;; s-::r i ._;;G . " 1 This 
c or.ti: :.u urn c o .. c ;;;.rti c .: i s c 1t;.2" r l y d r a.vm. from . athema.ticc: ... l 
physics . It i s obvi ously the gener a l Le i bn iz e&.n vi ~w 
of c o1:. t ir~ui ty, do mi n a n t in t h e gcm fj ral ma.th emat ical 
physics of t he n i Lete cnth centu ry . It i s the c onc ep tion 
ls,t ~<Lt ir: th 6 calcu lus which Le i bn iz gave t o mode- :r·n 
rnatlLmatics and which all but the mos t r •?.C~ l t p h ys i c i sts 
u ;~ed . I t us~s infin it ~s imals, but i n fi i teBimals 
wh ich ar e t h emse lv~ s r e solvable t o othsr small u n i te 
accc.r dil:. g t o the conveni encE: o f th ,c::. caJ.ou Jatc· r . 
Although tht: c orlC6I•t i c-n i s ne t dir~ ct l y drB.wn f rom 
Le.:.bn iz, yEJ t it i s r r.? l a t c d to Leibni z ' s t heory . 
But it wou ld be a rrd.eunde r stan<ii r"g to assume ·that 
ev~ry c ol·~ t inuity i s du e t o ext e j, si ty . tJ Contir<ua o f 
color , for exarr.ple , a:r "'  c o. tir-uiti c8 of qua l ito:t iv -:. 
ch a,ract ~; r i st ic s . This i s true also o f t or e c oi ;.tirue .. 
Th e n:ot o r c cr; tir u a v a.ry i n i r .t e. r•ei ty . 3 
repr •:'! ".' t'<ntE:.ti on of such a c :: n tinuum i s t o be f ound i:n 
thr:: co l or py rs.n1i d . The tone penci l lbs~ c l~ar1y 
d i a grams t h s same t h i Lg . By a co lo r or a t o~e 
Journal o f Specu lat ive Philoao~hy, 17 ( 1883 ), 170,171. 
2Paycho1og i ca 1 Principle s, p. 145 . 
3Journal o f Speculat ivB Phi losophy, 17(1883 ), 17 1 . 
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c onti1 uum Ward do es n o-r; 11~an t he c ont in.ui ty thc;,t is 
p r;:;sent i n tne focus of c on ci ousne::~g at any one 
moment. These co :~.til.ue. e:1.re C'"':ntinua which ar e tne 
grounds of th e ex la . ..;.a. t i or . . of the natur e of present at icnal 
ob jects. Befor :;;. turni1 g to this -·xp lanat i on , i ti se-:m1s 
neceo8ary to gain a c lear,c;.r notj_ un '\IJha.t sensat i ::r. is . 
Hon ar'.:i sens c:._ti cn s discuvel' ed? 
Sensati ct s a r e r eached by an a~alysis of e rcepts . 
"In a handful o f r os·=- }::etal s we are awe:~.r6 at onc E;: o f a 
de fir1i te colour, a. defini ~3 odour ~nd a de finite 
1 fe e l ' . Her'3 the r ;::; is a plurality ( a +b -+- c) , any i tern 
o f which can be wj.thdrawn from our i mmedi ate exp'3r i ence 
wi t h out . r e jud ic e t o th e other~; for we can close the 
e yes , hold the nose , o r drop th~ ~etals on the t abl'3 ."l 
chc-uac1;er i -r;ic s which a r e not due t o a rJlurali t y of 
uni t s b e i..:1g fus ed i 1-to o _e un it, but rath5r ar ~ 
charact er istica a ll o f wh ich ~r~ nece s sary t o the 
sensat j.on . "Let u s now t u r n t o th A c olour alone ; 
this we say has a certain qual i ty , i nt ns ity, extensit , 
&c . But not only ho.ve we not ne s-:-:ns~ f or ~ u a. j_i ty, 
~;moth e r f or i n t ene i. y , e:mo '\:i hen· f or '-Xt ·~n s:i. ty : "Ne c annot 
r ~chLC f;; the L t;:m~i ty t c z ero e.nd ye t hav t- tht:; qua.l i ty 
l' 6maii j_r g: no r c :::- n we supp r e.:> r:> th "' quality a.nd et i 11 
1Ps ~.rcho l "'rr_ ~-~ c ~_- . 1 Pr ~ 11° 1· ·· 1 ·· · ·o 106 
- - ... '-' • ~ ..L v ,;·' ;::. tj ' ... • • 
reta i~ the ext e~s ity. I n thi ~ cas the1 what w~ have 
i e not a plura~.it y of r~ re'-'t·ntat.i cr· . .S ( a +b+c ), but a 
s · r.gle- pre~cntatic.m hav i r. g a pluraJ. i ty of C', t t ri but c:z 
( a bc) eo r elat ed that the c.bse::ce o f cLny o.;e 
a. n ihi le.t r:: s th :.: who 16 . 11 1 
It i s noD c le~r that eeLssti~Ls form c ontiiLUE by 
virtue of so;L-:; cha :r: ao t ,.:.:r i s t·i c, but t hi s che.r'-.Gt t-ri st ic 
Th -' r e i e a not ewort h y charc:~ct er i st ic tt&.t i s conr ~::c t. e-d. 
There are seLea i crs whose 
fi'-Be~tat ~ CC prevents the preB~ntatj o: Of CArta i n 
other s~ns~ti ofia at the ::! sc: .. me momee t . ;..) Th ese 
sena~ti oLs wh ich cannc t be prea~nt~d toge th e r are 
An ob~ ~ct such as a 
Hc~Gv~r, it may r r oduc e a 
c c lo:r . Sow·ds , co l ors, t astes , and t ouches be long 
e V t"I'fl,J l y to d iffsy-cnt c ont i r..ua . Th ey do no t i 1hibit 
Thi · does n ot Dea a u i xed color . A mi xei color has 
lil . d 
,J l • ' p. 106 . 
2 r h ~ 
, .... ..J... • } p . 80 . 
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D.ixtu1·" oc. .. cr.>rt i or.. aT i Her:. fr cn:. th e: mand:"I' i r y.rlJ. ich. thP. 
cc. : ors c..r~· l'J!PCha.nio &.l2.y produc e., . Green h as it s ow~ 
~ . ' ., - . ' l pro::; er l · J.s,ce 1 1: 1in 6 co J.O r p yranila. . - What ~0 r e f er t o 
v~rt& of th~ c ~rdboara . Thi s pr8B9ut s a neTI 
In thi b c asE of the cardboard wh ich i e 
colored in diff erE~t parts o f i t ~ sur f ace with different 
col r e , wo seem to have t he preo0~ t t i on of t~o 
This l eads V!a:.·d tc· r e cognize thG maes or exter.;.L;!i ty of 
i~ ; t c~ethe-r o f a nurr.b::..r of StiESb.t i o . .~ s of th6 sf . n:e 
qual i t y . Such ~- so l 11t i oL l -! cwer:· u rrtuuohed. thG 
pro bl{-:rr .• I n f a ct it o l briLgs t he probleffi mor6 
acut ely t (.· the f ore , f or it i e ·no t clear how ualite .. tive 
hor!ioze.r:~ it y i r £i.t! seLee i wpJ.ier: pluraJ i ty . I n fact, 
~iffsrent i ~t i on b~twe~L ob j e ct s o f like quality &Ld ie 
euch ~ mo~ificati oL of our not i oP of prest~titg t0g~th er 
tho.~ i t b :chcg8 to ljght a n e;. vJ co . ti~ . uum . Thi s 
125' ::..26 . 
·-) 
;j i b . " lC. • > Pr· . 72 , 79 . 
82 
The~~ gualia are 
r~ lat i ure of the part to the extensive sensuous whol: . 
Now we see how ualitatively i cientiGa1 ob~ cts may be 
is 'oeceus e t hey a:ce d.iffo:-:re 1t in reh;,tior.~ to ext~1:s ity. 
I n or. e. se. 8e tht?.y a 1'6 not qual:i.tat i ve ::i_y thl?. ssr;: ~ , i .. e . 
t he: i:r uality, e.s :v·rts of the e~-t~ ,s ity c c;:ti'Ut...1 .. rr:, s 
Now w: he:~v~ thr- rr:cd :l.fj_cr . . iC'r· of c:ur 
orir· i r-a-: t hesis which cake.t: it cc,~:sist er·-t with tho 
- v. - .. _ 
fac~s a s they ar~ . "Thus, i n uny g ivL.l co.,tir.uun: , we 
t j ,; r., be un i tr;;,:. with mo:r.'E· than one object cut of a 
l.:l':'l'iet:, a.L_ of Wuich may be succf.H..:E; ive:y u •. it ec:: with it 
a::: .. d e.ny c-f v l:.ich may be s :.. nul tB .. ... eous ly u :; it ed.. wi th 
othcl' luC£4,} sig ' . . ir tho: B<:I!l€' C c · ti~ :UUL1 . 11 2 
of ~l~ Y c c ·.t : .. r.- uurr. as i t ie forn:uls.t u~: .. i .:: ; t c :rrus of th•~BE; 
or "loca l signs" of the e·ten~ iv~ c oLtiruu~ . 
11 But such difft:;:r~r~ c e of reJ..at::.c, t s t (.\ the whole c· ·_ 
of 1ocCi.J .. distirc -t.~ c· J. , rtot ae bei tg fron: th e begh::.Lir•e, 
such an ov ~ rt diffe~ ~n c e as th e tR:rD ' loca l s i gn. ' 
1Ibid . ' p . 147 . 
2Journal of Sp e cu le.tiv e, Phi1osopil.y, 17(1~;2 3 ), 171,172 . 
·.vj·,e:: u se t.· Lotze , i s mea1t to L nply . n 1 
These l ocal s igns charact ~ ize the l oc·ticn of 
sens~t i one rith i n the exte1s it r of the who le fi e ld 
of sensat ' ons It i s the extens ity of the whole 
field of a+; t ::;; ·.ded se 1sat ions 1 ·hich det r:1rn in~ s the 
loc· l s i; . of th e Ei ngl e sensat i on within it . 
This ext ens ive c ontinuurr., as the grou..-"ld of lc·cal s i gr.L£3; 
i s the contir.uu ~ of a ll the presentaticms ·which are 
::;; · v e ;. a t 8..ny one lOT1e • .1.t . It i s t he presen·~ati cna::.. 
co. t ~::: . uu J . I t f urn · shes "the t:xplanatiNJ of "th::: 
fac~ that tno membe r s of the same ua l ' t at i ve 
cont ir:.uum canLot be presented together if t hey have 
the sane l ocal s in. Thi s lea s t o a probl em wh ' ch 
J c. d leaves so ;ei'ihRt unclear : hc1.v doe s such a. continuun: 
al~~ O\i a c;,.a ge i n se .1se.ticns . 
The co.tinuum of se,sat :~ or:& is not st 9.tic . 
The re i s cha.ge fr om woment t o mcae~ . I t is net 
'i scont i nuous chan e, but the continuum cannot 
furnish th~ reason f .:, r the change . ' TI"h - sense..t i or~s 
occur or recur, c oexist t ogether togethe:r or succeed 
each other as they do , ~o psychol ogy c2n exp lai 1, no 
psycho1oO'ist has ever a-GT.empt ecl to exp lain . 
Sensations one an all a r- i ntrus i ons , i ter re_ ces 1 
a ff ecticns , or ~odi fications i n the ' m nta1 seri es . ' 
o f ar they ar& ~ ro c£ pos it~v0 that the ser i&e dces 
~Ps chological Principles, p. 147 . 
83 
not a l t ogether go a l ong by itsel f." 1 Ward does not 
i ntend that the presen-tationa l cont i nuum shou l d 
furn ish the r eason for t he changes within it. Sti ll 
it is not c lear how a1). ext::ns ive cont i nuum can change 
and y""t be the ground of locations. What remains 
behind the sensation when it has depa1· t ed that is then 
ass i gned to the s ens ation that fo l lows it? LocEtl 
signs are r e lat i ons of simultaneit y. How do they 
r oma i n unchanged when ther e i s succession? 
Unfortunat ely Ward has not st r ess ed the mo st 
central aspect of hi s continuum t heo ry. We have 
already s e en that diffe r ent members of the same 
continuum of sensati ons canno t occupy the same p l a ce 
i n t h e pre s en t at :l. onal continuum at the same time . 
This point Ward has not sufficiently stressed . But 
Hiany membe r s , each from a differ ent c .:J t inuum of 
sensations , mE;.y occupy the same p lac e i n the 
pr e oe.~.J.tati or,al continuum at the same time . In short, 
an obj ect ma y have a sme l l and be gr een a t the same 
time . Now there is a continuum of ~ ensations which 
might be ca l led, for the want of a better word, 
tac t ual. The skin furnishes sensations " ... coex-
t ens ive with the whole superfici es of the body ... 112 
----------------------
l naturali sm and Agnostic ism, p. 319. 
2Psychological Principles , p . 135. 
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Thus for each di ffe l' er..t i at C:'; Q. port i on of the 
p r e<::entat ioPal cont i r,uum ther e i t~ s.lwa ye p r esent a 
eeneati on of paasiv~ touch. Thes0 s ,?:nea ti on s of 
pe.es ive t ouch form a, c ont inuum of tactua l div ersity. 
This is th e con t i nuun: of l oc c:,.:i. s ign e. Th ee:e giv e a 
c or:·.t i11.uurr. "Assu mi Lg ther~ that tc• every i mrLedi a.t e l y 
di s t ii: .. gui she.ble pa.rt of th ~'- body the r· e cor1·e sponds 
a loc c:.l s i gn, we may allow that at any n~orHen t only a 
certCl,:i.L po rti c:n of thi s cor:.tinuum is definit e1y 
wi thir: the fi eJ.d of c cnsci ousnees ." 1 Th e d iversity 
of lc·ca l colortng r emai ne em inv&.riab~.e cne . Alec, 
•i u e t o th (;: ext er:. (S it y of th e r r e:senta t i c~-· al c olJ..t i r.LUurn , 
th e r alat i cns o f these tact ua l s eLsati on e do not 
The.c;e oor.s tan t tactu(;.t,l s ··nSt;!,t j_c n s a re th e 
oual ia of e xt ~ne iv . positi 0 _. A s enec:,ti c·n '•Vhich i s 
not tactual has locat i on within the pr esentatio~al 
c o1~,tj.nuum be o<).u se o f the ext.er·.sity of tha.t con t:i.nuum; 
t h e local sign which c harac ter iz ee th e loceti on within 
the c ont i nutun is a per ma1 ent tactual SP.l':U.:l<:t t icr: . 
I t may arpea r ~t first that this co.ti.uu.m of 
poei t icnal gua li<:~. or loca l sign s i s mer ~· ly a space 
Ward r e jects this t heory . He con e i de rs 
'that ext e.u. sity i s a. silrir·l e;r experi t::n ce than tha t o f 
l r tl•u• n7) 1 47 148 
• ' J::' J: • - · - ' ...._ -- • 
"''L , •·. ''f' · l ~ .... c-...-.~l...i -· . 
but SJ:: c.c~. a:..so inVC>lv::·s ki!lft,e::J theti c SXfF'r i enc e . 
fu:rr,ish 1..1.e sp&.ce: beoe:>.U2C~ f>J::e.ce perce:·t i.::> : h'f J.i~~:· t he 
:;rit. i t i v':.'- ub i q1.1.i t y __ exter.sj.ty . 
ir.ve:.r i Ebi J.it y o f a succes~ ve sE:::r- i t-s o f ;;mx i l i o-mctor 
is in~oes ibl e to r6ach P1 aga i n save thic gh 
Such a ~eries, taken alone, c ould affo r d us, it i e 
~c.q_ue:nce of i mrrr::<s i c.:E:> whlch i t vva::> i ou r O\'LJ. po'iilcr 
2 liO y.r·.duce ." Thus it i fl c 'bvi c·US thc-,-t ! . ard) i n 
Both exte~sity & Ld mot0r 
e-lc-n:ert ~::; a:ce. requi r·ed i n the ir,ter Yea v i r.[~ of elerne':t:ts 
" Herba~t ' e doct~ ine 
such. a series ..• h&lf u s materially i n ry : 1g to 
"Ln:.ci.e;;l·s-':aud t he· i n-t :i.r:r,a.t e blc:nd i ng o f the . srac i e.J. 
1- b · . 1 l a. . ' p . ltJ.,fi . 
2I' ' d OJ.. • ' p . 150 . 
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localisati o~ or projecti~u of imp r~s8 i 0n s ." 1 
now it ie c:ear t hat Ward can:ot agr8~ with 
H erl;o.r·~ , Mill, a J.cl Sp ~~ c er i n their th E:c ry that srace. 
perc apti un is d&riv~d fr om n0n- ext ended 66~Baticn s , if 
"'l'h t: 
mos~ elQborate att~mpt t o get ext brs ity out of succ .s-
sion and c oexisterc cs •.. i s that of H('; r bf;;r t SpeLc ~!' . 
H~ has dons , ;·erlH:',f' 8, al l the.t c an be don•3 , a .d only 
to maLe i t ~ih<o. morr.-. y: 1a L , tha-t th eo e:r.t ir r:· procedure 
We do ~ot fir s~ exr·c ri~ 1 c~ a 
~ow as s cc i~t~~ with or symbol iz e thb original ser i e~ of 
altcgeth~ r, we exp~ r ie~c e that mas s iveness or 
dtff'e_':\Z~ t i e."t'=·cl, moven:.::.r:.t s enabl e· u s t o fi .. d poe i t i c.:s , 
r• "_l(. .._ U- (1 =· + . .::, . , l l i t • •"- a.' i "·' ·t·· ~- ,-,c..!". II 2 
- - IJ 4 .,.. ""' . J. 1 - ... v - u C.•.L- v "" ~ • 
zrowth by disoriEination . A Bi!l.If·l e i nt:me i ty does 
l,,~ ,. ,. . 
.:1. - 1.0., 0. 8 . ' "; '~- ( -;s se: ) 
-- - -- '-"' ' 
110 . . 
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~>·c..de;:; or degrec.s , but thi .::: cunr.c;. -~ accoun t for the:< 
s radutt: l. d i s ori:l. i u .tt i (· :._ of oo :i.c rs , f0r .;;xc.rr;r le i:::-~ a 
sr ectrum. 
11 A sen8r-.. t i ~.:-n of a 
be chans ecl i rl·uc ono lw.vir: c: two auo.l iti.:·r;; . warw Emd ~ • ~ 6 • • 
cold , l eav i r.g tl'1c: L cc- cs i ty u nche.r,ged ; but wi i;h 
t i a.-t i c· ~ 
j s a :=r cund f c·:: fur ·i:iher di f ferE•nt i at i o~- · "In o"Gh~r 
maso ivenees i s th~ s~rue as s~yi=g that a port i o2 o f 
Th s cre;.t :i c. o f n r: 'r loc2.l E:- i gr.s i e. ri71':: ly 
147. 
2 I h ' ' ~ : a . 
;)I b iU.. 
88 
c o~~ i .u2 i s e p o i i t which ~ard doe s ne t cle~r ly 
ex1~ oun J. . f-h d c· SE; ~~ ( ·t. shew ho'.'>' t he diffe.r e:- tia. t i::n of 
t.h .:. pr ·~ cer t a t i e;. __ c.~ J. c c· . t i::uum, succc se:· i v ..:. che.:- S~ E.: i n 
thE · ·r -:·;::e .. "G s.ti .:·r:a :;. c or t. inu1.1m a:J. l uw th r;: d if f : :.. c.~. t 
i . e . succ es~ iv~ ly . Such cha ~ ge s o f quu:;. it y with i l a 
T h CI 'E.: are 
alwC:J.--s degr {:::-:~ of ch 2.:: ge . 
Thus 
the ~ G i s a C 0~ti~u ity of t he qual it a~i ve c o: ti ~ ua i L 
thG eu c c c ;;;; s i cn o f c hC!.I:.g0b wi t h i : . t h e rr ~;:;e.nta.t i r na. l 
- - - -- - - ---- --
J.. I L:; i d . , p . 7? . 
\ 90 
cant i r.uum. Of c outse ther e i s d i s crimi vat ion of 
Tfms i t 
i s the discrimi r:at icD. or d iff e;. r ent i at ion of du r·at :C on 
+ ., - . . . " . ~ t ' ' . . . . t . url e Q.lSCl'lrll L J. &."G lC L OI .tL Q..US, _L l "t; 8."G 1 V f.: COn l D.U c qua 
This n~ke a ne c essary an understa £din g of 
Ward ' s theory of prot F<ns i ty or d.u rat i (!n , a ve ry 
i nrr crtc:.li.c e how 5ve :r i s pr i mal f or a.n unde< l' s-cand i ng of 
2 . I n t h e Peycho1o vical Prig c i ples t h er e a~ e two 
l i s ts o f the chara ct e r istic s o f s ena~"Gl on e . Th ej' 
differ on l y i n oLe i t em. Both l i s~ s g ive the 
charact ~ ri st ic s of qualit y , int en~ ity, and 6xt en~ i ty . 
On e l i st however contains th5 charact5ri sti c of 
prat e si ty; 1 t h e othe r does . c t . 2 I n an art i c ::i.e , 
t h e Psycho J.og i cc;. l Pr_i nc i ple t'i , we f ind this exp 1 ici t 
ass rtion , "Protenai ty i s not , ae ext ensi ty i s, a 
1- b · .. 1 lCt ., p . 105 . 
::Lb . . , 1 20 .. . , r: . 78 . 
s en se- dat u m, though we &scri be it t o se&e e- data ." 1 
He r e th E> :cc i s arrar ent c on fu::1 i or, . Th e: p r ob lem must 
nav~:e cau s ed Ward s orn e difficulty beca,u se h e n avel' 
dea le with i t exy: licitly a s h e doe s the problem of 
ext e.r.;.si ty . The diffi culty lie s in the separation of 
presentati on from att ention . Ward ' s t heory of 
p r <?. seLtat icm s . as p r e E< ::mt ctt i ons t u a su bj e'c t means , a s 
W6 have found, that th e pr e s ent a ti on i s p r esentati on 
be ce:u .. se i t is a.t tended to . I f so , the sharp s epara -
ti on of presentati oL s a~d att ention i e not so poss ible 
a s Wa rd ' s theor y of the structural natur e of s ens e-
da t a l ed him t o thi..1k . I n his es,rly accounts , i n 
Herbartian fe.shion , h e e.ttri but ed durat i on t o the 
obj ect 8 o f a t tenti(Jn . Tht, su bj ect furnished t h e 
sta.n df,,rd of the measur e of durati(m.. But as his 
He r ba. r t iem ie;:m b ec ame n:or e tran sfigure d a n d the f1.1.l ler 
me.s.n i n g of the n.otior, of E',tte.nt i t-n dawned up o . him, it 
be came i ncre a siEgly c lear , I t hin k , that although 
ext ~nsity and qua li t y ar e th e charact eristics which 
c c:.n n ot be c•scribed to th . fun ct i on of att ~rltior1 ; 
dura t ic·n , how eve r , m&.y be a s cri becL t o th e cont :i.nuum 
only by vir tue of the att endin g su bject ' s a c t:vity. 
Dura.t :.c·n i s not a chs,ra ct e ri st i c of th e-; c o~1t i r uum in 
the s ums s ens that sxt 6~Bity i s . ThGr c i s change i n 
l Mi nd , N. S., 29( 1920 ), 132 . 
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t he continuum; but this change i s not p rot ens i ty . 
The changes , howeve r , are only p e rc e ive d as su cc es s ive 
b e cause o f t he a cti vity of th 1~ abiding subj ec t ~ I n 
his l a,s t forrnul e.,tio t of the probl €"Jm Wanl p r obably 
giv eB us the oon c epti oti toward which hi s thought ha d 
t {·::r.:.d ed. during the who le period of h i s more me,tur e 
p sych o l ogica l t hin kin g . "~hue we find i n the 
p e rc eption of time", h e says > " as we f ound i n th6 
:1> ·. rc ept io11 of s pe1.c ·. , a fac t or that d i sappel:',:r.' s f r om 
But th P t no f act or s are ve ry 
dif f t :r ent ; th ·xe it wa s ext er.csity-- which i s obj ective; 
hBl' S it i s what W-'3 have ce, lled p roten s i t y-- which is 
essent ially S l.J.bj ect i v~ . · I t i s through thi s tha t we 
~· s cri b~ t hr~ eens E;: - da ta the cha.r .;~ ct erist j_c of du r a tion , 
and e o s peak of that t oo as prot ensit y." 1 
Now i t i s c lee, r tha t "dura.t:i.c,n , i n f ac t , as 
ex : ~ r i en c ed i s i ns epa r a b l e fr om t h 6 a c t ivity t hat a ll 
~z:p eri enc E: i u:p lie s : it mt ans not bar e ly t o e xi t but 
a ctive l y t o p e rseve r e or p e re i at ." 2 How this dura tion. 
i s at t ribut ed t o t h e s en s o.tion , it is di f f icult to eay, 
sin c e a cc ording t o Ward ' s theory th9 a ct ivi t y of 
attefiti on i s not a p r e s entat i on . I n th e Psycho l ogica l 
Pri_£ip l e e prot ensit y i s desc ribed as •a peculiar 
s.' 29 ( 19 20) ' 130 . 
s., 29 ( 1920)' 131. 
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; n+: ·· . .,..,si.,..v ' l •~·.., t:a. - u J • This char&ct erizati oL of p rot~nsity 
occurs i n one of the porti on s of th . bo ok wh ich were 
the lat e st t o be writt &n . This theo ry i s part of the 
ge:n~ re, l c o!lc ..,rtion o f dure.tior: as subj .:.: c t iv~ . 
Prot ensity is the i n t ens i t y of the movements of 
att·:Eticr•. We;.rd ' s theory se e<clS t o be th',t we 
r e c c)gn ize durf~tic-n by the change or rhythr:. of atter~tion 
i n r e lation t o c ertain perceptu a l obj ects . These · 
chang6s ar e sometimes t e r med by other psychologi sts 
, ... .., v .,-·,-:.·-+s· of "'t-~"-"nt l· c- 1 2 I!lv ._t~.I!Ol..:.. u _ ~\, :.., ..... : .1..t • Of course i n the obj-?-cti ve 
de scr i pt i or. of dur <.>.t i cn change o f the c o:n t i:n.:.um is 
essential . The locaJ. s i gns furnish the: c l u e to 
c haLges Yvit h i v the who le• . 
En.lbj .ctiv B. 
t o b6 from th8 r elat icn of th e changing par t t o the 
pre c- r_tat ~cual whole . Thi s c hange ir~ the. p r 8sen:t<:;.t ional 
But this objectivE:: c ou.nt t; r r ·c:n·t would I lOt be pos s i ble 
· . nithout tht · c o:~ti>Llou s at·ii Emt j c.,n of tho subj -sct wh ich 
abide s throughou t the cht.nr;e . Th i s se ems t o be 
We.rcl ' s final t heory of dure.tict:•. 
It i s r.O'd cl0aa: tha., dura.tion is only att. ri bLl..t 6d 
t o th •.:; sense- d.atun1 bec i:tuse of it s r e:la t ::..on to the 
1Ps•chological Pri~cip lee , p . 217 . 
N. S . , 29 ( lS20 ) , 133 . 
The co~tinuum ae a whol~ 
r e:ma. i r-s be catls e i t is the extens i ve fi eld o f 
c 0: t i!:U Uiil abidr:;s b e c c:ms B it i t:J t he whole wh ich 
corr-s~onds t o t he abiding un it y of the sub~ 'Ct . 
Th ~.:~ :...·e a::c·e ch c:mg<::.s wi:thi: , the. eeL t i l uum just as the r e 
cxt er~ s i ve fi eld r e ma i ns . Th e l o c a l signs d o no t 
sll ift. Now it i e cle a r that the pre s0ntati cnal 
'ou t i n o _e e -:m s e ab ides . 
We a r e non i n a pos i ti o~ to answe r cur essent ial 
que8 t i ~n , i. e . what do es the presentaticnal c onti~uum 
me En f or i n dividual ex.vs:c· i e.nc e: . We have f ound t hat 
i t is the whole of s ensory presentat i ons a t ahy given 
r:.omer.t ; t hat thi s sensory wh olE: ie extend ed a,s a whoJ.6 ; 
'·~~d t hat th is ext cn.s i t ~r makes po s ~d. b J.. e by me £JLS of 
d iff e l'Emt ia,tj cn s withiJ, it lo c r:~.l signs or the pJ.e,oing 
o f d. if:fe:re::::.tiated quali t.i e t> by me~:me of mut ua..J.ly 
excluded.. p l a c e s . Thi s s enecry c onthtuum by virtue of 
att~nt i on is charact eriz ed b y durat i cn or a r at e o f 
c hance . 
qualitiee:: of d if :f:' e l' t ,nt plac es within it. ' 
char.i.g e.::; C;?.r .;;; aspects of th e c oLti;.: uum per s e ; but th e 
p rot ene i t y or temro o f cha :,ge is sub jective . Th 6 
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p r esr::.ntat i GLal cor:. t i :Luur.!l i s no t obv ious be c aus e of the 
~r orr ine~ c e o f the diff0 re~tiati o~ 8 wi t h i n it , and of 
t hs new i n t egr ati c·n s o f th8 dif fe r- e1~.tiat i cns wh ich are 
our perceptual ob jects . Th e' mar~ ifoldne e s of t h e 
porc eptua1 fi e ld o f att ention obscures the ext c.rs ive 
c 0nt i~u ity which cha r a ct e riz es it a s a whol e . But this 
6xt en sive c oLt lrluity is foi· Wa rd th ~::; e xpla. ... ati u-~.J. o f 
loca l s i gns and the p os s ibi l ity of mental a rowth . It 
i s the ke y t o ths obj ec t ive cha r a c teristic of 
e xpe r i en c e wh i ch make s poss i ble ps ycho l og ic a l 
e :x:p lan e.t i or:. . To the p r obl r;:m of e x:r;:• lan.at ion we now 
turn . 
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CHAPTIGH VI I 
TH~ PHESEHTATimiAL CO~TTINUl.H.1 AHD GEI:JETIC PSYCHOIJOGY 
The Plas ticity of the Pre ::Hmta.t io:na.l Co .... t i Euum 
l. Th e p reee~tat ional c onti~uum as ths ext ~nded 
senso1-y fi e l cl wh ich i n c l u de s all th <:• sen sat i on.s a-t any 
on ~:> mon't Ant as one c onthtu ous fi eld i s an ex .: lematicn 
of l OC i:1,1 signa . Wa1~d ' s t heo ry e x-p lain s that a er: ct 
o f topical exper i ?nce wh ich Lotz e 1 s tht-zory l eave E. 
o bscu r e , i. e . Wa:c d ' s t.heo ry of an ext t;-:L. s ive c cr.t inuum 
as t h~' gr ound of differ~:nt iat i n explaL 's th e incr eo.s ~d 
t ol:; ical discrimi nation \11Thich characte rizes men·!ial 
growth . Extensity i s the ground of le.ter;t p lura li t y. 1 
So much has be en made c lee r by our l:; r e li rrd.n <.try 
a n alysis of the cc.;tL.mun c cL C ~J.:t i c-.L , Thil;l ana1ysi8 
i tsel f had t o take i ~: to acccn.m:t "the expla.r.~.auory nature 
of th e c on ti~uum . The c or:t j_r.,.uum p rov e.d to be th6 
grov.r:t d of local s i t,n s . But t h ··, c ont :i.nuum as an 
more c omp l e·se -explanc::.ti on of the notion of d i ff e-: :r en -
tiati on and th· r etr:cnt i c.r, o f d iffe r er2.t iati on . I t i s 
·t;D. e plast icity of the pr E;:::ente~t i. ona. l c o::-:c ti .;.Uum wh ich 
PriLcip l 9s , p . 147 . 
explai n s mer .. tc.:-1 growth. 1 
The notion of plasticity, as u sed by Ward , i a an 
analogous one to t hat of biology . It i s a struc t ural 
t e ::cm a 1d inclica;"Gc:::~ tlH:: CB.:fJa c i ty ·to bs mo d ifi ed by 
p r evi ou s modifica ticnB :p roduc Hd by fur:cti cr:. ar e. 
r e-tE,. i r.ed a s permanertt modificat i cr: s of that which i s 
The most primal aspect of 
r-1""' .!-~ C i ~- y f ~· I' 11'J"'r<..-'l • c 1 C.ll'f fp·· ~·.nti...,--i, , .,. , 2 ~J c .. ,_, u J. ..,. u v v. o.. ... J.. Jo;' - ..., .;. !\,;. _,.. _a, ,J -'-··.1. • This t er m 
i s a biological on e ; and ths psycholc-·g i.oa l c anc er t i on 
d ·:.not E:, '~ by i t i s ane,logous t o th e. bic•l ogi co.l. 
Fu.n ctj_on , by e, divi sion of the c ont j.nuum , brings out 
th0 l at0nt plural ity. We fi n d tha~ by analysis of 
m6nt Hl g r o\vth t h e pr~~v i ou s ly undifi'e r -: nt iat e :~. hec cmes 
d i ff e r Rr.;, t i a t ~i d . "If needful, ·we mi gh t find .. i D 
b iology f ar b t~e r ana l og i e s to the p ro gr e s s ive 
d if f t::l·er.t i e..ticn of e xpe r i t;nc t: than i n th e phy s io FL l 
upbui 1di ng of mol ecules . Th e p ro cess r 6 s emb l es a 
. 
p.arti c;,,J. s egmEmtation of wh c.tt is Ol'i g i n a1 J.y cor.~.tinuous 
r athor· thar.. an aggregati c-r~ of e l ernen.tb a t first 
I t i e to b~ noted that differ~nt i aticn of the 
l i .. . ~ OJ. C<. . , 
2I t i •• pp . 75- Ba . 
3 I , · d 01 • J p . 76 . 
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pr eser. tati :: :~al c on t inuum i s the di ff.;_r~r~tia o~ i cn o f an 
ext el oo ~io ve fi £=:ld or to t u m obj e c t i vum . Ev e ry 
diff~rsnt iat ion ha s an absolut e pos i tion within the 
c o:~t i Luum . There are ' mat t er s of f ac t' wh ich are t he 
mer~ awar ~ne ss of these diffe rentiat i ~~s . The thetic 
or ex i Btential p r oposi ti cns which rve menticm 6cL i n th e 
d. i s cussicn of Ward ' s theory of kn ow::..ecige a:re the 
v erbal exprc-; ss i ons of th eBe simple matterr:; of fact. 
I n the in~ersonal proposit i on the 'it ' refers to the 
'Nhole conti r.:u um wi th i n which th e diffs r entiated sens e-
Th i s t heory of s enee- dat a as 
absc l ut e :y J.ocat.=.cl Vii t h i r.; a coEti:r;u um has a_. very 
r~al i stic sound . The ex i sten t i al prorosition i e 
a.bsolut-:'l bec e.u se cf the ext ~nsity of the p r e-ser.tation_al 
c or:. t i :uum . But VJarcJ. dif fe rs fro m Alexande:r , Russell , 
Norman K emr~ Smi th , an d. others of tne; r e-alistic schoo l 
i n tvv v e ry i m1.: ortant r egards : ( 1 ) s ens~-knowl c. dge for 
Viarcl i s phenomeneol a.n d r elativ e to t ..1e p e r c e iving 
i ndividual, and h en c e is not mathernat ic a.:L knowlt:; dg6 ; 
( 2 ) the seu:~e-data a,l' e not l oca.t e~d iP homog <:: IJ.AOU8 
. . h . t 0 s pac e ou\i • a v e pos1 1 0.:~ i n a c ontinuum wh i ch has 
n e ither t he hon~geue ity n or simp licity of s~ac e . 2 
l. 0 ( ) ~ lDd , N. s., 28 1919 ' 258- 267 . 
2p h - o - p o o 1 } I o eye Q_LogJ.C 8, 1 rln Cl f es , p . ~-':::: . 
by means of t ~e a c tivity of at t&~tion . Sense-
k~ow~edge is not ep i stemolog i c a lJy ob~ective f or Ward 
as i t i s for th~ r eal i sts . 
Plasticity i n volves .. ~ot only differcc.nt iati. c t · but 
also th~ persist enc e of the d if f er entiati on . This 
r Et er ,JG ive- ne E; 8 i s i mpl i e d i n the c onc epti on of 
; r ogreee ive diffe r entiat i on . Ret ~ntiveneB e i s n ot to 
be c or.fus e d with mamory . It i s not a c ont r ast of past 
an d preee.r.t but a me r e r f t erti cn o f diff r: r entia.t icn s 
o.; C e ma.de . Let u s c or.s i d.er vv i th Ward on. ~;, of his ovm 
I t may makA the c onc eption c l eare r . 
"Suprose , t h en, t hat i r.~ the c our se of a f er1 m inut e;;:;~ we 
take half a Ci.oz en g lc:'cn c es at a st r ange and curic1..:ls 
ih ich vrr:- mi ght symbol ize ae F1 , Fz , ... F6 • But 
r athe r , at first only the gener~ l out l i n6 is note ~ , 
n ext t he di spositj cn of p~~ala, stamen s, &c ., then the 
a-ctt:.chmc:I~ t of the ant he1·s , positi cr: of the ova~ry, and 
so m1; t he.t i s t o ss.y , s ymboJJ.z i n g the whol e f low0 :r: a .. s 
[p' ( ab ) s' ( cd) o" ( fg )], we first B.pp r ehend s ay 
[ p' ... s" ... o'], then [p/ ( a b ) s " ... o'], or 
[p " ( a •.• ) s" (c . . . o' ( f ••. )] ' evr.:.d so forth . It i s 
bec au E.o the traits firBt att endecL to per :'J i Bt that 
t hos e not ics d le.t er form e.r! adcl.. i t i on to th e:m so · the.t 
tha c o~~ lex a t lenGth may be cos plete .w 1 The earl i e r . 
1r· · · s ~ bld.' p . , .L . 
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d i f f -:: ::-e ... t i a t i o::J. B do n ot f a.de EWv<e,y l i ke r i p:c l c s upon 
t he wat e r . They r~ma in as a mo dificati on of t he 
The o l de r modificati ons a re net " like o l d s cc:t rs 
bes i de n ew one s ". New differ en tiations a r e combi ned 
vYi th t h e o l der diffe r ent iat i c ns " li.ke a cent i nua J.ly 
gr owi n g p icture ," a ble1di n G of t he old wi t h t he ne~ . 1 
Thi s ble~di~ g of t hs o l de r and the n ewer diffe r sn-
t i ati on s Wa r d t e r ms ' assimi l ation '. Ward p rot ~ st s 
tha t t h is b lending i s n ot a ssocia t i on . "For th e 
exp er i 'lncir'g su"b j ect ther~ i s appar~nt ly at this 
s tage -- a~ we have already urged -- ne ither the 
nume1·ioa,l d i s tirrctness nor the qua l itative identity 
2 ( A2)• sugc e s t. " 
I t is n ow clea.r t ho.t the notion of the progr e. s ive 
deve lo~ rue .t of the p r ec entat i onal co~tinuum i nvolve s 
d if f6lE.ntiat i r.)r: , r e t entiver:te s s , an d a s s i n:i l at:Lon . 
Thi s i s wh~t War d t 6r ms the plast icity of t h e 
Al t hou.gh p l a st ici t y i s 
the oharac t ~;c r i s t ic of the cor:t i a n .. 1.m , ye t it o hvious J. y 
i mp li ~ s th e d i f fe r e r:. "Giat h 2g activi.ty of the surJ j e:ct . 
l r· . , O l Q . , 
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1 Co rr eBpond.eno e 1 ~.nd Regr ess 
2 . The o o:·.i c e.p t ion o f p l aslji ci t y i s i mp li ed i n t he 
noti on of p r ogr es8 ive di ffersnt i a~ i cn throu gh t h e 
a c t i vi t y 6 f the paycho l oz i ca l s u b ject . A plae t :i.c 
c cn ·t; l r;UlJ.m i s ve ry d i ff ::' J:.' E' l~.t fr ox:~ ·t;h e. c on t i nu of the 
ma:':;h e r~: a.t icians . Th E: pr~ ze.;ntat i cr!al co:r:t i r.;.u u.m i s not 
h crnoe;e .eous . I t i f.:; l i k6 thE me.thsma,t ic c::. l c on t inu 8. 
onl y i !:~ th e; ch ec:-e.c-r, e l' i E:-t i cs of ext ens :i.t y and i n fiEi t e. 
d ivis i b i l i ty . Alth ough Wtu'd deri v ~d h i e not i cD o f 
c ontinu um a s a :p l a s tic ext.;;ns :i.t y c a.p a.b l e of 
· differ~ :tiat i on i s mo r e n esr ly a kin to Ari stot le ' s 
col t i nuum of livi Lg substance . Ari s t otle deriv6s h i s 
physica l c on t iuu nm f r om t h e p ri o r c oLc epti on of v ital 
continu i t y . H~ c onai&ers that d i v i si ors with~n the 
l·.,.., -r~ ,, c b·· c '" ·1··· -- c -'-u"' 1 1 .... ~ F-s 1 J..!. u 1...; 4 .,_;. ~· .._ : .!. : '=- o... t; !;)~ ..!... v J... .... • Th e math~mati c al 
c c:-. t i:.u a a::c ~ abstn:Lct icr.-. s fro w th <Z: c or:.t L .u i ty f ound. i n 
vito.. l qu&.n tit a tiv e c or:. t ir:.u i t y . 2 War d ' s the or y has 
mu ch i n coF:mor.:. •tr i t h thi s Ari st ot t: l i a.n conoepticn . 
The ; ·r €' cer., t;at i.cnal cont 5.r:uu m i s c onc r etE'; and n ot 
a .. bst r e .. c t . I t i s plo.s t j_ c an d. h er;_c 5 not homc gen ecu s . 
Bu t h e d i sagr ees wi t h Ar i stotlE i r< so f ar as 
1Met ., 1040b 10 sq . 
2 I bid . , l06la 28 sq . 
oc:·nt :i .:.mum an<.l not p r e f ormat i cns wi thir. i t a s Ari!;;tc't le. 
t hou ght t hem t o be . 1lard ocr:sj_de;rs the,t s e l e c ti v e 
et. t tS lJ:t i cn i s imr- l i t: c'~ by plf;,s-ti cj_ t y. 
~h ich iur li ~s s lG c ti v e aTt~nt i 0n i s th8 basie o f Ward ' s 
re:; e.nt :i.ver.ess , e,nd aes i iT: i lat ion ars: ane,lo gous t o t hE~ 
a dvanc e t o be f c,'\J.fl.d i n bio l og ica l .a dvanc e. . Th e 
activity of t .. e su 'h ~~ c t u pon t he p l a.sti c o l·;~<:; ct i E:l t h e 
• -1- + . t '· - f b . - . l ' l l L u e.g l' f. u 1cn arc n e c l u e o 20 j_og1ca ao.van.c e . 
c or. o t·.p t:i.cr; of r:sych i cc:: l o~dvc~r~ ct~ , we a r c- l ed bactYra.rds 
fr oir. wi.1e.t we :noF fi r. d to a coLtj Euum which i s l ~'-' f.:3B and 
l e ss diffs r er.t i a t e d a s we p r o c .e d bac k . "Worl:L g 
ba. c l~v.ri;.rds fr om t h is as wt: fi nd it n ow, we: a,l'~ l e -~ alike 
c c:: C '~rt i on o f a to t UJ!:....._o b j t2'Ct i vum o r o bj e: c t i ve. 
c on· j_nuum wh io:O. i s g r adually diffi':!:'Emtia-t.ed . n 8 
d.o<S s not as ser t wha·s th~ vory begi Ln h .g of this 
th~ p r~- ~ tT.tati cr1al ocmtir~UUli! i e an as y -:- t u ndiffe:Cf:L-
l 
~Thomson , The System of An i mat E Natu r e , p . 445 . 
3pA'y·cho loc• ic<=< ~i Pri r,ci ·n l F.>'< T• 76' 
- .4 -- t..; ... -.J-- ... -· •'• - j;· - · __. ' l "-" • • 
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t i at ed presentatio a l fi eld of atte~ti on . Thi s i s t he 
gr e:und o f psycholog ical exp lans..t i c·n . Given thie 
c o::.t L ,uum Emd. the activity o f a t t er.;t i cn , Wcn·cl 
c oneh'Ler s t h a t psycho l ogy ms,y exp lair ... mer.tal gr cwth . 
I t has al r eady bee~ made c lear that ~ard 's 
c oncept i o1-:. of cent ir:u i ty makes nece ssa.ry th e hypothesis 
of the p sycho log ica l i n di vidua,l, an i mae;inary e xp eri en t 
whose life-history "would c orr e spond with all that was 
n e ,;r i n the expe~·i en c e o f a c ertaill t yp ical ser:i_e B o f 
i r d i vidua l e. each of whom advanced a c erta. i r: s t Et,e;;;:: i n 
me _tal differ ~nti ati on .•.. From t h is hi et ory wou l d 
be omitt ed that i nheri t ed r ep roducti c,n of the net 
r esu lt8 of ancestral expe rienc e , that iml&~t e t radit:i.on, 
so t o say, by which alone , under the a ctual c onditions 
o f ex i s t bLCe , r a cial p r ogr e ss is p oss i b l e ." 1 The 
sol uti on of the p roblem of h e r edity is l e f t for 
specu laticns that lie i n the r ea lm of c oncr et e 
psychology of tho:: i nd lv i dus . l life and metaphysics. 
For general paychoJ.ogy the c o .c e ; tior of the 
r:sychologicct-1 ir.;.di viclue;i..l is ct necesse.l'Y one ; fc>r 
wi -ci:J. mlt it geners.l psycho _ogy f &.C:' s thE.:- di lemme. o f a 
ostulate which apparently c or;tr·e,dicts th e f e,cts of 
h eredity. War d th i~ks that h e r edity does not 
c ontra dict the p rin cj.rle of psycholog ical c o~ti nuity. 
lr b~a.- -..., "' h 
..!.. ., ¥ • ru. 
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Th e i .w.ciic e.t L m of the ms.nn er i n whi ch h c x· c.di ty r eally 
CN lf orms with t he p 1· 1:.-:.. c i r l e of c oxiJ i nui ty i s bes t 
postpont:d. until t he geEe r e, l out 1 i nes of r r ogr cse i ve 
davelopment ar e made c lear . 
Th i& phylogAn e tic d e ve lor ·mer,t of exper i ence 
f ol l ows t h e ana logy of b :l..ologicE•.l deve l opment. 
Th is biological d eve lopmen t i s also phylogenet ic. 
War d f olJ.owe Herbert Sp~noer i n hie dev ~ lovment of t h e 
t h eo ry of p ro gr e ss ive diff~r e~tiat i on . S1: er cer 1 s 
theo r y o f 1 cor1·e sponcle:nc e 1 , or t h::. analo gy of physic~~.l 
an d mEmtal grovvth , i n flu enced Warcl. 1 s th t:.o ry of mental 
deve lop me t. II Th e analog i ee that guided Herbert 
Sper.<c e: r in tr e <:~.ting t he sEune top ic a r t. the be:::t we . 
h a ve , and psychology i s much i nd.ebt ed to him on t h is 
scor E< . • .. Be t ween t he advar: c e fr or:; t he eeg t o t he 
c h icken cm d that fr on: the chi ld 1 6 mi r..d t o th e man 1 e , 
t he par alle l , mutatis; mutandi s , i s ve ry c lose ." 1 
The adva n c e of racial expG l' i e ~.t C 6 also f o l l ow·e the 
g~r...e r a.l an a logy of the. gro,vir·g o or:~:t=' l xi t y of the 
biologica l d e ve lop ment of the r a c e . Thi s c or ::cespon-
, f:nce it self i n dicat es that t h e adv anc e of expe,r i enc e 
i s fr o!J the s i mp l e t o -th ~ c omp lex . The e x lan e.-t ion 
of the order a~ d syst e m i n our human experi enc e li e s 
i n the subj e ct and the p l a st ic pres .:.ntat i ont3.. l con tinuum. 2 
1 I b id. > p . 410 . 
2 . 411. I b ld., p . 
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The activity of the su b j ect i s c entral i n Ward ' s 
co:,c epti on of psychological sxplanat i on ; but the 
na ture of the obj ect must be such as t o be a ground of 
mental advanc e . The plast ic s ensory continuum &.s an 
::::xt ens ive f i e ld exp l ains not on ly whe,t i s true i n 
Lotze ' s th eory of local signs bu t also the gront h of 
p l a c e discri fu i nation and mental growth 1 n general . 
diffe r e:r:t t heori es of psychology i nt o an un~xp ot cd 
un i ty . I t even is ext ended i n to a theory of the 
subco lBCious . Thi s c o~c 6pti on of th~ subconscious is 
c-~lso an expr essi·.)n of th ~~ princi p l e of conti.nu ity . 
The Pr •_.,,;:;~m.tat i or~a l Co;;~t i n uum and tne Su bccm.sc i ous 
3. Wa:r·d c onside rs t hat t he f ield of c o ... lsciouanes::J ) 
fin itum: " i n ot her WOl'ds the continui ty of our 
p r '='sentat i onal c ont inuum vYill be. t horoughgoing ) a s it 
y:as with Leibn iz. 111 The l i ne bet1'reen expli cit 
c o~a ci ousneaa and ha zy consc i ousness i s not a c l ear 
one . Th~ra is the f ocus of attent i on withi n the 
Coi.1t i nu um . Othe r obj s cts beyond the f ocus have less 
t l1e gr~E\ter t b .. e ir di etan c e 
1 I bid ., p . 90 . 
3 r·b · -1<1 ., p . S l. 
is f r ou t he 
':) focus . ' ) 
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Th e threshold o f c onsciousn e ss may b e ext ended by 
change o f t h e f o rce o f attenti on . Thi s s eems t o 
i 1 d ica t e t~at the fi e ld of s ensati ons h as no d e fini t e 
bDurdary and i s ocmt ir:u ous with the f ocus of a t tent i on. 
To a ssume tha t the thre shold i s an abso lut e demarcati on 
be t YJ& ::;n th e conscious and the u ncon sci ous n1e s.ns that 
a ttbn ti on might ca ll a non-p r esentation from non- be i n g 
i n t o be ing . Tha.t would me ~;.n. t h a t :r:' r e.sent ati one were 
det e rm i red fro~ one sid~ only , ae f a r ae i n t ens i t y i s 
c onc e rr;. ed . According t o t his vi ew " a man e·,sle•:r 
might aw<.dce p rop ri o motu, but t o e.w;;~k en him wou l d b e 
; '•!r.osr• 1. 'ol""' n 1 
.... ~ ~ • .!.- C -v • The theory of the subcon s ci ou s i s 
no t h i :ng mo r e than the prin cip l e of c ant j_nui t y a rp l i ed 
to t h e f a ct s of p r e s entati on . It was Le i bn iz who 
i r:~ t r ocluc ed t his c on c q.: ti cn i n t o psycholQgy . 
d.e rived i t . 2 fr om h1 m. 
We no'N s e.e that t he pr .;.s entat ior:.al c ent i nuum 
br i n gs t ogethe r t11any 11 previous1y unco~nec t -:ld 
speculo.ti o:.1s i n to unexp ec t ecL un ity." 3 By mf.ans of the 
c cr.:. t j_nuum Lotz e 1 s theory of locr\.1 s i gns i s brought 
i n t o h armony with a th eory g r ovvth. Le i b!1 iz 1 s 
-uheory of -ch t: subc onsci m.H3 is u n i t;:;d with the Kan t i an 
lr b id., p . 93. 
? 
"'Ibid. 
3Th e British J ournal of Psychology , 16(1935), 3 . 
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r ·~ c ogni"t; i on of thG d i st .:.ne t i on between c ent ent or de, tum 
and t he: functi on which or gan iz es the datum. Kant 1 s 
t heory of the man ifo ld i s trans formed into a theo ry of 
differ ent i ati ons within a plastic ext ~ns ity. 
Herbart 1 e theo ry of the p r esentati on i s trans f or med 
i n t o a vital notion of p l asticity which i s modifi ed by 
select i v e att n tion . 
Th e prin cip l e o f cont inui ty h 8,S s ti ll wi der 
aprli cation than we have 8o f a r made c lear. Ward 
o onside~a tha t the~e i s a continuity between s eJBe and 
understanding . To ·c omp let e ly under stand t he 
pp:. eentatL;nal c ontinuum th i s c m~t i nui ty must be n:.ad"" 
axplici t. Th i s i e our next p roblem . 
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CHAPTER VIII 
GaTESIS Oli' TEE SECOIT DAHY COl"TH:- UA AED If7 'l'ELLECTIOE 
The Motor Cont i:r.:uum 
l. The t heory o f mov ement p lays a large role i n 
it fre e two side s : the subject s icl ;;: ci.l! cl the c~) ~t ct side . 
Let us c o~ s ider t hb su bj ec t side first . 
Eon- voh.m.tc,ry at -'-;E.::u tj_ cm i s s1..1.ch .:~.s occurs 
wi thout the i nt e rveLti ar of f eel i Lg . It is th e: 
c og,Tl it:i.v e.. phB.se of e.xp er i ePce. Thi s oogn i t :i.ve p h f·.f:. "': 
of s .. tt 6nti cn caus s e. plee.eu:c e or pe. i n a El a s ubord i no.:te 
"In short , feelir:.g appeo.1·s t o b e-:; an effect, 
whi ch th ~:::c e fore cannot exist without its caus e , tlv :·ugh 
· The u.tt en t :i. l' It which f ollows this 
It i s 
att~Lt i or c o~trolled by fe e l i ng . This a.tt ent i o ..... 
Ke epir.g our exp ositi<:' t.l upon th e 
2 I - · - 55·· DlO. ., p. • 
109 
ple..ne:. of the s imr·lt:: r sttue.tj_ c·n , s L1ce we shall clea.l 
wt th i deas la.t "' r , we fi r .d that to the dif fc::rer .. c e of 
r ec ep t i va ~ d active at t~n ti on t h er e corr esponds a 
diffe r en c e of ob~ect s . 'Active ' at te;r:ti. c•n ie 
dirc ct ~d to motor pree;ents.t j.cn s . Ward ' s th E: o r y is 
... 
tha t att eLt:i c,n t o these obj_ . ct ~: causes a ct ion . Are 
these objects or p resent ~t i 0ns senss~i on s ? 
c o~s i dere that t hey "" rR 1 ....... ... . I t i ~ unfortunat e t hat he 
g ives wO a ccount of the geL0S iB of distin ct l y moto r 
e,lso s or;:e obs curity of u ee.ge i L th<-" t .;;; r liS emr·loyed . 
At on8 time mo tor :p r e sr::ntc.tions are t ermed 1 s e:-:~ sC' ry '; 2 
a t ne t her time t h ey ar e plac s d i~ oppositicl t o 
Th i s c on fu s ion i s du e to th e sh ift from 
ane;. lyt ic psycho l ogy t o gen eti c :P sycho logy a.nd b<wl: 
<:1.gc1. i n wi th e:ut mak i ng sx:r;Jl ici t t he ch&.ng e of sta.n.dr oin t . 
c onti!'Uum as ar.1. u n.differentiat &cl s ensory e~~t e .s ity i s 
t h~ only obj ect and t h e glT und of exrlc:n:o.ati cn of th e 
<ievs lopiiLg exp er i ei:.c e , th e rwtor objec ts ~ h ich e> r e not 
00~ t i ruum a r e s en sory in char a c t e r . 
lr . , OlCL. , p . 137 . 
2 I bid ., p . 13 6 . 
3 I b id., p . 137 . 
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mo t or p r .... :;-::;L t u t t c'-'" s f or m a cent i :cuur!l which is 
distia ct from t he s ;:::nso :cy o0ntinUl1.lD . I r.1. g-:;net io 
e xr,l e.na.t o:cy p sycho::._ogy mot or p r esent o,ti or- s a 1·e i n th 
Wa:cc:.. un f ortuna.t ely do_ ;:; ll..:_:, t 
w&k~ c :ea r th ~ st atus of the t wo type a of ob ~5ct a i n 
-,• c.,~· Ct 4 V A 1 
- ..,.CJ.i ..L - . Henc e t herv i s not a sharp di ff s re~tiat i on 
bet~ee~ S9nso ry and mct or objects . 
'i.Larvati ~~ ~ ~ff ort or r es i s t ance ' ar e sharp ly 
co .. ~ t tnuum . 
not J ossess~ · by t he r es t of the pree~nt ati oual 
oo11.t i :;.uum. "The broa( f act w~~ vrant t o se i z e i e , t he,t , 
We c~~1ot explain paychoiogically the 
l r ,), d. ,..., 
I l. • .> ..£:-" • 68 . 
order i n which part i.cular sight;e and. sou ls occur ; 
but t he ElO Vem r:::ntz ths,t fol low them, on the oth.;:. r he::.nd , 
cE\ be ad~:qu.ate ly explaine-d only by psycho logy . 111 
Ap~arsntly ward c ons i dsrs t hat th esP mo t or 
pr 92~nt at i c~ a hav~ ext ens ity which they or iginally shared 
·r i th t ht: r ~~ c; t o f iih~ ! r es ertta. t io:r·.al cent in11L.un , b1..1.t 
t l1 i s i s no t th e uniqtte cl1ar:-:r .. Ct ·::: l .. i st ic o f these l" ~ae11-
t r. t j_ ons . 11 I n moto r objec ts , que.li tat i ve eli ff 8rencef:l 
a.r:; o.t a 1:1 i n i mur.:1 , th e conti1mum co ... ~ sisti 1g -..rholly of 
. '.> 
gradatio~s of int ena ity . 11~ 
Moto~ ) r eaentat i o~ s a~e n't what p sycho logi sta 
u su c lJ.y t e r rr1 1 k i naesth •3t i c s ':' !1SHt i O-.\S 1 • Warcl :ra gs.rds 
as p~uts of the. se.~ .. sory c o:r t S.nuum. He 'Nould p r ef,~ r 
to C!;!..ll t hem 1 e..uxilio- moto r obj~cte 1 ; but h e does not 
Ul'g ~ the> -r; srm becaus.:: it has r ~ c ei v<::d no acceptarwe . 3 
Mot or p r esenta~ions , o~ the ot~er hand, are Lot 
but r <.:1.ther 
effor-t . 
bec8.U83 o f th·:: ir r ola:tivs siwplic ity . HellCe th ey 
were t he more r eadily i solat ed from the r est of the 
l uird , o. s. , 8 (188 3 ), 480 . 
2Journal o f Sp ecu lativ~ Phi lo sophy , 17(1883 ) , 171 . 
3Psycholog ica l Prin cipl es , p . 136 . 
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pr""e-.., 1ta:1:; i ·:ma l c ont inUI.un and :=. e t i n oppo si t ior t o t h e 
;:;enera l s ensory c ont i"nuum f rom which t hey Fer a 
d.ev ::: loped. . At f i r st thi s wa s o4e continuum which wa s 
But it t ended. t o br e2.k u p 
i"!1t o mi n.o r con. t i nu ci... " Movements , v1fE: mu st suppos"' , 
or iginally belonged t o one undi f fe r entiated , or 
r c: ,t h:::1· i mperfectly di f fe r :mt iat .:' d cont h1uum; but as 
d e vs lopment a.dvanc e , t ended mo r ~ and morb t o be c ome 
l i ke se1 .. BE,,tions , a c ol lect i o:. o f specie.l c ontinu a , i. e . 
grou;~ s o f dls t inct mov ement s separately poseible and 
&drnitti~g of definit s combin~t i oJe i~ va ri ous l rays .n 
D iff~: r etnt iat i on o f the 11oto r c en t i r'.u um i s due t o 
Fee J.in~ che;ng (;;l ::~ t he inte.~..~.si t y of t he 
attentj.on c:·md t hi s c ~:ms es mov ernen t . 
then, t hat we h a v e at any g iven moment a c &rtaiti 
di st ri but ion of at t."-r.:. t i m;. b~.t ri.:::sn sensor y anJ. mctur 
pr'3::;ent a t i cn s; a ch&..nge i n t h<: t di s t r i but i on wi.lJ. 
n ean a change i n the 0 ff~ctive i nt ensi ty o f so me o f 
t hese , a~d , in t he c ~:a of the mot or p res~nt ation s , 
oh:- ng·:: c f int en.sity Ele CJ. •. s , at any n~.te , a. t ... nd.~m cy t o 
of of th ~ i nt ensity of 
The~a p e cu liar aen 8 ~tionu , called ' mot or 
pr e8ellt~t i ona 1 , are control l ed by att ent ion . 
1 I b i d ., p . 137. 
~ 
""'I b i d . , p . 54 . 
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So mu ch has already been rncv:le c le[~,. r . Li keviist? thr=>.y 
cont r ol t o som~ ext ~nt o th ~r sensation s . II It i s 
t J be r 0 il::G!llbereci t hat the SUbj ect obt ain s COGD:o,nd. o f · 
out of the mass i nvolved i n 
e;·rlo t i ~;nal expr e :::f;l i c·n only becaus-::. snch movements , when 
they occur , ar e f cund t c c ontrol c ert a i n sensutions . 11 1 
Now these controll i ng mo veme_t s mak& poss i ble th e 
i ntegr at i on of the sensation s i . perc eptions . Ward 
c o1~s iders the:1.t apart fr oE th i s motel' synth~a j_s , .. un e r e 
could b <=> o p~rc erti on . "Apert fr om this int erve~t i on 
o f cc.tt ro llL..g lJ1(' V eEle~.- t s , t he pres ,~ntat i on - c oat i nuum 
no m<:~tt i2: r hoi"r much i t be ca1 e di f fer entiat ed -- would 
st ill r emc•in , f or all pu r poses of 1m.owlodge , little 
bett_.r t hE;,:.n the disc rmr:. ect ed E!2,n ifold f o r 1vhich Kant 
t ook it . 11 2 
Now it i s by me~ns of this i nt egr ation of t h~ 
dif f~ rentiat ~d sensat i ons o f t he cont i~uurn that apac e 
perce~tio~ i s deve loped . Th e l oc o..l signs h eLVe 
but k i naest het ic and ac tiv e 
t a c turl elements ar~ also i n volv ed . The devBlcped 
p:; c ~pt furn i shes the 'in t u.ition of thi.~..gs • i n spac e > 
and also th ~ orientati on o f thin gs i n re l ation t o each 
I t is rnov0rnent ·that ma.keo poss i bJ.e th e 
l_ , . d 
l 01 • ) p . 140 . 
3 I " . i Dli.. • 
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' r.-os i·ti o:·~u1 sj_gns ' or succeBiJi on o f kins,e~theti c 
These pos it i0~al si~ a ar e an i 1va riable succ ese iv~ 
ser j_ ~s o f signs which mu st be pe,zsed t hrough in 
me.!~ i g mo v ements . 
wh Ar9ao th e loc a l eigne ar9 sigts of plac e . The 
form~r ar3 cha~act er iz Ad by euccessicr ; t h0 bv J 
. ~ . . . 1 s 1 mu J.:t .;.,n E; 1 --:. y . 
is not space , as Prof;;: 8EO r No1·man Kemp Smith t h i ks 
The pre s ntational c cn tiLuum i s not 
It is no t r 8cognized 
u.s a c cr.:.tinuum at the perce:ptual l e ve l , o r the c or~ c e:p-
tuev1 leve 1 . 
expe:r i e~1 c e thr:; mot or c onti:~_uum , but not t h e 
" But ··Nher::.as we c e..n on ly 
iDf~r , and that i n a v e ry roundabout f ashi on , tha t 
cur sent:;~·:t i ons L •• ot absolutely di s t i n ct, but partG 
o f onQ mas~ ive sanaa tion , as it w: re , w~ a~e ~ti ll 
li~~ble, 1.n:.de :::..· t he L.flu enc e o f st rong en ot i on , 
direct ly t o exp:.r i ence the c o:rr0r.:~ponding c un t iP.ui ty 
i n th e c~8 ~ of movement ."2 
lr bid., p . 150 . 
2 I bid., p . 53 . 
Th6 pres entat i onal 
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is t o be i ntsll i g i ble . 
eleru~nta~ l eve ls of 
The motor cor.tinuum , i n o :rgEmizatio~J. vi th th ·3 
The gr owt h of s~ace perceptir1 
i n volves the ' blending ' of Herb~rt and th e ' local 
sig~e ' of Lot ~ e . 
i n volve not 011.:Ly p re s e;:-~t ex-per i er:.c e but also exp~;r i e ... ;. c ee 
of ·the past Th i s r e- pr essntation is i nvolv&d 
i n th e c c~cept i cn o f aasimi laticn wh ich Ward coLBiders 
t o b r:; s. funda.m:mt c,l e.sp ?ct of thE> plc:.;,;s t i c i t y of the 
pr s ~ s-tati onal c ontinuum . 
o f pE-rc eption l e.::.ds u s t c Wa ::.· :l ' s theory of th e ne.tur e 
a~d ge~~a i s o f the ideat i oLal cont inuum . 
Th e I deational Co~tinuum 
2 . w~rl h as traced the genes is of the ide&ti onal 
c o:.lt i:nu um v ':.-ry carefully . ".. . I t s e,..,ms rncmife ~t · 
out of , or d iff2rsnt i at ea fr om it in c ona0quenc~ of 
'') 
i1lOV81£:'9E t S O f o, -~tenti.:;H . 11 r.., Th e traoi~g of · the genesis 
lr . . 
0 1 0. . ' p . 167 . 
2 ~ , . , 
.L Ol '-'. . , p . 177 . 
Th e f irst i t ~; :-cmed.i at c f.:.rrr, is the ' a ft :~r -image ', 
a f o rm wh ich We.rd would p re f,~r to ce.:a ' after-
-, 
sans ati or '.~ It i s t 0 be noted tha~ ' afte r-
s~~sbt i c~s ' r em~in as ve etigQs o f perce;t ~ a f te r t he 
still . th~y are not aff ~ct ed by moVAffient as perc epta 
c.trb . "If we turn away our e ysa we cease t o s e~ th e 
f lE1.me at 'Nhi ch we h ,;_ve ber::n look ing, but th e -.ft~r-
c o~..._ tinues loc alj_s~J. i ::-· th•.:; de. rk fj_ e ld of e i ght, e.v e:n 
2 if we close our eye 8 altogether." 
These ar~ cases " i n wh ich sights or 
s ound.s , usually such as a t the t ir~e W""Jl' 'S engrossL.g 
eve~ dnya af~ er th e phy s ical etimuli, as we l l ae the ir 
Th e earli 6st f orm of the ide~ or image p ro~er is 
l i , . -. DlC.L ., 
Zp- ., 
_ DHl . 
3I h i"" 
....., _v.,.. ' 
p . 174 . 
p . 175 • 
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wha.t Fechner oa,l l ecl the 1 memory aft ;;~ r· - i tf;t ;, g~: '. "A s an 
in stanc e of what is meant may be cit ed the familiar 
experi enc e that a knock a t the door, the hour struck 
on the clock, the fac e of a fri end whom we have 
pass ed unnotic ed, can sometimes be r ecognised a f ew 
mi nut es lat er by means of the persisting i mage, 
although -- apparently 
entirely disregarded. 111 
the actual impression was 
Ward considers that the elaboration of these 
forms out of the pr e sentati onal continuum is du e to 
the acti on of subj ective selection. There was 
a t tenti on upon the recogniti on asp ect of the percept. 
Some animals show a sagacity ca lled by G. H. Lewes 
' p r eperc eption ' e.g., "the sight of ic e yields th e 
for efe el of its coldness , the smell of baked meats a 
f or etaste of their savour. 112 It is not oworthy that 
this preperception is domi nat ed by subj ective i nt ere st 
and r eveals a c erte,i n i ndependence fro m the present 
percept i on due to the i nt e r est of a tt ent j_mL Ward 's 
t he sj_s is that due to attenti cn domir ... a ted by i nt e r est 
this r e~pre s ent ative a spect of experi ence ha s developed. 
Slowly it is emaJJ.cip a.t ed from the p r es en tati ona l 
cont inuum until the i n1s..ge proper i s fr ee and ma y b e 
1Ib. , 175 let., p . • 
2 Ibid. , p . 18 6 • 
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br ou.ght back to attention apart from the movements 
which cont rol sensations. 
At first these ima~.ges are generic and without 
t emporal orientation. It is only by the different iation 
and aesirni lat i on of i mages that a recogn ition of 
tem:r:.oral sequence is developed. It is by this means 
that the memory thr ead is evolved. The fre e ideas are 
organiz ed according to the sequence of attention and 
hence have an order which is determined by the subject 
rather than the form of t he obj ect. 1 Into this thread 
new i mages are assimilated. Ward does not consider 
that such assimilation is true association. 
Associati on involves . the distinctness of the i mages ; but 
assimilati on does not i nvolve such distincti on and 
S,.,, ... a-· "' tl· on 2 C' .tJ .!. <.'• '- • 
Ward has a theory of temporal signs that is 
analogous to hie the ory of local signs. 
th~ concept i on he borrowed from Lotze. 3 
The t erm and 
These 
temporal signs ar e signs within a con.tinuum of idee.s . 
As we have seen, they r epresent the order of att eD.tion 
given t o perception . Thus the memory continuum stands 
in contrast to the order of perc eption . 
1Ibid., p. 205. 
2 Ibid., p. 183. 
3 Ib. ' 10.. ' p. 203. 
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In harmony with this general theo ry of the 
memory continuum as a ' thread', Ward con siders that 
association is by contiguity alone. Othe. r forms of 
associe..t ion are deriv at i ve from this primitive form. 1 
The contiguity, however, is due to the selective 
movements of a t tention which hav e organized the 
"Thus the most important peculiarity 
of this continuum is that it "is a series of 
repre sentations i n tegrat ed by means of the movements 
of attention out of t he diffe r entiations of the 
p rimar y or presentat ion-co ... ~t inuum, or rather out of 
so much of these differentiatic.'i) S as pertain to what 
we know as the primary memory-image ." 2 
The memory thread is a mere s eries of i mages . As 
it i s elaborated by the repetition of events , the 
t hret d is deve lop ed into what Ward calls a 'tissue '. 
Thi s is the i deational continuum. 3 This contir::.uum 
i n vo 1 ve· s wee,k and strong port ions . Images do not 
form a mere se ries within it. "One who had met the 
king but onc e would scarcely be likely to 'think' of 
him without f inding the attendant circumst ance s 
r ecurring to his mind as well; this could not happen to , 
libid.' p. 192. 
i3 Ibid., pp. 196,197. 
3r, . ~ OlCI.. . > p. 199. 
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one who had met the ki ng in a hundred diffe rent 
scenes. The central representation of t he whole 
comp l ex would have become more distinct; wher eas the 
s everal divergi ng lines, by i nvolving opposing 
r ep r esente.t i ons, would tend to neutralis e each other, 
so that pro bably no de finit e bac kground would be 
r e i... etctted. "1 The ideational continuum contains 
generic images and not me r e ly a train of specific 
i mage s. It is not a s eparate continuum that stands in 
cont re.s t to the memory cont i nuum. It is a trans-
formation of the memory contirJuum. It. makes idea s or 
i rnages even more fr ee than they were in the memory 
coD tj.r:uum. 
War d does not exp l a in the r elation of i deation to 
action . He evidently consider s it obvious from his 
general theory. It mu st fir st be notic ed that 
a t t ention may be dir ected to a train of i deas rather 
t han the sensory cont inuum. 2 Action which is due to 
the domi nation of feeling which in turn was caused by 
att ention to the ideational contir.uum furnish es us 
with the simp l est form of ideo-motor action . This 
activity which is due to the ideational continuum may 
be very rapid or it may be tardy i n execut ion. 
1Ibid.' p. 199. 
2Ibid., p. 56. 
l 3C. 
The activity of attention may be directed to the 
manipulation of · ideas themse lves .1 Thus an ent ire 
psychosis might be almost entire ly in the attending 
to the ideati onal continuum, i. e ., both passive and 
active att ention might be given to the ideat ional 
continuum. 
Ther e is another obscurity i n Ward 's exposition 
of the theory of ideati on. It is not clear how the 
presentational and idea.t i onal cont ir~ua a re r elat ed i n 
deve loped human experi ence . 11 For it seems manifest 
that a s econdary conti r.uum has been i n some way 
f or med out of, or d i f ferent iated from it in consequ ence 
of movements of attention . Still the p r ecise 
conne;x:ion of the two continua is very difficult to 
det ermine. 112 Ward 's onl y answer is the tracing of 
the steps by which the ideational continuum was 
develop ed. How i mages ar e formed out of i mpr ession s 
after the idee.tional continuum is form ed is not made 
clear . The assumpti on s eems t o be that it is du e to 
attention . The method of genesi s , however, is not 
made explic it. 
It is now clea r why Ward terms the ideational 
continuum a secondary continuum , and the presentational 
1Ibid.' p . 56. 
2Ibid., p . 177. 
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con·tinuum the primary cor:tir;.uum. Thi El usage is 
appropriate at the l evel at which ideat i on is 
explicitly developed. Thus the t erm presentat ionr:~l 
cont i nuum has two slightly divers e usages. First , it 
means the tatum obi ectivum at the leve l of development 
at wh ich th~ fi e ld of consciousness is one sensory 
continuum. Second, i t also means the sensory fi e ld 
which stands. i n cont r ast with other presentations, at 
the levels of the development where explicit ideat i on 
and i nte llecti on have deve loped . The former is the 
exp lanat ion of the development of ideat i on and 
i nte llection ; the lat ter is the exp lanation of the 
local signs and i ncreas ing discriminati on . But the 
diff~rence between t hem is one of the place of the 
sensory field i n the genesis of the mental life . 
The s A are two aspect s of one . genet ic theo ry. I n 
general, however, Ward uses the term 'pre sent ational 
continuum' t o .denote the primitive continuum from 
which by subjective s election perception, ideat i on , 
and i ntellection are developed. That brings us to 
the next point i n our inquiry: how is int ellection 
developed upon this theory of explane.tion . We shall 
deal with the problem briefly, since only the main 
outlines need t o be made clear . 
132, 
The c·ont inua and Int ellect ion 
3. Thought for Ward is discursive. If • • • Thinking 
at our level -- may be broadly described as solving 
a problem finding an ~ that is b. In so doing we 
start from a comparatively fixed central idea a and 
work along the several diverging lines of ideas 
associated with it -- hence far the aptest and in f act 
the oldest de scription of such thought is t hat it is 
discuraive.rr 1 Thought is an elaboration of 
ideat i onal content in order to achieve some end. 
~~'Like other forms of purposive a ctivity, t hi nk i ng is 
primarily undertaken as a means to an end, and 
especially the end of economy. It is oft en eas ier 
and always quic ker to manipulate ideas than to 
manipulate real things; to the common mind the 
thoughtf~l man is one who •uses his head to save his 
:::! h ee l s 1 • ""' This is not a matter of mere abstraction. 
I t is selective att ention to determine "light-bearing 
and fruit- bear i ng co rnbinati ons". 3 The motor i mage 
of the name is very helpful in this respect. It 
fr ees the mind to a larger extent from perception than 
1 Ibid., p. 295. 
2Ibid., p. 30'3 . 
3 Ibid., p. 304~ 
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do es the concrete generic i rnage . 1 It may be mo re 
generic and is much more flexibl e than the i mage . 
Henc e it is the i nst rument of all but the most 
elemental thought. 
Concepts are formed out of the matrix of the 
ideati onal tissue. 2 Associ ation , for Ward, is by 
means of c ontiguity. Thus even i n the ideational 
cont i nuum the perceptual order still controls. But 
upon the intellectional level ther e is a n ew situation. 
D~e to selective att ention, aspects of the ideational 
ti ssu e are isolat ed and by attention are organized 
i nto n ew uniti es . 3 Thus the ideational continuum 
furnishes -the material of b 1owledge. But the form 
comes from the organiz-ing work of attention. First· 
i ntellectual at tenti on analyzes the material of the 
ideational continuum, and then it re-synthesizes it 
into new uni t i es . 4 This is the creativity of thought. 
Thought is activity. But it organizes given material. 
Pure thought -- a mere analytic concept -- is the 
selective activity. But it do es not exist apart from 
material which it oper~te s upon. 
lrbid., p. 296. 
2rbid., p. 302. 
3Ibid., p. 313. 
4Ibid., p. 305. 
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Thought does not exhaust knowledge . There is 
sense-knowledge which is a mer e awareness of 'matters 
of fact' i n the p r esentational continuum. But thought ' 
is a t the l eve l of the analysi s and synthesis of 
ideational mat eri a l. Thought-knowledge ia mor e than 
awareness; it is the elaboration of material to 
det s rmin e "light-bec-~ring and fruit- bearing 
combinations". Th e categories ar e functi ons of 
synthesis. 
We now see how, due to subjective selection, 
i ntellection deve loped out of the ideati onal cont i nuum. 
Intellection is not a continuum. It is an 
organization of the ideational material into ne,w forms. 
It i s not possible until ideati on has suffici ently 
advanced to make poss ible mobile images . But the 
diffe r ence between ideation and intellection ia vast, 
s i nce i magination i s i n t er ms of association, wher eas 
int e l lection brings i nto play r e l a tions that are fr ee 
from contiguity and the perceptua l combinat i ons. 
I nt ellecti on makes poss ible creative choice. From 
the general outlines of Ward's theory it s eems that 
intel lect i on is only indirectly related to t he 
preElentational continuum. It deals with perception 
only through t he medium of i mages. 
We now have befor e us Ward's conception of the 
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mental growth of the 'psychological individual'. It 
is explained by the plastic presentational continuum 
and selective at tention. But the meaning of the 
continuum conception for concrete individual 
psychology has not yet been made explicit. In 
concrete psychology the problem of heredity must be 




PSYCHOPLASM AND BIOPLASM 
The Presentational Continuum as Paychoplasm 
l. Genetic p sycho logy-, develop ed in out l i ne , 
p r esents what Ward consj.dera t o be a schema or out line 
of growing experi enc e . By avoiding the pr oblem of 
h eredit y it makes clear t he outlines of th e general 
growtt of experience. But i :r:_ the psycho logy of t he 
concr ete i ndividua l this achem&, must find its 
justificat i or; . Each concr .,te i ndividual, at what eve r 
l eve l hie experi ence , shou ld fi t i n tc1 the schema. 1 
As Ward pa sses fr om the gener al out lines of his 
g ~net ic psychology to the psycho logy of the concrete 
i ndividual he changes hi s empha sis. 
retains a certbin analytic aspect.2 
Genetic psycho logy 
It is i nterest ed 
in th e: deve lopme-nt of sp ecific st1·uctur eE:J , e .g., t hE: 
i deat i c..nal cont inuum, and so isolates each of t hese f or 
s epar E;.te study. Thi s is nec es sary to r ~ vea l the 
geneti c deve l opment of each. But in the psychology 
of the concr ete i ndividual the i mportant matter ie the 
1Ibid., p. 431. 
3
-b' d l ~ • ' p. 408. 
general synthesis, the organi c whole . 1 In t his 
psychology of t he or ganic whole Ward u ses a new t erm 
for the pr eeen.ts.t ional cent inuum. He t erms it 
1 psychople.sm '. Thi s t erm, he thinks , both emphas izes 
the continuum aspect o f the sensory fi eld, and also 
brings to light i ts c lose affin i ty with biological 
c ntinuity. "As bioplasm, not a concour se of atoms, 
i s fo r the p r esent the linli t i ng t erm for biology , so 
we may spe~l.k of psychopla:sm, and not a 1 manifold of 
s ens ati ons' or ' mi nd- stuff' as our pre8ent t er m i n 
. emp iriCS,l psychology • II 2 
The t erm 1 ps ychcplasm ' emphas izes the conti u ity 
of th~ i ndividual's exp erienc e with his ancestors ' 
exper i ence -- at l east i n some: f orm. Thi s ' plasm' i s 
wh r t i s given tc· the: individual e.s the inheritanc e 
with which to begin hi s experi enc e . It is his 
Anlage . 3 It gives t o the individual i n condensed 
form the experi enc e of all his ancestors. We shall 
explair; t his t heo ry later. For the present it is 
important tha t we understand that for Wa r d t his 
psychop l asm is the i ndi vidual 's pr~e;,entational 
continuum whi ch i s alr eady to some extent elabo r ated . 
1I bid ., pp . 409,410. 
2 Ibid. , p. 412. 
3Ib· · 
.L <l.' pp. 427-429 . 
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That me~m s that the ir~di vidua l does not begin h i s 
experi ence wi th an undifferentiated cont i nuum . He 
begi .s wi th a continuum in which both differentie,tion 
and int egrati o~ have been wrought. 1 This is the 
"psychoplasm" which is g iven t o th e i ndividua l to be 
f a rth er e laborat ed . "We might then conclude a priori 
that al l that can be sa id to be psychologica lly -- as 
distinct fr om physiologically and sociologically --
h eritable is mere ly the peychoplasm that the subject 
elaborates not the 'psyche' or sub j ect iteelf."a 
This psy6hoplasm or p eculium of which the subject 
obtains possession is only a s ensory p l aem . It i s not 
a memory t hr ead or ideational ti ssu e . These ar e 
e laborat ed out of th e ' paychoplasm '. So much seems 
c lear from Ward 's gener al discussion . Howev e:r t h i s i s 
nc:t aff irmed > and the omission has made t he conception 
of ' p sychoplasm' very obscure . Professo r Hicks has 
assumr~d that We-.. l'd cons iders that the i ndividual 
i nherits i me.ges and cone ept s. 3 Profeasor Hicks's 
i Et e: r pr etat i c·n s eems to be r e fut ed> hov·rever > by the 
fact·that Ward c ons i ders t hat children have no 
intellection pr oper . 4 
lIb i d • > p • 42 6 • 
2 Ibid., p. 425. 
Even the i deat ic.r.tal cont irmum 
3Mind, N. S., 30(1921), 23. 
4Peycho l cgicel Prin ciples, p. 413. 
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i ~ no t dev eloped. The ' psychoplasm ' o f whi ch the 
human su bject obt8,i ns possess i on is eh~bora.ted t o such 
an extent that the development of the secondary 
c o_ tirms. and i ntellect i on is he,c1tened, eo t hat i n a 
short t i me the human ch i ld dev elops w:he.t it took the 
.. 
rac e ages to a ccomplish. The details of this concrete 
deve.lopment Ward does not exp lica t e . Suo mor e , h e 
only deals with the p rinciples i nvolved i n hi s th eory. 
"I never contemp l a.ted mor e than Et.n expos ition of 
p sychology as a whole : mer e ly subsidiary details, 
however i n t eresting, were beyond my purvi ew. 111 
Th e Relat icrt of Psychoplasm and Bi opla sm 
2. "The main fac t well-asc er t a i ned by th e 
biologtst -- and i ndeed known to everybody -- i s the 
r esenfblance, due to cent inui ty .and p rop i nquit y, between 
the organisms of pe. r ents and t hose of their 
of fspring -- a re semblance t empered always , it must be 
r e@embe r ed , by more or l ess variation . A like 
r e E:J embla.nc e and ve.r i at ion the comparativ e. psychologi s t 
al so finds on the mi r:.d side. 112 But this r esemblanc e. 
is no t a matt e r of th~ l iving exp e rient; it i s th e 
r esemblance of the psychop lasm or objective side of 
lib" . . . ~a.., p . vi~l. 
2 b" 42 I ~d., p. 3. 
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experience . This is what the i ndividual i nherits. 
Ward realizes that thi~ t heory necessitates the 
coordinat ioll of the not ton of psychopla,sm with that of 
bioplasm. The r e lation i s not superficial. The 
solution he offers is a brilliant piece of biological 
speculation ba,aed in part upon his own car eful studies 
i n neurology. 
Ward makes habit the key to heredity. "In short, 
what habit is for t he individual life that is her edity 
for racial l ife. 111 He espouses the mnemic t heory of 
heredity on l y to transform it. Now habit, as Ward 
un.derstc:mds it, i a not a mere physiological concept. 
Habit can be understo od only fro m the standpoint of 
psychology. It is actic:n which has been subjectively 
i naugurated, and then becaus e of sufficient repetition 
has become automatic. It mu st be remember ed , however, 
that "the repetitions that will suffice to make 'use a 
s econd natur e ' or a habit aut omatic for a J.ifetime are 
very f a,r from sufficing t o ensure herF:di ty for futur e 
genera,t iNLs . Yet unles s the facility and familiarity 
. acquired in a single J. ifet j_me are transmitted in 
some -- it may be, almost i n finitesimal -- degr ee , 
there could obviously never be any transmission at all."a-
1Heredity and Memory , p. 52. 
2Paychological Princip l es, p. 427. 
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The psyohoplaam that the subject obtains is a 
pla.em that ha s been organized i n part by the habits of 
his ancestors. It is clear th en that Ward does not 
sepa 1·ate organic life from psychicEtl life . "We find 
th en no ground for separc:..tir.Lg organic life from 
psychical life: for us all life is experience. We 
cannot therefore assume that experience has no part in 
the building up of th e organism, and only begins when 
a viable organism is already ther e . For us, ontogeny 
and heredity ar e aspects of a .single process -- a 
process that only experienc e wil l explain."l Th e 
clue to this concept i on li es in Wa:r:cl' s theory of the 
nature of th e living organism. For him it ie a, 
functi ona l unity of liviiJ.g selves . Th ere is 
sympathet io re.pport between them. This is their 
functi onal unity. The biologist treats the germ p l asm 
as an ext ernal object. The psychologist furnish es a 
new point of vi ewv when he suggests that the germ plasm 
is a functi onally unit ed colony of psychoids. 
"But what exactly i s this continuity bet·vreen body 
e.nd ger m, and how a:re new acquieitj_cns pa,aeed on? 
The oont i :n.ui ty is whe,t it always was, the oontinui ty of 
membershilJ in a commonwealth where the whole is for 
the parte and the parts for the whole; where all are 
1Her edity and Memory, p. 50. 
more or l ess en rapport . The key to all this is to 
be f ound, I believe, in social int ercours e , not in . 
physico,l transmission." 1 If there is rapport between 
the parte which functionally work together a,e a whole, 
then it is conceive,ble that the germ plasm as a part 
of the- organism is influenced by the habits of the 
organism as a whole. "··· The facility and 
famil i arity acquir ed in a single lifetime are 
transmitt ed i n s ome -:- it may be, almost infin itesimal 
degree. .. • Sti ll the point is that ages may elapse 
before the effect is perceptible . And meanwhile in 
consequence of environmental changes it may gradually 
disappear; or agai~, it may be neutralis ed by the 
amphimixis or blending of bi-p~tr ental charact eristics; 
or it may become ls.tent -- as i n what is called 
atewi sm -- for one or more generations . 
Transmis s ibility, rather than actual transmission, is, 
then, thE;: meaning of the so- ca l l ed. ' le.w of heredity'. n2 
This is the manner i n which Ward considers that the 
individual comes to have his peculiarly developed 
psychoplasm. The germ plasm ho.s been influenced by 
ancest ral habits. This germ plasm as his tatum 
objectivum or imrnediat e object is his psychoplasm. 
1 Ibid., p. 54 . 
2Psychological Principles, p . 42 7. 
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Present ~ti on as a Relation of Subjects 
3 . We now fac e the p roblem of more directly 
r elat ing the physiological and psycho l ogi cal conc ept ions. 
Thi s is a problem ths,t trans cends psychology; but ae~ 
Ward 's solution of it throws light upon his conception 
of expe ri ence , it is valuable f or our analysis of the 
continuum conception. 
Ward 's anthropomorphism is the most bas i.c c J.u e to 
h ie p ychology and philosophy. The r e lation of the 
subj ec t to p r esentations is the basic principl e both . 
of psychology and of epistemology. II Th er e is 
fundamentally only one standpoint -- that of the 
subjective f actor to the objective factor, wh ich is 
immedi ately p erceived in the one [in perception] and 
lllt:ld i ~.tely co. ce ived in the other [in mechanica l 
t heoryJ." 1 In perc epti on ther e is an immed iat e 
a1aranea~ of the pr esent ed obj ect as ther e . 2 In the 
hi gher l evels of knowledge th ~re is an appr ehens i on of 
th ~ obj ect i n t er ms of the activity of the 
i nter pr etati on of the ercept. This i nt er pretat i on is 
possible because the active subject is organizing the 
y.;resentations furnish ed by the ideational tissue . 3 
1Encyclopaedia Britann ica, 11th ed., vol. xxii, p. 60 1 . 
aMi nd , N. s., 28(1919), 259. 
3psychological Princip l es, pp . 301,302. 
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"As r egar ds the r eal ca t egori es , i t may be s a id 
general l y that these owe t he ir origi n i n large measure 
t o the anthropomorph ic or mythi cal t endencies of human 
nl All 
knowledge is thus of the form of subj ect knowi ng 
object. 
Now i n the mechan ica l and other phenomenal 
scienc~ s , the percep t ed object i s treat ed -- abstra ctly 
so Ward thiuks -- as if it we r e no t any sub ject 's 
obj ect , i. e ., as if it exist ed not as a p res ~ntat i on 
but as a thing per se . 2 Also i n being i nt er pr e·ted, 
substantiality is attributed to it in an abstract for m 
without considerat i on being t aken of the necessity of 
seeki ng its fu ll meaning . In short, substantiality is 
no t criticized but is the substant ia li ty of unrefl ec-
tive perception . 3 Abstracti on fr om the fu ll 
imp lication of the knowi ng process makes th i s pos s ib le . 
Witrd r eco gnizes that the r e is an ep ist emo logica lly 
obj ective factor i n knowledge wh ich psychology does not 
cons ider. Psychology i s i nt e r est ed i n the 
presentation qua presentation to a sub ject, which r e lation 
mus t not be deni ed even by ep ist emology. But 
lr· · d - · 334 OJ. . • ' p • • 
? 
"'Naturalism and Agnost1ci sm, pp . 470-473 .. 
3Ibid., pp. 480, 48 1. 
ep i stemo l ogy considers l<:rwwledge a.s r evealing the 
rea l world at the trans sub j ect ive level . It i s 
i nte r est ed i n p r esentations as r evelat ions of t he 
wo r ld of nature and hi sto ry, " t h e world that each one 
c omes t o know ancl di st i ngui sh f r om himsel f and h i s 
psych ica l org~1i sm , only a f ter attaini ng t he 
Psycho l ogy r ecogn izea that 
ther e i s such a f ac to r, but it is i nter ested in i t ae 
p r esent a t ional and not as a r eve l a tion of transsubjeot i ve 
meaning . 
A t heor y of r eali ty must be const ructed i n the 
l i ght of psychologica l truth. It must , ho~ever, take 
it s standpoint of i n t erpr etc:'l.ti on at t he transsubj ective 
l eve l. Ot her wise no wo r ld , as wo r ld, cou ld be 
. cons i der ed . Psychologically , the wo r ld i s only .a 
pr esent ation ; "d i e We lt i s t me i ne Vor st ellung ." 
Ward con s i ders t hat the f acts f u r n i shed by p sychology 
show that t h er e mu st be an anthromorphic int erpr etat ion 
of the wo r l d. "At the out set , thi s world i mmedi ately 
con fronts u s not as one Mi nd , no r even as the 
ma ... i f es tat i on of one , but as an obj ect i ve whole i n 
which we di s cer n many mi r:.ds i r:.. mutua l i nt er a ct ion . It 
is from th i s plura li stic st andpoint that our exper i enc e 
lpaychological Pr inciples , p . 4 17. 
l3 t:i 
ha s in f act deva loped, and it is here that we acquire 
th ~ ideas that eventually l ead u s beyond it.« 1 Wa r d 's 
u l timat e metaphysics is i n the e:c.d the i st ic; but this 
i deal is grounded i n anthropomorph i sm . 
- +' se ..L ..... Ward c onsiders that the simple st hypothesis ie 
that the world of na ture is entirely composed of 
subj ects, a l though some of them ar e of such an 
elemental or der of r eacti on the.t iVe attribut e thinghood 
t them without disce rning t he subj ective r eacti on on 
the ir part. Howeve r , the prin ciple of continuity as 
a sound pr i nciple of method would i ndicat e that the 
r ange of an ime.t ior should not be lirn i ted without 
evidence t(.' the c ontra ry. 2 This then i s th~;:; 
justifi cation of conc eption of the body as a Boci ety 
of psychoi ds or psychologica l subj ects functi onally 
operating t ogether. 
Now p r e sentati on upon this theory i s the r e lation 
of subj ects to ea ch othe r. Since Ward , under Re id ' s 
i.nfluenc e- , r e j ects the theory of. 'subj ective:; stat es' 
th e only hypothesis left t o him is t o assume that 
pre sentati ons a r e the r e l a tion of the subj ec ts which 
make up the sensory experienc e of t he pe rceiving 
subj ect. II Pres ent ation i s a r elation among monads . . . 
lThe Realm of Ends, p. v. 
2Ibid., pp. 60-64. 
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n ot a subj ective stat e in a single mon~d~" l 
Pres entati on is the relation of subjects to a 
pe rcei vi ng subjec t ; just a s attention i s the r e lat ion 
of the perceiving subject to them. In the r e lation 
of pr esentation the subj ects are presented t o t he 
attending subject as the 'othe r than he', i.e., objects. 
As pr esent ed t o the subj ect, i. e . as s ensations, 2 they 
ar e phenomenal. Th ey appear t o the p erceiving 
subject , but their meaning i s not r evealed to him 
unless he i nt e rprets the ir appear anc e to him i n t e rms 
of his own activity. This is Ward ' s theory of 
phenomena and noumena. For him there is no br eak 
bet we en the t wo , but the one only has c omplete mean i ng 
i n the other. Subjects alone ar e r eal; but each 
subj ect i s relat sd to his world. Thi s world is made 
up of subjects. But subjects as present ed to a 
p~ rc e iving subj ect are external and as p r es entations, 
phenomenal. 
A most obvious que stion now confronts us: how can 
this monadiatic theory of ~re sentations be reconciled 
with Ward 's theory of the continuum. Ward ' s own 
answer to this ques ti on is that the monadi stic theory 
is"··· far beyond our psychological f acts : it i s a 
lr' · ,d Dl ., p. 260. 
2Ibid., p. 258. 
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specu lative 'first chapter' i n place of the psychologica l 
one, which we have had t o admit t o be lacki ng."l 
Th e unity of pr es r:mtat i on s a~ems to be due to the fact 
that they a,re prese .. tations of one at t ending subj ect. 
It is the dolllinant monad that makes possible the 
functional org5.nization which makes up a human body or 
community of suujects.2 The th eory of the cont i l'lUGm 
is the supreme expression of the fact that Ward is not 
a genuine monadologist. The functional unity of the 
soci ety of selves is as central for him as the s elves. 
Ward does not need to transc9nd the en~ irical level 
tu fi nd his plura lism tramscended. The continuum 
theory is itself a r efut e.tion of ext r eme plurali sm . 
It is c lear that at the human lev - 1 the domi nant 
monad is relat ed i mmediately to tha monads which make 
up the brain. 3 It is to the monacls or subj ect s 
which make up the brain that the human self att end3. 
The 1:1 e are ita presentati ons. If thi s is so , how does 
t he human s .lf know the sel f that domi r_ates another 
body? This iS possible because the subordinate 
monads min ist er in perfect functi onal unity to the 
dominant self. As i nstruments these subordinate 
lpaychological Principles, p. 412 (foot-not e 1.) 
2Realm of Ends, p. 196. 
3rbid., p. 257. 
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monads ar e so r ele.t !;?,d t o the domi nant monad that the 
pr esentation that t he domi nant monad. has r evectls the 
wo r ld beyond the body , i. e ., t he funct i onal 
organ izati on of selves r elat ed t o the do mi nant monad , 
as well as certa i n aspects of th e body i tself. 1 
That i s the r eason t hat a single locat i on i n the 
pr es entational continuum eveals mo r e thEm one mean i ng. 
The same obj ec t ca have sound , smell, tast e , co lor , 
and kinaesthetic t one . We are e~wa:r e of ov.r bodi es ; 
but they a r e d i aphe,noue for us to whom they be1or.:.g . 
It i s not c lear how i deati on i s developed ou t of 
p syohop l asm . Ward speaks o f i deation and i nt ellection 
f or mi ng an i nner body f or t he s elf.2 Assur edly this 
inne r body i s not f ormed of subordina t e monads . Yet 
if it is not so c oii·,posed, it i s not clear how it 
could be deve loped . It seems that it c ould no t be 
of monadic c onstructi on sin ce Ward uses i t as an 
argu men·t for il:'lmo rtalit y. 
With this exposition of the theory of peychoplasm 
v1e have carried the exposit ion of the continuum 
uoctrine to its speculative ground. We now turn to 
an evaluation of t he theory of the cont inuum . This 
eva.luat ion me,y throw · l i ght upon the expoei t ion itself. 
libid ., p . 463 . 
2Ibid ., p. 400 . 
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Our attemrt will be to show the i mp l ications of 
War d ' s monadic theor y of th~ s Elf . We shall not try 
t o criticize the va,l ic:lity of t h i s funcle.:mente, l 
aeau~pti cn . The evaluation wi ll throw mere light 
upon Ward ' s general theory if we attempt such a method 




1THE LABYRINTH OF THE CO NTINUUM" 
(AN EVALUATIO N) 
CHAPTER X 
EXPERIENCE OR MH!D? 
Is Experi ence the Ul timat e for Psychology ? 
l. War d r e j ects the t er m ' mind' becau se of its 
association with the Ca rt esian occasicnalism. On 
the ot her hand he acc epts Berkeley's s t andpoin t as th e 
correct one for psychology. Ther e is an ambiguity i n 
this double posi ti .:m , possibl y a very fundament al 
i n consist ency. Th e difficulty l i es at this poi nt: 
Ward wishes to ho ld to a t heo ry of know l~dge as the 
r e lati on of the kno·wer and the known, yet he does not 
wi sh to r ecogn ize t hat such a r e lation constitutes a 
new s ignificance for t he obj ect s o app r ehended. The 
obJ ect no longe r r emains as it was bef or e it was 
r elat ed. It i s an appearanc e t o the sub j ect, and 
h ence a s appearance is other than its own selfhood. 
Now this is a s much as t o acknowl edge tha.t the ·pe rc ept 
is other than the ontological obj ect. Professo r 
Hicks thinks that Wa rd is untrue to himse l f i n a l l owing 
thi s t ertium quid to a ssume a central r ol e within a 
s yst em.l Be that as it may, it is c entral, and Ward' s 
1Mi nd, N. S., 46(1921), 7-9. 
1::ntir e psychology and ph i l osophy ar e founded upon i t. 
Ward u s es t he t erm ' expe r i enc e ' t o i ndicat P that 
presentat i on and attention ar e r elati ons of a subject 
to somet h i ng other than he . But t he present at i on 
i tsel f i s not the datum. Att ention it s elf i p. 
apprehens i on i s creative . Ward acknowledges that i n 
his theory of time . From the standr--oint of hie 
o ... .!.tology, the r ela.ti onal theory i s s ign ificant; but 
fro . t he standpoint of i mmedi at e experi ence we deal 
wi th objects as s t and i ng betwe0n the subj ect and the 
things i n thems elves . This i s a pos i ti on that ie 
i d.ent ical with th's posit i on taken i n the nir~th 
edit ic,n. of the Encyc lop~:~.edi&. Bri tc:mni cc-~ . War6.' a 
th6ory is a theory of the mi nd . It is i nter ested i n 
pr esente.t i ons as mental amd not as phys i cal obj ects . 
. It s eems that ·ward wishes to eecape fro m a theo ry 
of ecc entric proj ection . Howeve r, h is ori ginal 
Encvclopaedi a article escapes t h i s t h eory by mak i ng the 
psychological prob lem one of the r e lati on of the 
subject t o ite pr es entations. The ground of the 
presentati o~ s he l eaves t o ontology . 1 In the 
Psychological Princ iples he does the same thing. He 
l ea ves the prob lem of the continuum or igins to ontology. 2 
- - -------- - -
l"'ncyo 1 o..,...~ ~a.',. ~ 
,L.:.J ,j. .J.. .l."""C..tl - ~ Bri tE•.r_;_n ica , 9th ed ., vol . xx , p . 38 b . 
2 Peycho logicaJ. Pri!,c i p l e, s, p. 412 ( foot - no t e 1.) 
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Perhaps it may be thought that our theo ry of t he 
mentc•,l ob j ect is t he sa me c~s Wa1· cl 1 s own a vowed th ·.ory. 
It i s t rue t hat mos t of t he mate rial of th . 
Psycho logical Prir>.ciples does conform to the vi ew h e r e 
de veloped as the t rue one for War d 's syst em; but the 
theory of psychop l aem does not con f orm to it. If we 
u..ssun1e that the pree entati on.a. l c ontinuum is inhe: rited , 
we absolutely separa t e att ention from the structure: of 
t he cont i nuum. Tha t me£l.n s tha t p reeentati <..~r s ha ve an 
i Hhe·rent structur e apart fran: a t tention . Warc.l • s 
theory of s ens e:- data, de veloped .aft 5r the Psychological 
Princip les was writt en , a l so gives to the cont i nuum 
charact e ri s tics sepa r ate fro m a ttent ion. 1 The 
s epar a tion of the ob jects of experi ence from att entic•n 
i s a rema i nder from the presentationalism which Wa r d 
d id s o much to r efut e . If he had deve loped his 
psychology in t er·ms of 1 mivd' i nst ee.d of 1 experi enc e • 
h e might have escap ed more c cmp l et~Z:ly the dualism into 
which hi s theory fal l s. Let us now turn t o t he. 
' 
prob lem of the dua l ity of exp eri ence. 
Is t he Subj ect-Obj ec t Relation Ultimat e for Psychology? 
a. Ward assumes that the pr es ent a ti on is partial l y 
i ndependent. That is the r ea s on t hat he f eels a s 
l Mi nd, N. S., 28(19 19), 270-27 4 . 
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sympat heti c e.s he do es with Her bart ' a th eory. To 
He1·ba.rt 's theory of the Vorst ellung he e.dds the 
conception of function . The quasi-independent s tatus 
of the p r esentati on drove Ward ultimately i ntp hi s 
theory of psychoplasm. 
If the preDentati on is a mental obj ect, the 
manner i n wh ich the e.ubj ect apprGh ends its environment 
we now u se ontological t e r ms then the pres ent at ion 
has no i ndependent etatue. It is an existence f or 
the perc eiving subject alone. It might be treated as 
if i ndep endent, but this would be a very abstract 
pr oceedure . The relat ion of p r esent~\t i on ccmnot be 
eas ily analyzed fr om the r elation of att ention. Ward 
is correct i n g iving a cert a in vividness of i nt ensity 
to the pr esentation, 8,s well as a.ttri buting its order 
and time of appee,rance to conditions which the subject 
did not i naugurat e . This is the validity i n the 
theo ry of presentations . 
It would s eem thc"t the truth which the doctrine 
of independence contains might be p r ese rved as well by 
Ward 's earli er theory of 'subj ective modif ication '. 
However, such a t erm is very mis leading . The 
p r es ~tation ie not the modification of the subj ect. 
It is rather the f or m i n which the subject appr ehends 
its environment . Such modifi cation , the modification 
of the presentation, is not a modification of ~he 
subject. The presentation is the form in wh ich the 
subject apprehends changes with in the brain, that 
functiona lly unit ed society of monads with whi ch the 
subj ect is en rapport. In short, the pr esent atior;. is 
the form in whi ch t he subject apprehends it s environ-
ment . But the pres0ntation is not the environment. 
A s ensati 0n is not a monad . In Ward's ontology the 
presentation is the joint product of several monads 
functi cn i ng together. From the psychological 
stemdpo int, the preEtentat ion is em app r ehended content. 
It is a phenomenon. Thi s s eems t o be the tru: mean i ng 
of Ward 's theory of pr esentations. 
The doctrine of psychoplasm can be r econstruct ed 
in t erms of this less presentational aspect of Ward's 
theory. Properly sp eaking, the pree entati bnal 
c ont inuum is not i nherited . What is inherit ed is 
the subj ect's envi ronment. In functional rela tion 
wi th this environment, th e subject apprehends it. 
Th e form of this apprehension, or better t he 
environment D.S pe1·ce ived , is the prese .:.te:~tional 
cont i nuum. As we sha l l s e:e lat er, it ie the 
presentations which form a. cent inuum. The continuum 
is th E! appr ehended form of p r esentations. It is 
consist ent with a monadology, becs.use it i s the form 
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of the appearance of the monads which compose a given 
subj ect' e environment. The cc·nt i nuum is no t a theory 
of the essence: of being; but a theory of one a,spect of 
function. 
Even if we co&sider the presentat ion t o be mental 
' we st ill have to cons ide r the coordina t e doctrine of 
a t tention. In one s ense Ward ie correct in making 
o~ttention the corre le,tive of presentation : perc epts 
a r e analytically distinct fr om the ground of att ention . 
Even if pr es_.ntatione ar e modifica tion s of functi on , 
t hey do not a rise from t he volitional or emotional 
direction of the mind. For ir~ di vidua1 psycho logy it 
ie function as grounded i n the s e lective activity of 
the self which ie funds,mental. From this subjective 
star.dp o i Et, pr es ent at ions or eE'ns at ion.e are not 
s tr ictly functi onal but are L._t e rr-u.rtions within the 
functi onal order. Ther e i s thus a double r e lation : 
t he func t i onal r Al atio A of att ent i 0n , and the 
modificaticn of that attention which is not inaugur a t ed 
by th ~ attention itself. In this sense ther~ is a 
duality within mind: the duality of attention and 
presentat i ons as modificat i 0n s of attention. The 
subject is the f eeling and will as function. This 
a s modified by perce iving is the mind . 
Is All Knowledge Anthropomo rphic? 
3. The percept is not the thing as it is i n 
itself. The percept must be i nterpret ed t o reach the 
mean i ng of the r eal. This is Ward's theory. He 
holds to it throughout all his wo r ks. It is likewi se 
consistent, and on ly consistent, with the vi ew of 
pr esentations as appearance. This theo ry ia hardly 
to be r econci led with the t h eory of psychoplasm . 
Th e r easoD we have s een . Phenomena can hardly be 
·i nherited. 
Professor Dawe s Hicks thinks that Ward 's mi stake 
l i es in the a,ssumpticm that t he a,ppear<:mce ia othe:r 
than a dim outline of the r ea1 . 1 Ward thinks that the 
perce:t:-t i s always changed i n orde r to gain a knowledge 
of the real. Professor Hicks's theory of perception 
makes the progress of knowledge one of i ncreas i ng 
d iscriminatj_ on . The out lines of the app r ehended. 
real are gradually fil led i n . W.:-1- r d , however, 
r ecognizes that p rogr eE;s in kt: ow ledge r equiree. 
i ntegration as well as differ entiation. 
upon the blind t hat hs,ve caused those who have never 
p r eviously seen to have vi s ion, have allowed a •tudy 
of this synthesis. From this ev idence it i s evident 
that i ntegrat i on is n ecessary for unifi ed p erc eption. 
1Mind • .. N. Q ._, • J 30 (1921), 6,7. 
148 
If int egration is necessary for perception , then 
it would seem that Ward i s correct i n making 
sens ations phenomenal . If we k~:.ow the r '9tl.. l it is clue 
to ir~ t e rpr etcLt i on as wel~- as mere di ff erentiation or 
discrimi~ation . Ward consi~ere that the bae ie of 
t h i s int '-' l'p retat ::. en is the nature of t he. s e lf which 
does the i nt Fr pr e t i ng. The s elf is imman ent in the 
activity of i~t erpr etation. The s elf int sgrat e s a s 
we l as different iat es becaUl;l "' it i s what it is, an 
active beiLg. This activity is th~ ground of the 
i n t egration . This ie the r eason that knowledge is 
anthropomclr phic: the self d iecove:cs t he world through 
its own activity. As it di s covers the wor l d, it also 
l ear ns to krcow itse l f. Thus transsubj ec tive 
b~ow l edge develope with s e lf-consciousness. Thi s 
anthropomo rphism i s apsol'Ll.t ely consist ent with Wa,rd 1 s 
mcl_ad.o l ogy. 
Do eG Ward's theo ry tha t s e lf- c o~s ci ousne ss i s a 
~a~e developm ent bring disc o~tinuity i nto hie 
p sycholc.,gy? Not if self-c on eciouensse is c l~arly 
meod6 conthmous vr i th lc:.s s and l ess diet i nct self-
ceri se i ouesnes~ . It would seem tc• be true that for 
Ward any int erpretatio~, even the i ntegrati cn wh ich 
mak es possible perc ep t iNl , i s i n some sense know l edge 
of s elf. As Ward us es the term , howev er, it means 
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explicit knowledge o f self as ov er against other 
obj ect s . Of c our se- , such knowl edge i s a g r owth. 
But s ome mi nut e kr:owl edge of self s e or:e to b e i mp li '-d 
L~ an y know ledge. We,rd ' s th eo r y of p r e s entation s 
l eads him ast r a y onc e mo r e . P::ces en t att cn s ar e not 
distir.ct front a t t ention . At tent:.on i s i mme,nent i n 
the pre E1entat i orts. Presented i cr... s ca.1nct be s ep&,r a t ed 
fr om atten t j.on . Hen c e any awaren e ss of the 
pre sent cLt ior.:. is an a warene s s thc~t invo lve ~: r e c og,11i t i on 
o f atter. t:i.or.: . Att ention f ir: ds itself i n i ts own 
products. Ward sometime s makes his p r oblem very 
d i ff icult by attempt ing to r ea.ch the: limit i n g f acto r s 
o f the psych ical l i f e . We shall treat of this d i ffi -
cu lt y la. t e r . 
Granted t ha t aLL kn owl edge i s anthropon~orphic and 
a l ways i n vo l ve s some d i m awc:~ren ess o f s e l f, do es it 
nec eElSc!,rily fol 1ow that al1 knowledge i s fundan,enta. l ly 
p r act ic&.l ? Ward answers t h is quest i c:·n by s how i ·=g 
the ori g i ns of thought. What he s e ems to mean is 
tha t lm o':i l e d.g "" c c:u1 ~,ot b e unde1·stood without app reciatin g 
th e purposes whi ch unde rli e it. Att ention i s a 
functional uni ty . Cogn ition_ and vo l ition are 
mutually i n vo l ved i n developed th ·u ght . Ward 
c onsiders tha t the mean i.n g o f kn owl edge must be sought 
i~ th e total psychosis of wh ich th e knowledge i s a 
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part . Knmvledg ~ i s a meE;ns t o the atta i nment of the: 
' good '. Of course the va lidi t y of knowledge is 
cardinal to t he attainment of the good . I n thi s 
sense truth may be made a separat e i nquiry. The good . 
is d i s covcil'ed through the t ruth. But truth i s 
i nst rumental, i n the concrete gr owth of mi c d, t o the 
go ,d. Knowlt:;dge can only lose its instrumental 
charact e r if i t is made i tself the good . Ward 
considers thi E; i mp ose i b le becaus e of the emo t i c·nal and 
moto r aspects of experi sr: ce . Knowledge i mp li ee; more 
thar,. itsel f and ce.x:;not be ma.de the comp l et e good. 
The eudaemonis t j_c ideCl,l , t he ideal of the whole per son., 
is th e only true good . To it know l edge i s i nstru-
ment a l. In this sense all knowledge is practical . 
Th i s type of anthropon.o r phism makes knowledge 
p ractica l i n a very widA s ense . It seems a necessary 
aspect of War d 's theory of t he natu re o f the growth of 
.r~ owJedge . It is i mp li e<l i n hi s ant hropor110r phi sm . 
CHAPTER XI 
CO NTINUUM OR MAf:: IFOLD? 
Are Sensations Extended? 
1. War d confesses that he was long i n doubt about 
the p rob lem _of ext r.::n si ty . He finally dec i ded for it 
becaus e he consider ed that without it there could be 
no differentiation . This is strange considering tha t 
he subscr i bes to Kant's dynam i c theory of matter . 
Appar ently extensity is a funct iona :J. cres.t i on . Yet 
Wara treats i t as if it wer e th e char act eri st ic of a 
structure wh ich is distinct frow the functi cn that acta 
upon it. Th e theory of peychoplasm is the extreme 
form of this theory of st ructure . 
If it be true that there i s a psychoplasm, then 
the assumpti on of ext er.·si ty would be a va l id one . 
But we hav6 seen reason s for doubting this theory. 
Presentati ons ar e not substances ; t hey are 
modifics,tions of functi on . If so, then there: may be 
diffe rentiati on without ext er.s ity. Differ entiati on 
is due to the power of discrimi nat ion. Synthesis i r:J 
t he f unctiona l unity which may fo llow this 
diecri ~ ine.tion . Stil l Ward JT. ight cont end that t his 
would not account for the extensive aspect of spac e . 
J a.mee , Kfilpe , St out, and Stump f c ons i der tha.t 
sensat i on s ha ve ext ens i ty . Their a r e.;11merct for 
exteLsity is i dent ica l wi th that of Ward : t he perc ept i on 
of spe.ce is i mpos s iblt: without a,n unde rivecl extens ity 
~hich be l o gs t o each s ensati on . Ward is i n good 
peychologice, l co mpan y vvhen h e espous es t his vi e1; . 
But this doct rine l eads him i n ·Go peculia r d iff iculti es . 
Ward d i d not see how the percept i on of spac e was 
possible without a genuine fi eld of continu ous 
se-.. BC:,t icns . Mer·ely c ompr ese:nt s ense.ti cn.e would not 
fu r nish the ext ensi t y which charc-.c t e riz ee spac e-
percepti c·n . Since Ward it::: i n s ci enti fic th eory a 
mo ado l ogist, this ext ensity mu st be ph enomena l. It 
eeen s th~t hi s positi on is mor e near l y r e lat ed t o 
Kant 1 e than wo·uld appe&.r at fir s t sight. What h e 
·w i shes t o deny i s t he man ifold o f s er.s<:<,ti crJs which 
th~ mi nd gives a epa i al for m by ite own activity. 
I n his s hG.rp d ietin. ct:i.cn bet wee.-n pr eGEmtati '·n an d 
E.~,.tt - .nticn > h e attr i but •.:5 6 mor ~· t o the presente.tion t han 
Kant does t o t he s ensati on . The essence o f h i e vi ew 
seems t o be: the s ensati on has no ex i s t enc e i n wh ich 
it i s not a p r esent at i on . 
If v·; e con sider t his fundamen ta l aspect o f We.rcl 1 s 
theory i n th e l ight o f the general theory of 
p r er:ent a.t i c·ns which we hav e develor:ed as Wa1' d 1 s truest 
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theory , i.e., t he theory that sensations are mental, 
we shal l f i nd that th€: meaning of Ward ' s vi ew of 
t · t · · · f' i t I w , i ~ tl + ex e s 1 y lS very s1gn1~ cem . a ra. cons a.e rs 1au 
mor e t han the qua.l itative a.spects of space-pe rc eption 
a r e non- r e lational , i . e., not a synthesi s of parts. 
For Ward' s psychology there i s no stimu l u s which 
prec eeds t he presentatiou . Vi ewed in this light , 
his doctrine i s not un like Lot ze's. Sensor y presen-
tat ions always have a char acteristic by which they are 
locat ed wi t hin a whole which i s the t otal ity of 
seusory intuition. Ward 's theory i a essentially 
Kant i an . The extensity is due to the appee.r ance of 
r ea l ity t o mind. Of COlJ_r s e Wct. r d ' s theo ry do eE> not 
make e. shB.rp s epar ati on between e.pp ea r ar:ce and r eal i t y. 
Rea l i ty i s i mme.nent ill percepticn . But Ward holds 
firmly t o the Kant i an theory that percept8 ar·e 
appearance to mind . When t hi~ is c l ear t he f ac t that 
he c ol~ side r s s ens t< .. tic:ne ext ens ive loses its fec1,rfulnees. 
Th e essenti <3,1 diffe r ence betvieen Ward and Kaut i n this 
respect l i es i n the difference of source fr om · wh ich 
ext ensity arises . For Kant it is a f orm gi ven to 
s -en s a. t i cn s by the mind . For Ward , a t l eas t i n his 
Earl i er writ ings , i t i s th~ charact er i atic of 
s o:;n s · ti cn s becams e t hey are given to mind a,e a modi-
ficat i on of mi nd. Sens &. t i or;. s and hen ce senso ry 
, 
charact eri stics are the result of two or more subjects 
functiouing together. 
Ward' a doctrine of an extendea. p l s,am s eems untrue 
to the essenc e of hj.s monadology. But the refutatton 
of the theo ry of a sensory manifold which p r e cedes 
perc eption i s sound. Th e theor y of the p l asm we 
r e ject; the refutation of the manifold seems a 
fundamental con~ribution to psychological theory. 
I s the Principle of Continuity Valid? 
2 . The principle of continuity s eemz to be the 
one speculative nrincip l e i n Wa rd 's general method. 
Cons idering t hat i t is speculativ e ~ it i s sur pr ising 
that he never made e. more thorough expos iti on of it s 
s i gnificance and statu s for hi s system . 
However~ it may be tha t Ward int ended that the 
mean i ng of t he p rincip l e of con t j_nui ty should be: it 
i s sound method t o p r oceed without break unless ther e 
is emp irical evidenc e t o the contrary . Th er e are 
n:any passages which ha ve t his coloring . But Ward 
oft en t ends t o give the prir .. cip le more than a 
methodologica.l mean ing. That i s because a 
methodological prL.ciple always has it s i nfluenc e upon 
the sci enc e i n which it i s u sed. 
Ward seems correct when he cons ider s that without 
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this principle it wou ld b~ difficult to extend t he 
bou~ds of science . It is a valuable methodological 
princip l e provided it means t hat we must move wi t hout 
br·~ak from the known t o the unknown , l ear nL.:.g the 
unknown i n terms of the known. But its application 
is a difficult one. 
Ward ' s moat striking use of the principle of 
continuity is i n a.pp li cc-~tj_ on t o the conception of the 
psychologi ca l i ndividua l. This is not only it s moat 
striki n_g use , but in connect ion wi th Ward' s 
Lame.rckianism , it s most dubious us e . Granted t hat-
the functional a c t ivity of tl.1e dominant monad me.y 
modify the structure of the bre.in by sympa th~t ic 
r a.-,:>po rt, it is not necessary upon Ward's theory that 
this direct modification be i nherit ed . The proc ess 
mi ght be mo r e indirect, and yet c e,rry out his theory 
of continuity . 
If advanc i ng exper-i ence does i nflu en ce -- as 
Ward thinks it do es - - success i n obtainin~ 
. c 
food, the method of struggl e, and geographical 
distribution, then ms.ting is i !ldirectly influenc ed by 
experi ence. If so> ther e is g round for the 
experiential modification of creat ive advance, apart 
from the direct inhe ritance of a cquir ed charact eristics. 
We only po i nt t his out as an a1ternative hypothesis, 
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wh ich is cons istent with Ward ' s g~neral c onc er t i on o f 
Ae to i ts biologica l val i d it y we can not 
dec j_de . 
g;;,ne t ic r: xr; lanat i ·~·T" imp oBfJ i bl e ? Thi s i s Ci,L i nrr. ,or ta.r:t 
queet i 0r, si~ c A ~ard ' e p eycholo~ical th~o ry i s an 
8,tte r::-~: t to pr es "-:r:t The Orig i n o f t h. Sr.H~ci e s psycho-
lo g ic ~·,lly , trc..o in:~. the s t er e o f tlv~ clev "< l o ~ ment o f 
exp1.;:ri en c e f r oru i ts meG ·, r en,o t e b~ r; ir::n ings t o the 
l <Sv e l of marJ . Thi s briLge t o our a-Gt s:r~t i cn an 
c c.::::n-::.ecti c:r:. wi th h i s g r:m<::ral the ory. I nher i tar~ or> 
c ons ists ir a eynth ~e i s of t~ o p l asma . With Ward ' s 
of s ynth o::sis . '' li[lf1 
i nh eritan c e of acqu ir ed charaot ~ r i et io 0 . 
s e eE t o do vi c l e~c p to hi e c entr a l thes i s . The 
CN~tinui t y i e not eo obvious, but the adve.r..ce r ema ins 
that i t i s by m~ar:ds o f a p ecullar ty-y:·~ o f e~/nt lv:.- e i t:· 
which iLvolve s bo th r pc er t ive and mo t or f eatur e s . 
Li ke nn.1ch o:t:. h j_ ghly sr~~cin.liz c;d e xre ri enc e , th e 
synt hesis v,rh ich rc b:::;;. p oss i ble h e redity i e SJ: :ecj_e.lized. 
psychology to make pos s i ble this type of exp l anat i on 
is a fu ller development of the conception of the 
Anlage and ge1.1er e.l sex experi enc e . 
Consider ed i n thi s l ight, t he princip le of 
corr espondence he. s distinct valu e . Of cours e , it c <:m 
be unduly: stressed. Ward hi1 s elf r ecogniz es the;,t 
structure ls.gs behind funct i (.)n. But the obvious 
success of methodological psycho-physical parallelism 
i n laboratory pr actice s eems to i ndicat e that 
corr espondence has some general va lidi t y. Its value 
for Ward li es i n the f act that it i ndicat es tha t 
grov-1th is fr om the simple t o the complex. That l eads 
u s to the app lication of the princi;lle of continuity 
to th e r elati on of sensations. 
cont inuum? 
Do sensati ons form a 
Do Sensations Form a Continuum? 
3. If we avoid the t erm ext ens ity, since it is 
conn'9cted with the conception of psychoplasm, our 
question p re~ent s itself i n this form: is ther e i n 
perception a gr a.dual advance i n the discrimi ne,t i on of 
local signs? One of Ward's most signal contributions 
to p sycho logy seems to be the stress he places upon 
t he r~lation of· th e cont i nua of sensations to the 
problem of perception . These s ensory continua are 
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expla.ne.to ry, but do not as cont inua f or m parts of 
co!lsciousness . It i s t he whole fi e ld of consciousness 
wh ich dete r mi nes t he. numb -::1r of different sens<:'.ti ons 
tha.t may be pe rceived at one mom"'nt. The s -?-r:. eor y 
c o ..  tinua explain the r elati oE of members of the same 
qua litat i ve group of sensations to any one loc<:i.l sign . 
This theory of ~he incop r eaentabi l ity of members of the 
sD.me sensory cont inuurn it! a ve ry strong a spect of Ward ' s 
continuum theory. 
If we grant t h i s much of Ward's theory, we can 
e£-.!.s ily s ee that t he d.iffe1·en tiaticn of quali ties ie 
close ly connected with discrimi 1ation of l ocal eigne . 
Ward doe s not conside r the local signs a p riori ; they 
are distinc ti ons or discriminations i n t act ua~ 
6911Sat iOl1S. That t he c o r ~ cr et e i ndividual always he,s 
a ce rtain a mount of su ch di sc rimi nation Ward would 
grant. He only c ont ends that d i scrimination becomes 
gr eat 5r with the advance of experience . Th e 
exp e rimeEta ca rri ed out by Dr. Rivers and Dr. Head in 
nerve division se em to confir m Ward 's vi ew of the 
genes i s of local s i gn s fr om an originally but 
part i ally diffar enti~t ed t a c t ual s ensory fi e ld. 1 
It mus t be r emembered that t h is gre.due. l d ifferentiation 
depends upon t 'he structure of that organization of 
lBrain , 31(1908), 323-450. 
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monads called the n ervous system . If this theory of 
dependence is corr ect, then the deveJ.opment from 
simple to comp lex discriminat ior of local sj_ gna seems 
to be correct. The general principle of 'correspon-
de_ca' seems to i ndicate the general val idity of Ward's 
theory of deve lopment. 
As sumi ng that all sensations are l9c~ted by the 
general tactuhl field, does it n ecessari l y fol l ow that 
the sensory fie ld is a continuum? From the genetic 
point of vi ew it do es seem c lear that the c o~tinuum is 
the l i mit i:lg concepti on from which we must proc eed in 
explanation of d(::velopment. In the case of analytic 
psychology the continuum conc eption is not quite so 
c lea..r. However W~rd•e i llustration of the body 
submerged in o. war m ba.th indicates the typ e of c onti r~ui ty 
that stil l underlies our advanced and complex s ensory 
l 1 . .t. . 1 
- OC8..t.1Zavl011 . In so f a r as the co~t inuum of local 
signs controls th e whole orientation of other sensations, 
we might well say that the sen sory fi eld is a highly 
differentiated continuum. From the epistemological 
po int of vi ew this is a phenomenal fi :~ ld. Psycho l ogi-
cally it is at a certa in level of ex rience the 
i ndividual's wo r ld . As Lei bniz s~~ys speaking from 
the ep ist emological point of vi ew -- "He who s ees all 
1Psychological Princip l es , pp. 78 ,79. 
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c ould r ead in each what i s happ eni ng ev · ryv-vhere . " 1 
Bu t f or the i Edi v idual a;t the se:1se le-vel subj ect and 
c bj ect a r e the univ e r se , the object or whole of 
pre s entations is his world . This latter po i nt o f 
view is a psychological one . Pre s ent at i ons are the 
world. 
War d 's theory o f the cor.:.tinuum i s a valuable 
con tribution t o th e th eo ry of mental growth. It is 
particular ly il l uminating i r.:. reference to the c onc ep-
t ion of local signa. We ~hall now turn t o the p roblem 
of its relation t o i deation and i n t e l lect ion . 
1Monado l ogy, secti on 61. 
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CHAPTEE XII 
GENESIS OR FACU LTIES? 
I s I deation Evolved from Presentations? 
l. We f ound i n our expos i ticm of Ward ' s genetic 
theory that the continuum can neve1· be considered c-.s 
absolutely undifferent i at ed . The undifferentiat ed 
continuum i s a limit which i s never reached. Vard 
begins his expos itic·n with the assumpti on that 
emp irica l psychology cannot deal wi-iih exper i ence which 
does not involve at least a slight diffe r entiaticn 
between perceptual objects i n gener al and motor 
obj ec-ts which stand i n contrast to them. 
makes this a ssumpti on is i ndicat ed by the f e,ct tha.t 
he begins his genetic account wi th experie~c e so far 
·laborat ed. Although he postulat es th e bar e monad 
and cons i ders that the bare monad's continuum is 
undiffer ent i ated , 1 yet he does not begin with the 
undifferent iat ed s enso ry f i ~ld . 
It se~ms that assimilation is really a kind of 
recognit i on. Ward does not exp l a i n how assimilation 
a.r i sAB. That i s a par t of the p l asticity of the 
lcontemporary British Philosophy, p . 45. 
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p r esen"ttt·;:; ior1s.1· co:-... t i nuurn . Ward r ecogniz ee that th6re 
i s no level of exp eri enc e Vi i th wh:i.ch emp iri cal 
paycho~ogy deals wh ich do es net exhibit ecme degre~ of 
as s i mi lati 1in . Thus r ecogni t iorJ of sc.rt1e forrn is 
r:r (;, 8ent i n a l l expe ri ence wi th which emp irical 
psychology deale . When this a epect of War d ' s actual 
method i s c lear > we see that i deati on i s t o some degree 
i m:r·lici t i n the p r es en tat :l. onal c or.~.tinuuru . That i s t he 
r ~as n that Wa rd a cknowl edges t hat all p r~sent at i on 
iLvo~ve D r e- p r esent ation . Aa gr owth exper i enc e 
i nvolves the r e- presentation of the past . Memory and 
i deati on are the deve lopment of t h is r e cogn i tion 
aspect of e:~eri ence i nto a body of s eparate 
pr ~,sentat ions. This t heo ry seems consistent with 
Ward ' s theory of development . But it c or~ f l ict s with 
his theory of p eychoplasm. 
It is not clear how idee,tion can be e1e,borat d 
fr om that plasm wh ich is the bra i n monade pr esented 
directly to the perc e iving s e lf. However, if we are 
correct i n our i nt er p r et ati oc of the natur e of t he 
presentation as implied in Ward's monadi st ic position > 
then the presentational continuum is not composed of 
mon~.ds but i s the manner i n whi ch the p erc eiving s eJ. f 
e.pprehende its subor di ne.t es, the monads wh ich compose 
the bra i n . I deati on , acc ording to this t heory> is 
accordi ngly the elabo r ation aLd dev~ lopm ent of one 
a spect of perc ept ion . Aseimilatj on was the r e even 
i n tho ~arli ex stages . Ideation i s the dev- lopruent 
by s e l ecti o~ of this aap ect o f pe rcepti on . I n othe r 
wordc , ideation is a specialization of that which is 
p r esent to some ext ent i n all expe ri ence . 
Ho w such specialization is possible is ·-nuch 
c lear e r upon the bas is of Ward ' s early th eo ry of mind 
than upon the basis of his lat er th"'ory of exp '3 ri •5nc e . 
Strictly taken, his lat e r t :.1eo ry would mee.n that the 
icleati oL.a l cor tinuum is a nsw organizs,tion of n:or~ c~d.s . 
D .a t hat mean that new monads a r e developed or taken 
fr om the environment for that purpose? WC~.r u s e"'ms to 
i mp ly that the ide atic·i1al cc1nti nuum is n ot the 
funct i c:::,al r e lati on o f monads . His theo ry s eems to 
be that it is mental i n struc ture . Such a hypothe sis 
is or .. l y possible up or~ a theory o f pre..., .. ntat t on s as 
~ ent a l. On the oth er hand it would be difficu lt to 
deve lop a thGory of ideati on as a r e lation of monads . 
It i s n ot e·worthy that t he id-eation al c ontinuum is 
not di ffe r tn:.tiat ecl so much as devel~ped into a. 
continuum. It is devs lop d fro m that wh ich ie no t a 
continuum, i. e . , fr om a me!11ory th r eC;?,d. Under such 
circur:i6t ance s ide ;;.tic-n is not a continuum i n the sanie 
s ens E-> o f the word a s sense objects are . I t would 
hcv ~ be~n well if th ere had been sorn w other t er m 
with whi ch to charac~~riz e ideati o~ bes i des the term 
'contirmurn '. It has, howev""'r, one advantage : it 
atr~ssea th~ cvntinuity i nvolved i n id at i on . 
Bu'G it does no t make cl e8-r the i mport ant aspect of 
Wa~d ' s th~ory : i deation is synthetic. Th e 
prc :3 entat i onal co:nt_j_nuum i s a un ity which is gradua lly 
differentiat ed; i deati on i s a development of one 
a sp -ct c- f the :pr esent at i o<1al c ent inuurn i nto a new 
type of contiLui ty . Hence ideation i s not like the 
Le ibn j.zia.n con·tinuum wh ic~1 is d ivisible a d i nfi n itum. 
I·u is a cont i nuum, however , in the sense that it i s 
no t a mani fo ld . This is i nd ir s ctly i nd icat ed by the 
f act the.t time is an aspect of ide8,ti onaJ. exper i enc e . 
Wa.rd. ' e st r ess upon ideation as a c ont i nuum which 
i s vf..ry distinct fr Oi:l the pr ec:;entatioLal ccet i nuum 
make~ it diffi cult f or him t o show the or gan ic 
r~ J.ation of p •rception and i deati on . He does 
carefully tra c e the cont i nuit y; but he l eaves the 
relati o1:: of percept i cn a .. d i deation a t th e l evel 
when bo"th are h i ghly ds ve:loped - - uncl~-.~.r. If 
i dQat i cn we r e not c ons idered as a highly discret 
continuum, but r a ther as organic to p e- rc eption, i. _., 
as a un ique cont i nui t y whlch i s dev-e: loped ou~ of and 
yet r ema ins organ ic to pe rc epti on , Ward ' s theor y of 
i de~ti oL wou ld not p r esent a dis continuity betw ~n 
these ·t wo aspect~;~ of experi enc e . His me thod i s at 
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th i 13 point too analyti c. The i mpo rta.~t thine; is just 
thi s c onr.~ ection of p~rc <=- ption and ide<i ti on. This is 
th e very po i nt which WarU. doee1 not .::>xp licj_t ly dev "" l op . 
Howev ,~ r , h e do es r Acognize t he d ifficult y wh i ch we: 
ar ~ now c oLs ide r i n g . But would th . r ~ have be~n so 
shar an antithesis if t ne method u sed ha·i be ~n 
d i ff s r ent ? What i s iElpo rt ~nt is not the diff .:.. ren ce 
be tv1ee;n percer .. tion and i deati on but their r ele.t ion. 
Possibly Ward f ai l s i n h i e u su al st r ess u pon 
dev e lopment to make explicit even to himself the whole 
which is being evo l ved . 
I s I n te llection Evo l v ed f rom Ideatio~ ? 
2 . Ward u ses the t e r m 'logic ' t o d~not e th e most 
abstract elements o f knowledge . He c or.t siders that 
it dee,ls only wi th the laws of s ynthesis . Thus l og ic 
l i ke mathems,tics i s absolut e ly certain kncw l edge. 
I ts prov i n c e i s abst r a ct univ ~rsals . Of cours , 
knowl Qdge is wider than the p rov inc e of abst r a ct 
u n i v -e rsals . But for Ward thought-kLowl edge or 
i Ltellectior-' is o-;:-~ly th e knowledge of logic and 
ma-themat ic s . Th is k-nowledge is distinct from 
i d eation. Concrete kn owledge i nv olves ideat i on . 
Although i ntel l 6cti on i s d i st inct from ideation , it i s 
d ~ rived fr om i deation . Ward trac es th e steps o f this 
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gen~s i s with some care . This develoTment makee 
possible the r eal izatio1 of such relation s as ar e 
f or mally i mr: li od i n all thought but a r ::: no t made 
explicit until th e y are &. be~;ractly p rese1ted. This 
abst r action makes poss i ble the cont rol o f i eation in 
t e r r s of norms. This is concrete t h i nki ng. such 
c oncrete thought obvi ously i nvolves i maginat i on . 
Hel'S again Ward i s stressing analysis, but wi th 
more justificati o::':!. than i n the c ase o f the separation 
of pe rce1,tion and ideati o-::1 . Ward is juetifiJd i n 
this analysis just becaus e logic an.d math ematics , in eo 
far as they are forrna1 , do stand il.t she.r·J oppositi on 
t o concret ~ thought. Of course we a r e using the 
t e r m 'logic' i n Ward ' s sense. Th is leads us to a new 
po int: are the forms of logic archetypal r ather than 
constitutive? 
Ward thinks that the forms of logic ar e derived 
from sens e and ide at i o.~ a.l r elati ons. Yet 
int~l lecti on i s p rimarily archetypal. Ward's theory 
s eems to be that the simplicity of t he logical and 
mathwm~tical for~e is a creat ed homogene ity. The8 e 
f o r ms ar e abstracted fr om sens e and ideati on and a r e 
cr ... at i vely standcudi zed. If thi s be true , then i t 
is ha!'d to see how the categorie s can be constitutive. 
War d r ecogni zes that they are specifications for 
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action . In thi s sensa t h~ cat egori es are the norms 
of thought. But -th e ca,t ego ri ee a r e not the laws of 
ac tual i t y. War d can hctrdly consist ently mai nt a i n 
th is posit i on . He himself develop s a t heo ry of logic 
wh ich i nvolves the real and axiologica l ca t egori ,es . 
Of course these categori es are not merely formal. I t 
i s the break between t he di ffere~t types of cat egories . 
which r eveal s the inadequacy of t his theory of 
cognit i on . 
Ward ' s theory of the app lication of tha f ormal 
categori es is not enti r e ly c lear . Although these 
catego ri es are a ssumed t o be archetypa l rather than 
coneti ·tu t ive , yet i n applice.ti on to -di stinct i ndividua l s 
the categori es of numbAr ar e absolut ely val i d. The 
number of perc e ived i ndividua ls may be absolutely 
kr_ wn . Many t h ues Wa rd seems to mean tha,t numbe r 
c annot be appli ed ae uni veraally as i s usually assu med. 
Ev en. if this be grant ed, it is f a r from the poe i t ion 
of C~.rchetypes . It is t o be r ~gret ted t hat Ward did 
not make his epist emo logy c learer , espec i ally aa his 
theo ry of the appli cation of mathemati cs to perc ept ion 
is vital t o the understanding of h is attacks upon 
natur al i sm . I t may be that he outreached himself 
when he made physic s into a me r e ly statistica l sc i ence . 
Thi e \Vould make exp l anatory phy s ic s i mposs ible . 
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If our analysi s ha s been cornwt, War d 1 s defr::ct 
i n met hod is t oo extreme a us e of analysis. The 
or ganic s ynthesis which we meet i n concr ~t e experi enc e 
i s sometimes lost sight of. Th e disc ontinuity i s 
no t in the t heo ry of perc eption . Th e cont il"l.uum 
doctrine pr events that. But t here is a disccnt i nui t y 
i mp li ed i n the theory of psychop la,sm, an extreme 
embodiment of t he mo r ;;; radical theory of t he s eparation 
of the self from pre:sentatiuns. Ward was i n f lu enc ed 
too much by t he p r e sentationalism which he was trying 
t o r ~ fute . Thus, a lthough h e escaped a doctrine of 
a multitude of facu lt i es , he developed a theory whi ch 
separ ates the s elf from its experi ences. I nstead of 
s ev~ ral faculti es , we have several types of 
p r esentations . These di ff e r ent types of pre sentat i ons 
a r e never shown t o be i n organic unity:. Thus , 
i n stead of faculti es we have diffe r ent genera of 
pres entati ons. Ward ' s theory, like Aristotle 's, i s 
defective~ i n its sharp separ at i on of structure and 
functi on . 
We have n ot essayed t o criticize Ward's monadic 
theory of the aelf. Thi s is the bas ic concept of 
Ward's ayst ~m of psychology . Rather , W•;; ha.ve 
a ttempt ed to int ... rpret certa i n of his theori es of 
p res ~ntations i n the l ight of this bas ic con cept. 
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This p rocedure haa th e advant age of develop i ng t he 
evaluat io. i n t er ms of e. mor ;::; COinplete expoei tion of 
War d ' s fundamental method. The concept of t he 
monadic self ia War d ' s bas ic hypothes is. Our attempt 
has been to expound and criticize his psychologica l 
m~thod i n r e lation to this bas ic h)Totheeis. To 
eva luate the - "Fons rerum substantiatoriae Monas " i s 




1 . All of the i mpo rtant discu ssions of W rd ' s 
cc 1tinuum have been critica l r a ther than expository . 
Also none of them have traced the historical 
c on~~cti ons of the concept ion , no r_ have they 
cons ider ed War d ' a theor y of cant j_nu i ty i n the light of 
hie basic conception of knowl ~dge . Th ey disregar d 
his anthropomorphic method . 
2 . The hi sto ry of the cont i nuurn theory r evec.:.ls 
Le i bni z' s con cept i on as sj_gn i f:Lc ard; f or the 
underata.r.~.d ing of Ward . 
c o~tinuity r ather tht':l..n 
notion which War d u ses . 
However, i t ie the law of 
t he speci fic mathemat ica l 
3. The first postulat e of War d ' s th eory of 
knowledge is eE>sentially anthroy,:.omor ph i o: that which 
psycho l ogy discovers t o be th e f a cta about knowledge 
er·ist emology must ac c el)t as true . Knowledge has two 
~ ales of c er~ainty: sense- knowl edge , th e wor ld as 
i mmedi s.t e ly appr ehended by the experi ent ; and thought-
knowledge , the abstract knowlE>dge of f or mal logic and 
mathematics. Pure t hought- knowledge does no t give 
us the i nt8r y.. r etati c:n of r eality. Thi s i s only 
obtained through t h e i nt erpr etaticE of pe rc eptj_c.n in 
t e r ms of self-consciousnes s . Such a. method of 
int c. :cr r etati or< is a progr essj_v e aprr eh enEi i On of th A 
unknown i n t £:: r ms of t h e known. This is the pri~cipl e 
of c ont :i.nui t y e. s imp li ed in War d ' s anthror ... ornorphic 
theo ry of know l edge . 
4. The standpoint of p syche- l ogy is individual istic. 
'a r d ' s psychology, hoNev er, r e jecte the theory of 
subj ·=-ctive modificati ui.lS which the i ndividualis t ic 
st E.ndpo i n t of Berkeley involves . The stand:r;;oint of 
r; sychology comp e l s r e oogn i ti on of the prin cip l e o f 
oont il~ui ty . Sheer dieccntircuity has n o meani n g from 
t he star:dp ir.~t of exper i en c e a s indi vi dualiet ic . 
The embodiment of thi (:; typ e of ex:f.> lanation is the 
fiction of the p sycho logic~>.l i ndi vi dua,l, an i ma g i nQ,ry 
i ndi vj. dual who has de veloped all the comp l exity of his 
exp ri ence in one unbroken life,. 
5 . Along with the method of continui t y Warcl u s e s 
ana l ys is to det er mine the eaeentia l f actors of an y 
exp~rl ence what s oev er. Thes e factor s e,r e subj ect and 
ob j c~ct . . The obj ects of experi enc e a r e p r esentaticr•.s 
by virtue of the f~ct that they are p r Bsent ed to a 
subject ; the ~:mbj ect of exp e.ri e;nc e is the subj ect 
because pr esentc;~ti <.• lJ. a aro given to. it. The subj ect is 
a functi cr:..al unity which atten ds to p r esE:nt ed obj ects. 
Pre8entati or: s ar e th e. structur e wh i ch th e functi~ nal 
su b j ect mo l d e . 
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6. S ene~:t icrj. S f o r m s e v ::.: r al class .s, e.g., co l or e, 
sound& , tast es , etc~ If the qualiti es of an y one o f 
t h er-.;e c lass e s a r e p r e .... ;ent ed tn a graduat ed seri es --
1 much e.s Hume su gge sts in A T:r eatise o f Human Nature --
it w i l~ be found that they form a continuum. The 
c ont i r.uum of tactuElil s e ,, sati cn e is uniqu e i n s o f a r 
as ar of its .er,:bers are p r e sent ed t ogether. It is 
not ewo rthy tha t only one mer:iber of t he sanie c on t i nuum 
o f sene~tio~ s cart be associat ed with the same p lac e 
at t h e same tinJe . It is th t: tactua l c ent i nuum which 
narks the loc a lity of othe r se~ s at1on s. Al l 
s ene:}.t i ons ha ve ext er• i ty aLd f o r t his r eason a t any 
o~- 6 moment a l J. c cmpr e sent s ensat i.cn s ar!?- mutuall y 
exc lueiv~ , but ar ~;: . partE of on e extensive ccr.:.ti r:.uum. 
The l a v o f cor. t L _ui t y r- ,;;. r n:its th .:: r ec ogl-::. itic.• ... l of no 
b r .;:a.l<:s with i r t h is · c ont :.Luous fi eld . I n sc.rr:e o f hi s 
earl i e r wr i.tir g s Ward a s cribt:s 1: ro t ~z.. si t y or dura,t i c•n 
t o t h i s s eiHw ry oont ii:utL of a ll our s en s a t i ons . In. 
hi s lat~r writin g s p r ot ensi t y i s made t h e charact eri s tic 
o f a ~ tE;rt ti cn rat h e l' than of t lw cont i nuum i tse l f. 
Thus the pr ese t e t i c.Ltal c ontir.uun~ i s the ext ens ive 
fi e l d of a ll conwr eseP t s ensati ons . 
7. I n our own i mm ed i e.t e experi enc e we ha ve 
ev i ' ence of ad.vanc o fr on; t h o les s c ompl ex t o th e mo r e 
1Book i. part i, s ec t i on 1. 
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complex. At terlticn diffe:re _,t i.atee and i nt egrates the 
present&.t ic·nal con t inm .. un . It is not ic e~.ble that 
th ~rb i s a correspondeDc e bet ween the gr owth of mi~d 
and tha: of body . Ward use s this parallelism as a 
clue to the ge.~eraJ. f orm of all r a cial developments 
of exper i ence.. Th e p rincip l e of 'correspondenc e ' 
togeth6 r with the law of continuity l eads Ward t o 
aseunje that het erog r:ne i ty has d. evelored fro m 
homogeneity . The undiffsrer.tia.t ~d pr E;sentational 
co tinuum is the limiting t erm of genetic explanatioP. 
The t ~ rrn ' pr esentational continuum' is eometj_m e u sed 
to denot e thi s genetic l i mit ; it is sometimas u s ed i n 
th e me r e genera l s ense of the whole ext e~s iv t ccnt i rill ity 
of s .nsi:; .. t ior;e which is i rmnec.liately appreheLded as 
obj ectiv (-:; . In both cas ~~ th~r e is no assignable 
l i mit t o the continuum. 
8. Genetic psycho logy must exple.in th e. deve lopmen t 
of tht: higher forms of ex12eri enc e fr(.ll!l th e homogeneous 
senso ry cont i nuum wh ich the conat ive subje:ct acts 
upon by means of att enticn. First the active and 
r e ceptive s enso ry obj ects bec ome distinct. The active 
presentbtions a r e stre sses and tenaion s whcia6 
ext eLaive charact eristi c is almos t nothing. Voluntary 
attenticn elaborates these presentations into a 
co:r:t ir1uum. 
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Due t c the specialization of s elec ti ve att ~,rlti cTt 
a di s t i r ct cont :.n.uum is graclue. lly deve leo r~ ed whi ch is 
c o npose.d of the r ep r oductiv e asp ects of the :p r .s enta-
tic·nEt.l cor:tiLuurn. At first th ere is only a mP.mory 
thread, not a c ont i nuum p rop er. Gr adually , through 
selective control , the thread is dev e loped i nto an 
ideationa l c ontinuum. The f lexib i l i t y o f this 
co: tt i r- uun ma.kes ross i b l e the man i pulat i on of i dea s i n 
t e rr!Js of a selecti ve l y i naug1..1.rat t: d order. The 
highe st f orm of t his c ontrol, f ound ir thought-
kr:.owl e.:dge , is i:nt ~J.lect~_('n . 
9 . In o ::c ller to account for the c ompl exity of the 
preuentbtiona l contiLuum with whi ch the expe ri ent 
b6g in~, and also provide for the con t i r_,_ui ty i ndico.t ed 
by the hypothesis of the psy cholog ica l i ndi v idu a l, 
Ward elabo rat es the theory of psychoplasm, th e p l asm 
whiGh th e exp er i en t r eceiv es fr om his ancestors as a 
structur e already e l abo r at ed . Thi s p l asm makes 
pose ible th e u se o f th e material of gen e ral p sychology 
i n the: psycho logy of the concre t e i ndividual . It i e 
the i mmediat e obje-c t of the expe r i ent . In highly 
develop ed exp erh:nce thi s pls,sm i s -.vhat t he physi-
ologis t fro m hi t:1 ext t:~ rnal standpoint terms the: bra i n . 
I n War d ' s panpsychism psychoplasm i s a functi onally 
uni'G t' cl gro'll.p of subjects i n r e l&,ticn to thE: p e rc e iv ing 
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subj ect or self. Hence preeentati o~ is a r e lat i cn 
of au b j H; t s . 
10. War d ' s ear l i e r theo ry of presentat i ons aa 
menta l se · 16 to be mor e consistent with hi s theory o f 
mat eria s ecunda th~m the later doct rine of psychoplasm. 
Psychoplasm as a structure distir ct from the perceiving 
experi ent can hardly be an ' appeara.nce ' to the 
perceivtng se lf. 
1:. Ward ' s theo ry of the present ati 0nal con t inuum 
as exte1 aive is cor:.sist e.nt so long ae: the contj_ .uum is 
considered to be phenomenal . It rJr es ent s 
difficulties when i n t erpr e;tecl by mec-ms of th e theor y 
of p sychople.sm . The cont ir1uum thecry is to e· ri g i dly 
i nterpr etecl by the princi .le of conti ... uity. 
Cont i~uity might be mor e i ndirectly found and yet be 
va l id. Ward ' s central thesis of progre s sive 
discrilr, i nati c:n and mental gr owt h is, however, 
cone istent with hi s gener al theo ry. 
12. The genesis of idea.t i cn is parti cularly 
obscure wh en vi ewe d. i n . , -r;n e light of th e theory. of 
psychoplasm: how can i ma,g i na t i on b e developed out of 
a p lasm of r a la.t ed. monc-~ds . But if perc ept i o.lf5 ar e 
menta l and i nvo l ve r e-pr asent~ti on , the genes1s of 
ideati cn is not so obscure. Ward a l so severs thought-
knovi l e:clr;:;e too sharr,~ ly fr om percept ion and i de&,t i on . 




r.:.. c t be ~r~ r-· 1" :;: -r,_r2_ C..'l'lS l~r de1: s lcr ~ ed. . 
thr'- :r rir.:. c i f l e· \) f c cr: t ::..r.ui ty ae f cuncl d.e v e lopf'd i L 
math~rna~i ca l rhys i cs ~ I t i s a l s o r ~ lat ed t o Ward ' s 
ovm cc:- ,o epti cn of th ::· r, ri::: .~ c i' 1 6 of ocntir..uj_ty : 
wi th wh ich it beg i Le . But hi e; r s y cho l o~:y o f the 
Th sr= .. tv1c :ro L:·, t s o f vi ~! '.'v· E·.r e not c or:.s i :::.t er ..:t l y 
c o::..'ir:: l c. .. t e c.l . 
status o f the c c~ ti~uum iLd~ fin i te . 
are i Lc one i ateLt wi th ~h i & r e l at i 0ral t h eor y . Only 
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